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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to examine the debate between Quine and Boolos over the 
logical status of higher-order logic—with Quine taking the position that higher-logic is more 
properly understood as set theory and Boolos arguing in opposition Üiat higher-order logic is of a 
genuinely logical character. My purpose here then will be to stay as neutral as possible over the 
question of whether or not higher-order logic counts as logic and to instead focus on the 
exposition of the debate itself as exemplified in the work of Quine and Boolos.
Chapter I will be a detailed consideration of Quine’s conception of logic and its place 
within the wider context of his philosophy. Only once this backdrop is in place will I then 
examine his views on higher-order logic. In Chapter II, I turn to Boolos’s response to Quine— 
his attempt to examine the extent to which we may want to count higher-order logic as logic and 
the extent to which we may want to count it as set theory. With each point Boolos raises, I 
attempt to give what I think would have been Quine’s reply. Finally, in Chapter III, I consider 
Boolos’s attempt to show that monadic second-order logic (MSOL) should be understood as pure 
logic as it does not commit us to the existence of classes, as we may take the standard 
interpretation of MSOL to do. I discuss here some of the major reactions to Boolos’s plural 
interpretation (Resnik, Parsons, and Linnebo), and conclude with more speculative remarks on 
what Quine’s own response might have been. Throughout this thesis, my primary method has 
been one of close textual analysis.
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Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to examine the debate between Quine and Boolos over the 
logical status of higher-order logic—with Quine taking the position that higher-logic is more 
properly understood as set theory and Boolos arguing in opposition that higher-order logic is of a 
genuinely logical character. Many philosophers, especially since Boolos’s 1975 paper “On 
Second-Order Logic”, have taken sides in the debate but very little, if any work has been done to 
explain what Quine’s and Boolos’s respective positions actually were. This has been particularly 
detrimental, I think, to our understanding of Quine where the exposition of his views on higher- 
order logic often gets little beyond alluding to his well-known aphorism that higher-order logic is 
set theory in sheep’s clothing. My purpose here then will be to stay as neutral as possible over 
the question of whether or not higher-order logic counts as logic and to instead focus on the 
exposition of the debate itself as exemplified in the work of Quine and Boolos. Though, 
admittedly, through my work on this thesis, I have become increasingly convinced of the 
strength of Quine’s position and that the burden of proof, so to speak, lies with those who want 
to claim that higher-order logic is logic in the same sense that first-order logic is.
Chapter I will focus on the exposition of Quine’s conception of logic, particularly as he 
presents it in § 33 of Word and Object, “Aims and Claims of Regimentation”. My aim will be to 
explicate how Quine conceives of logic from within his overall philosophical project of arriving 
at the clearest, simplest understanding of the world. I will then turn more directly to consider his 
criticisms of higher-order logic, again emphasizing how he develops these criticisms from within 
the broader framework of what he sees as the task of philosophy generally. Another related 
feature of Quine’s conception of logic that I hope to bring out in this section is the way in which 
he relies on a fairly intuitive and traditional characteristic of logic, that it is self-evident or
obvious, so as to carve out a body of theory that we can reasonably identify as logic. In many 
ways this tradition of logic is pre-Fregean though Frege himself also appealed to it when he 
offered a foundation for arithmetic grounded in logic. The aim will be to show that Quine’s 
position is at least well-motivated and interesting even if we should ultimately decide to reject it. 
In fact, that we may decide not to accept Quine’s characterization of logic will be consistent with 
what he claims to have shown in drawing the boundary of logic at first-order quantification 
theory. Ultimately, I thinlc Quine is rejecting the view that we need to supply logic with a 
general philosophical account needs of it.
Chapter II will consider in detail the criticisms Boolos’s 1975 criticisms of Quine’s 
position and the kinds of responses that Quine could have offered. In many places it will seem 
that the two philosophers are talking past one another; that their respective positions in a sense 
rules out any common ground for debate. Yet, we will continue to see how Quine’s position 
gives him a way to respond to nearly all of Boolos’s criticisms. It seems that here Boolos is at a 
disadvantage. He appeals to Frege and the logicist tradition to suggest that higher-order logic is 
indeed well within the bounds of what may be traditionally thought of as logic. Though Boolos 
gives up the view that logic in this tradition has any claim to epistemic privilege; it suffers from 
the same epistemic debilities as set theory. Furthermore, he admits that higher-order logic is 
committed to tlie existence of sets, or at least subsets of the domain. It is hard to see how 
granting either of these features does not further Quine’s own view of higher-order logic as a 
substantial mathematical theory, too substantial to be thought of as pure logic. A better strategy 
for Boolos might have been to reject this standard view of higher order logic as we will see him 
do in Chapter III.
This final chapter will consider Boolos’s plural interpretation of monadic second-order 
logic (MSOL). Here, he appears to confront Quine more directly in that this interpretation of 
MSOL apparently shows a-way in which higher-order logic makes no additional ontological 
commitments to sets and can be understood in terms of our ordinary English plural locutions. 
Because Quine himself wrote almost nothing on Boolos’s plural interpretation for MSOL, this 
chapter takes on a slightly different structure than the previous two. It in includes a discussion of 
the major reactions to Boolos’s plural interpretation, such as those found in the work of Michael 
Resnik, Charles Pai'sons, and Oystein Linnebo and concludes with some more speculative 
remarks on what Quine’s own thoughts on this matter might have been. Throughout this thesis, 
my primary method has been one of close textual analysis.
Before we begin I would like to highlight two topics that I have not discussed outright in 
this thesis but that I think are implicitly at play throughout much of what follows. One is the 
issue of what is to count as set theory, or a set theory. Much of the debate as it is presented here 
is roughly over whether higher-order logic is to be counted as logic or as set theory. I have 
focused mostly on Quine’s and Boolos’s differing views of what logic is. However, it seems to 
me that they are also at odds over what is to count as set theory. Thus, the debate between them 
could have been approached from this side as well. The other is the issue of the relationship 
between logic and model theory and what the relevance of the one to the other is, if any thing at 
all. At least in his 1975 paper, Boolos’s arguments often rely heavily on the model theory for 
higher-order logic, a topic with which Quine often shows minimal concern. I highlight this topic 
not merely because of its relevance to the Quine-Boolos debate over higher-order logic, but also 
because it is a topic currently receiving a great deal of consideration throughout the literature on
the development of analytic philosophy and its interaction with mathematical logic/ 
Unfortunately, I leave both of these issues for some future work.
‘ For an overview o f  the debate and references see Juliet Floyd, “Frege, Semantics, and the Double-Definition 
Stroke,” in The Story o f  Analytic Philosophy, Anat Biletzki and Anat Matar, eds. (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 
141-66.
Chapter I: Quine on [Higher-Order] Logic
In his contribution to the 1988 Washington University conference on Quine’s philosophy, 
Burton Dreben remarked of Quine’s 1932 Ph.D. dissertation “The Logic of Sequences: a 
Generalization of Principia Mathematicd\ that the generalization itself is unimpressive as a 
technical contribution to the development of mathematical logic (a view with which Quine 
agrees), but “[t]he true significance of the dissertation lies elsewhere: It shows in full the 
independence and force of mind, the special, if not unique, logical concerns, and the deepest 
philosophical impulses that have characterized and governed Quine to this very day.”  ^ The aim 
of the present chapter is to bring out what these “special, if not unique, logical concerns” are in 
the context of Quine’s criticisms of higher-order logic. What we will see is that the issue for 
Quine is in a sense very much a terminological one. Quine’s aim in logic is clarity; once we 
have made explicit what we are doing when we do logic, how we apply the label Togic’ itself is 
of little consequence. However, being a terminological issue does not make it a trivial issue for 
the pursuit of clarity runs deep throughout Quine’s philosophy. Indeed it could be identified as 
the driving force behind his entire philosophical outlook.
The reason these two aims are not to be distinguished is because part of simplifying and 
clarifying our science, our understanding of the world, is the extent to which we are able to 
paraplnase our scientific theory into a canonical notation that makes explicit the ontological 
commitments of the theory and the logical relations among its sentences, in addition to removing 
ambiguities of ordinary language from the theory generally. In section I, I will attempt to show 
how Quine implements this strategy in his chief philosophical work, the 1960 Word and Object?
' Burton S. Dreben, “Quine,” in Perspectives on Quine, Robert B. Barrett and Roger F. Gibson, eds. (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 19??), p. 81; Quine’s dissertation was published years later as W.V. Quine, The Logic o f  Sequences: A 
Generalization o f  Principia M athematica. (New York: Garland Publishers, 1990); see in particular Quine’s preface. 
 ^W.V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960).
In sections Il.i and Il.ii, I will turn directly to Quine’s criticisms of higher-order logic, 
particularly as they appear in his 1970 Philosophy ofLogic^ by addressing his attitude towards 
quantification over predicate letters, the completeness theorem, and his characterization of 
logical truths as obvious. Again we will see that Quine’s aim is to dispel confusions and to make 
assumptions explicit. For if regimentation into canonical notation is to clarify and simplify our 
scientific theorizing, the canonical notation itself must aspire to this aim of clarity and simplicity. 
What we will see is that Quine’s philosophy of logic gives expression to a certain Quinean view 
that philosophy is science gone self-reflective. In both science and philosophy (and so in logic), 
our aim is understanding, and the means for achieving this is to strive for the simplest and 
clearest systematization of the world we are capable of constructing.
Quine begins §33 of his Word and Object entitled “Aims and Claims of Regimentation” 
reflecting upon the useful purpose served by practical temporary departures from ordinary 
language. These departures achieve many advantages but most important among them are 
understanding of the referential work of language, clarification of our conceptual scheme, and 
simplification of theory. Consider, for example, the use of parentheses. Quine remarks that to 
limit their value only to the resolution of ambiguities of grouping fails to recognize their far- 
reaching importance as they also allow for the iteration of identical constructions without 
requiring repeated variation of their expression so as to maintain grouping. In this way.
 ^W.V. Quine, Philosophy o f Logic, 2"'* ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986).
W.V. Quine, Word and Object, pp. 157-61. In developing my understanding o f  Quine’s conception o f logic, I am 
much indebted to Thomas Ricketts’s papers “Frege, Carnap, and Quine; Continuities and Discontinuities” in 
Carnap Brought Home: The View from  Jena, Steve Awodey and Carsten Klein, eds. (Chicago and LaSalle; Open 
Court Publishing Company, 2004), pp. 181-202; and “Languages and Calculi” in Logical Empiricism in North 
America, Gary L. Hardcastle and Alan W. Richardson, eds. (Minneapolis: University o f  Minnesota Press, 2004), 
pp. 257-80.
parentheses allow us to minimize the number of basic constructions and the techniques required
for their employment. They also allow for the possibility of subjecting both long and short
expressions to a imiform algorithm and to argue by substitution of long expressions for short
ones and vice versa without forcing a readjustment of context. Were it not “for parentheses or
some alternative convention yielding the foregoing benefits,” he remarks, “mathematics would
not have come far.”^
On Quine’s view, the introduction of the logical notation for the truth-functional
connectives and the quantifier-variable notation for generality not to differ in kind from other
linguistic innovations used to simplify or clarify scientific theory. In fact, given these devices,
augmented with classes and the predicate “ e ” for class membership, Quine holds that his
canonical notation is sufficient for the regimentation of the sentences of any scientific theory and
the demonstration of the logical relationships between these sentences once so regimented,^
Additionally, the quantifier-variable notation provides an objective standard by which to judge
the ontological commitments of a particular theory, a significant advance over ordinary language
with its tendency towards nominalization. The ontological commitments of a theory regimented
into canonical notation are displayed by the range of the values of the bound variables.^ For
Quine, this simplification and claiification by means of a canonical logical notation is continuous
with the aims of scientific theory generally:
The same motives that impel scientists to seek ever simpler and clearer theories adequate to the subject 
matter o f  their special sciences are motives for simplification and clarification o f  the broader framework 
shared by all the sciences. Here the objective is called philosophical, because o f  the breadth o f the 
fiamework concerned; but the motivation is the same. The quest o f  a simplest, clearest overall pattern o f  
canonical notation is not to be distinguished fi’om a quest o f ultimate categories, a limning o f the most
 ^ Ibid., p. 158; for a similar account see also “Logic as a Source o f  Syntactical Insights,” in The Way o f  Paradox and 
Other Essays, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 44. An alternate convention is found in the 
logical notation used by the Polish logicians.
 ^W.V. Quine, “The Scope and Language o f  Science,” in Ways o f  Paradox, p. 242-44.
 ^W.V. Quine, “On What There Is,” in From a Logical Point o f  View, 2"^  rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1980), pp. 12-19; “Scope and Language,” pp. 242-44; Word and Object, pp. 242-43.
general traits o f  reality. Nor let it be retorted that such constructions are conventional affairs not dictated 
by reality; for may not the same be said o f  a physical theory?^
Quine illustrates this project vividly in his review of Strawson’s Introduction to Logical 
Theory by considering the situation of a formal logician who is also a scientist or 
mathematician.^ The logician-scientist’s interest in ordinary language lies in its utility for the 
pursuit of his scientific aims. If a departure from ordinary language will improve upon this 
utility, the logician-scientist has no qualms about doing so. He may, for example, introduce the 
notation '=)’ to replace Tf-then’ of his ordinary language knowing full-well that '=)’ does not 
capture exactly what Tf-then’ did, but such is not the purpose of the new notation. The scientist- 
logician is never under the illusion that his aim is synonymy between the ordinary and 
extraordinary language. Rather, '=)’ is meant to simplify the theory by increasing perspicuity 
and adding algoritlmiic facility. So long as ‘z>’ is fully adequate to fulfill the role that ‘if-then’ 
originally played in the scientific work at hand, the scientist-logician can get along without this 
more cumbersome piece of ordinary language. Quine compares this technique to that of 
paraphrasing in ordinary language so as to remove ambiguities, the difference being that there 
the purpose is to facilitate communication and here it is the application of logical theory. 
However, for both purposes he sees synonymy not just as umiecessary, but as wholly misplaced:
In neither case is synonymy to be claimed for the paraphrase. Synonymy, for sentences generally, is not a 
notion that we can readily make adequate sense of; and even if  it were, it would be out o f  place in these 
cases. I f  we paraphrase a sentence to resolve ambiguity, what we seek is not a synonymous sentence, but 
one that is more informative by dint o f  resisting some alternative interpretations T
Quine’s comparison of his use of logical notation to that of paiuphrasing in ordinary language
should be emphasized as a distinctive philosophical departure from his predecessors in the
* Quine, Word and Object, p. 161.
 ^P.P. Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theoiy (New York: Wiley, 1952); W.V. Quine, “Mr. Strawson on Logical 
Theory,” in Ways o f  Paradox, p. 150.
Ibid., p. 150.
” Quine, Word and Object, p. 159. (My emphasis)
analytic tradition as is brought out particularly well by contrasting his view of the analysis of the 
ordered pair with that of Russell/^
Quine explains that the ordered pair appears as a sort of defective noun for it has the 
peculiar feature of allowing two objects to be treated as one. In previous cases, he determined 
that defective nouns, such as attributes or propositions, proved undeserving of their claim to 
denote objects and so dismissed them as irreferential components of their containing phrases. 
Unlike these earlier cases though, the particular feature that malces the ordered pair seem 
defective is the very feature that gives it its utility; it is essential to its purpose that the ordered 
pair be treated as a single object. For example, this feature allows relations to be assimilated to 
classes by construing them as classes of ordered pairs. Without its objectual status, the ordered 
pair would be ineligible for class membership. The aim of philosophical analysis as Quine 
conceives of it is to make sense of how it is that the ordered pair can stand as a single object.
He explains that mathematicians have introduced the ordered pair by way of the 
condition
(1) If <x,y> -  <z,w> then x = z and y  = w 
And hence, any already recognized object fulfilling this condition will fulfill the role of the 
ordered pair. Norbert Wiener offered the first such analysis in February 1914 defining the 
ordered pair as the class {{x}, {y, 0}}.^^ Kazimierz Kuratowski followed in 1921 with the now 
more standard {{x}, {x, y}}. Both versions fulfill (1) while maintaining the important feature
Ibid., §53 .
Though arguably Felix Hausdorff might have produced {{x, 1}, {y, 2}} first; see Akihiro Kanamori, “The Empty 
Set, the Singleton, and the Ordered Pair,” Bulletin o f  Symbolic Logic 9(3) 2003, p. 291 n. 33.
that the apparent two objects of the pair are treated as a single object, a class, Wiener’s 
definition, Quine explains, captures what he sees as central to the task of philosophy:
This construction is paradigmatic o f what we are most typically up to when in a philosophical spirit we 
offer an “analysis” or “explication” o f some hitherto inadequately formulated “idea” or expression. We do 
not claim synonymy. We do not claim to make clear and explicit what the users o f  the unclear expression 
had unconsciously in mind all along. We do not expose hidden meanings, as the words “analysis” and 
“explication” would suggest; we supply lacks. We fix on the particular functions o f  the unclear expression 
that make it worth troubling about, and then devise a substitute, clear and couched in terms to our liking, 
that fulfills those functions. Beyond those conditions o f  partial agreement, dictated by our interests and 
purposes, any traits o f the explicans come under the head o f  “don’t cares”. Under this head we are free to 
allow the explicans all mamier o f  novel connotations never associated with the explicandum.'^
Wiener’s construction of the ordered pair may be what Quine is most typically up to when he 
offers a philosophical analysis, but it is clearly not what the tradition had in mind. Russell, in a 
way, conceived of the aim of analysis to be precisely what Quine says it is not: to expose hidden 
meanings. In his 1903 Principles o f Mathematics, Russell states that the purpose of the logical 
analysis of mathematics is the discovery of the logical indefmables, or logical constants, “in 
order that the mind may have that kind of acquaintance with them which it has with redness or 
the taste of a pineapple.” The success of this reduction would then allow philosophy to provide 
an answer to the question, what does mathematics mean? Russell explains,
Mathematics in the past was unable to answer, and Philosophy answered by introducing the totally 
irrelevant notion o f mind. But now Mathematics is able to answer, so far at least as to reduce the whole o f  
its propositions to certain fundamental notions o f logic. At this point, the discussion must be resumed by 
Philosophy. I shall endeavoui’ to indicate what are the fundamental notions involved, to prove at length that 
no others occur in mathematics, and to point out briefly the philosophical difficulties involved in the 
analysis o f  these notions.'*
Later in life, reflecting back on his mathematical work, Russell wrote specifically of the Wiener- 
Kuratowski analysis.
The proof is relatively straight fbrwaid. See, for example, Herbert B. Enderton, Elements o f  Set Theoiy (London: 
Academic Press, 1977), p. 36.
Quine, Word and Object, pp. 258-59.
For a detailed account o f  Russell’s various views o f  philosophical analysis see Peter Hylton, “Beginning with 
Analysis,” in Bertrand Russell and the Origins o f  Analytic Philosophy, Ray Monk and Anthony Palmer, eds. 
(Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1997), pp. 183-215.
17 n  j j  n  11     i r iA o  o n d
XV.
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Bertrand Russell, The Principles o f  Mathematics, 1903, 2" ed., (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1937), p. 
Ibid., p. 4.
10
I thought o f  relations in those days [circa 1900], almost exclusively as intensions. I thought o f sentences 
such as, ‘x precedes j ’, ‘x is greater than y  % ‘x is north o f y ’. It seemed to me— as, indeed, it still seems—  
that, although from  the poin t o f  view o f  a form al calculus one can regard a relation as a set o f  ordered  
couples, it is the intension alone which gives unity to the set.^^
Elsewhere Russell is reported to have called the analysis “a trick” This contrast between
Russell and Quine over the significance of the Wiener-Kuratowski definition of the ordered pair
helps to illustrate the extent to which Quine is willing to do away with traditional philosophical
concerns so as to obtain clarity about a troublesome but useful notion of our current ongoing
science. That Wiener’s and Kuratowski’s definitions differ is of no matter for Quine. They both
fulfill condition (1) and where their differences lie has no effect on this; there is no hidden
meaning, no essence, for the analysis to discover. What distinguishes Quine’s attitude towards
philosophical analysis is that he does not judge the success of the analysis by some preconceived
philosophical notion of what the analysis should be, a guiding metaphysical assumption
concerning the intensionality of relations as in Russell’s case. Rather his guiding concern is
whether the proposed analysis fulfills the condition that makes the ordered pair worthwhile for
science. So long as the analysis does this, any other features of it may be consigned to the realm
of don’t c a r e s . F o r  Quine
Bertrand Russell, My Philosophical Developm ent (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1959), p. 87 (My 
emphasis); and o f Quine, in particular, he wrote, “Professor Quine, for example, has produced systems which 1 
admire greatly on account o f their skill, but which I cannot feel to be satisfactory because they seem to be created ad  
hoc and not to be such as even the cleverest logician would have thought o f if  he had not known o f the 
contradictions” (p. 80).
W.D. Hart, “Clarity,” in The Analytic Tradition, David Bell and Neil Cooper, eds., (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 
1990), p. 207.
This o f course is also the view Quine holds with regard to numbers. As he remarks in “Ontological Relativity,”
So, though Russell was wrong in suggesting that numbers need more than their arithmetical properties, he 
was right in objecting to the definition o f  numbers as any things fulfilling arithmetic. The subtle point is 
that any progression w ill serve as a version o f  number so long and only so long as we stick to one and the 
same progression. Arithmetic is, in this sense, all there is to number: there is no saying absolutely what the 
numbers are; there is only arithmetic, (p. 45)
See “Ontological Relativity,” in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1969), pp. 26-68, and especially pp. 43-5; and “Reply to Charles Parsons,” in The Philosophy ofW . V. Quine, 
expanded ed., Lewis Edwin Hahn and Paul Arthur Schilpp, eds. (Chicago and LaSalle: Open Court Publishing 
Company, 1998), pp. 400-1. The classic development o f this view o f  numbers is Paul Benacerraf, “What Numbers 
Could not Be,” The Philosophical Review  74:1 (1965), pp. 47-73.
11
explication is elimination. We have, to begin with, an expression or form o f  expression that is somehow  
troublesome. It behaves partly like a term but not enough so, or it is vague in ways that bother us, or it puts 
kinks in a theory or encourages one or another confusion. But also it serves certain purposes that are not to 
be abandoned. Then we find a way o f  accomplishing those same purposes thi ough other channels, using 
other and less troublesome forms o f  expression. The old perplexities are resolved.^^
It is in this vein that Quine considers the ordered pair to be a paradigm of philosophical analysis
and philosophy of science to be philosophy enough.^^
Though the simplification and clarification of scientific theory, alone, is of sufficient gain
to recommend regimentation, the regimentation of scientific theory into canonical notation also
aims at the clarification of the science of logic itself. Having regimented a theory, we can more
easily identify the logical relationships between its sentences by applying logical theory to them,
what Quine describes as “the systematic study of logical truths.” Chief among such logical
interdependencies among sentences is logical implication as Quine explains, “Logical
implication is the central business of logic. Logical truth would be of little concern to us on its
own account, but it is important as an avenue to implication. It is simpler to theorize about truth
than implication because it is attributable to single sentences whereas implication relates
sentences in pairs.
The importance of logical implication to scientific theorizing is not to be understated.
For Quine this logical relationship is “the lifeblood of theories” as it is what links a theory to its 
empirical checkpoints.^^ Having established a hypothesis, implication allows for its testing. One 
side of the implication, the theoretical, is made up of our backlog of accepted theory plus the 
hypothesis; this side does the implying. On the other side, the observational, is an implied
Quine, Word and Object, p. 260 (Quine’s italics); For my account o f  the significance o f the ordered pair in 
Quine’s philosophy, particularly as it indicates a decisive contrast between the philosophical outlooks o f  Quine and 
Russell, I am indebted to Kanamori, “Empty Set,” pp. 288-93 and to Hylton, “Beginning with Analysis,” pp. 213-15. 
^ Quine, “Strawson,” p. 151.
W.V. Quine, “Grammar, Truth, and Logic,” in Philosophy and Grammar, Stig Kanger and Sven Ohman, eds., 
(Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1981), pp. 17; see also Methods o f Logic, 
1950, 4"' ed. (Cambridge: Flarvard University Press, 1982), p. 4; and Philosophy o f Logic [1986], 
pp. vti, 48-9.
W.V. Quine, From Stimulus to Science (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 51.
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generality of the form “Whenever this, that”, Quine’s observation categorical, available to the 
experimenter for direct testing. So long as our canonical notation includes the resources to 
represent the relation of implication between a body of scientific theory and an observation 
categorical, this notation will be sufficient for the needs of s c i e n c e . An d  determining whether 
one sentence implies another does in fact require nothing beyond the resources of Quine’s 
canonical notation, the truth functional connectives and quantification. Implication holds simply 
when the conditional formed from the two sentences is valid, when it is a logical truth.^^ This 
raises an important and illuminating question for Quine’s conception of logic; how is he to 
characterize logical truth? The definition of logical truth, or validity, offered by most 
contemporary philosophers and logicians goes by way of model theory: a sentence is logically 
true, or valid, if every model in a model-theoretic semantics S is  a model of the sentence.^^ 
However, in his Philosophy o f Logic, Quine first defines logical truth in terms of sentence 
substitution: a logical truth is a sentence that yields only truths when we substitute sentences for 
its simple s e n t ences . He  then notes that his substitutional definition can also be given by a two 
step method employing the notion of a valid logical schema.
He describes a schema as a sort of “dummy sentence” that depicts the logical structure of 
what could be an actual sentence, a sentence of the fully interpreted object language. The logical 
structure of a sentence is its composition in terms of truth functions, quantifiers, and variables. 
Sentences then, by Quine’s account, are composed only of logical structure and predicates. A 
schema depicts the logical structure of a sentence by replacing the predicates with schematic
W.V Quine, Pursuit o f  Truth, 1990, rev, ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 9-10; 1 am 
indebted in this paragraph to Ricketts, “Frege, Carnap, and Quine,” p. 198.
Quine, Methods [1982], p. 46.
For example see Stewart Shapiro, Foundations without Foundationalism: A Case fo r  Second-order Logic, 
paperback ed., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), p. 6 .
Quine, Philosophy o f  Logic [1986], p. 50.
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predicate letters "F\ 'G \  etc. Unlike actual predicates, these schematic predicate letters are not 
part of the object language but serve instead only to diagrammatically mark positions where 
object language predicates could appear. For example, the sentence ‘There is something that 
walks’ can be rendered into canonical notation as ‘(3x)(x walks)’. Replacing the predicate ‘(D 
walks’ with a schematic predicate letter ‘F ’ we have depicted its logical structure thus ‘(Bx)Fx’. 
Quine then defines a logical schema as valid if every sentence obtainable from it by substitution 
of sentences for simple sentence schemata is true. Now, a logical truth is a truth obtainable by 
this substitution method from a valid logical schema.^® He does not include separate substitution 
clauses for term letters, such as names or functions. Given identity as a logical primitive, name 
and function letters are superfluous; both can be paraplnnsed away by Russell’s method of 
descriptions. This austere language of truth functions, quantifiers, variables, and predicates is 
enough though eliminable term letters may always be introduced for mere convenience.^^
We should pause here to observe that Quine’s substitutional definition will not work if he 
takes identity as a primitive logical predicate for then ‘(3x)(3>>)-ix would coimt as a logical 
truth, and logic as traditionally conceived, and as Quine conceives it, does not pronounce on the 
number of objects in the world. Yet, if he does not take identity as a primitive logical predicate, 
truths of identity theory such as ‘x = x’ or ‘(3y)x would not cormt as logical truths as they 
could be falsified by substituting some other predicate for ‘=’. This, too, seems an undesirable 
result as such truths are often considered logical truths. This tension, though, does not result 
from Quine’s substitutional definition but from the identity predicate itself he explains, in that 
once identity is allowed as part of our genuinely logical vocabulary, some logical generalities
Ibid., pp. 24, 49-50.
Ibid., pp. 25-6; Quine, M ethods [1982], pp. 274-77.
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become directly expressible in the object language. Logic’s concern extends in this way from 
talk of forms of sentences to the expression of genuine sentences.
Still, Quine thinks there are also reasons for wanting to include identity as part of the 
logical vocabulary. One is that, like quantification theory, there are complete proof procedures 
available for identity theory. Another is that identity theory, again like quantification theory, 
does not discriminate amongst objects in its application. Neither of these features holds for 
many branches of higher mathematics and, in particular, not for set t h e o r y . H e  then offers a 
further consideration for favoring the inclusion of identity theory as part of logic:
[F]or identity is marginal in a curious way. Namely, any theory with any finite number o f  other primitive 
predicates gets identity too as a bonus. For identity can be defined, or something to the same formal 
purpose, by exhaustion o f  those primitive predicates. For example, i f  the primitive predicates are ‘P ’, ‘g ’, 
and a dyadic ‘P ’, we can define = y'‘ as
\/z(P x = P y . Qx = Qy . Rxz = Ryz . Rzx =  Rzy)?^
By defining identity this way, truths of identity theory gain the same schematic status as other
logical generalizations. Ultimately, these considerations lead Quine to include identity theory as
more appropriately part of logic than of some other higher branch of mathematics. What should
be stressed here is that his initial considerations against counting identity as a primitive logical
predicate are not to be understood merely as an ad hoc maneuver for securing his substitutional
definition of logical truth. Identity presents difficulties for any view that sees logic as primarily
concerned with form, and specifically for Quine, forms of sentences.
Though his two-step definition of logical truth comes to the same thing as the definition
given in terms of sentence substitution the notion of a valid schema serves a further purpose as
he explains, “Because of their freedom from subject matter, schemata are the natural medium for
logical laws and p r o o f s . I t  is only after he gives his substitutional definition that Quine then
Quine, Philosophy o f  Logic [1986], pp. 61-4; Quine, From Stimulus to Science, p. 52. 
Quine, From Stimulus to Science, p. 52.
34 Quine, Philosophy o f  Logic [1986], p. 51
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also presents a more standard definition of logical truth in terms of models: a schema is valid, if 
it is satisfied by all its models, and, again, it is a logical truth if it is a sentence obtainable by 
substitution into a valid logical schema/^ These definitions are equivalent provided that the 
language is rich enough for elementary number theory, a demand he thinks moderate. Where 
this is not the case, he thinks there is just as much reason to blame any discrepancies between the 
two definitions on the wealaiess of the language as on the substitutional definition of logical 
truth.^^
Let us return now to consider Quine’s preference for using schemata to express logical 
laws and proofs. Why should their freedom from subject matter make schemata the natural 
medium for logical laws and proofs? What role does topic neutrality have in Quine’s conception 
of logic? An answer begins to emerge in a remark from his introduction to Methods o f Logic. 
Criticizing a flawed attempt at locating the difference between logic and branches of higher 
mathematics, Quine writes.
Logic and mathematics were coupled, in earlier remarks, as jointly enjoying a central position within the 
total system o f  discourse. Logic as commonly presented, and in particular as it will be presented in this 
book, seems to differ from mathematics in that in logic we talk about statements and their 
interrelationships, notably implication, whereas in mathematics we talk about abstract nonlinguistic things; 
numbers, functions, and the like. This contrast is in large part misleading. Logical truths, e.g., statements 
o f the form T f p  and q  then q \  are not about statements; they may be about anything, depending on what 
statements we put in the blanks ‘p ’ and ‘<7’. When we talk about such logical truths, and when we expound 
implications, we are indeed talking about statements; but so are we when we talk about mathematical 
truths.^^
For Quine, logic, as we have observed, is the systematic study of logical truths so as to make 
perspicuous the logical interrelations between sentences, most importantly that of implication. 
Logic traces implications regardless of subject matter and to this end, does not show prejudice 
towards any particular subdomain of objects. The relation of implication applies impartially to
Ibid., pp. 52.
Ibid., pp. 53-5.
Quine, Methods [1982], p. 5. (Quine’s italics)
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sentences regardless of subject matter. His use of schemata here brings the notion of form to the 
forefront of his philosophy of logic as any sentence whatsoever can be written in place of a 
schema of the same form. In this way, his logical notation treats of any subject matter 
whatsoever while taking no particular subdomain of objects as its own.
Thomas Ricketts has stressed that this conception of logic is in sharp contrast with the 
view of logic found in Quine’s predecessors Frege and Carnap, that of logic as the maximally 
general science. I would add to this list also Russell. For Russell, logic’s generality was a 
consequence of logic being about the most general features of reality, the logical indefmables or 
constants. “Logic,” Russell wrote, “is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology, 
though with its more abstract and general f e a t u r e s . I n  contrast, Quine holds that logic is best 
viewed not as a complete notation for a maximally general science of logical objects or 
constants, but as a partial notation for discourse on all subjects. Quine’s conception of logic on 
this count resorts back to a variation of the pre-Fregean understanding of logic that rendered 
validity in terms of form. Quine formulates the logical laws then not as statements in the object 
language as Frege and Russell did but rather as generalizations over the forms of sentences. So 
to take the example from the above quoted passage, the logical law governing the valid schema 
there is stated: “A material conditional of a conjunction with one of its conjuncts is true.” Here, 
we see also an important contrast between Quine and the pre-Fregean tradition in logic. The 
forms Quine speaks of are not forms of thought that somehow lie behind language but are instead 
forms of sentences rendered into Iris canonical notation.^^
Within this context, the significance of Quine’s having introduced the notion of logical 
truth by way of sentence substitution becomes easier to see. It is only after having given his
Bertrand Russell, Introduction to M athematical Philosophy (London; George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1919), p. 169. 
Ricketts, “Frege, Carnap, and Quine,” pp. 196.
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substitutional definition of logical truth that he goes on to give a more standard model-theoretic 
account and to demonstrate its equivalence with his substitutional definition. He remarks that 
one benefit of the substitutional definition of logical truth is that it saves on ontology; it does not 
invoke the universe of sets but rests instead within a realm of sentences. Presenting logic model- 
theoretically encourages the view that logic is about mathematical structures, its models. Quine 
sees this as potentially misleading in that it may lead one to think that quantification theory 
presupposes significant mathematical power at the outset. His definition of logical truth in terms 
of sentence substitution, in a sense, legitimizes the appeal to a model-theoretic definition. It 
shows that sentence substitution is enough. As Quine makes the point, “There is philosophical 
comfort in the assurance that we can talk of logical validity and consistency without appealing to 
a limitless realm of abstract objects called classes. We feel that in talking of substitution of 
expressions we still keep our feet on the ground.”"^® Given though that the restrictions on 
allowable substitutions for quantificational schemata become rather complicated, a model- 
theoretic definition can be easier to operate with in practice as Quine himself often does."^ ^
To briefly conclude this account of Quine’s conception of logic, I wish to draw attention 
to one further aspect of his view: the reciprocal containment of logic in language and language 
in logic."^  ^ In presenting his canonical notation, Quine often describes it as a departure from 
ordinar y language, or as extraordinary language, but this should not be taken to indicate that 
logic is in some way external to our conceptual scheme, external to our language. He explains,
Not that this logical language is independent o f  ordinary language. It has its roots in ordinary language, 
and these roots are not to be severed. Everyone, even to our hypothetical logician-scientist and his pupils’ 
pupils, grows up in ordinaiy language, and can learn the logician-scientist’s technical jargon, from to 
'dyldx' to ‘neutrino’, only by learning how, in principle at least, to parapluase it into ordinary language. 
But for this purpose no extensive analysis o f the logic o f  ordinary language is required. It is enough that
Quine, Methods [1982], p. 212; Here 1 am indebted to conversations with Thomas Ricketts.
For examples, see ibid., pp. 116, 173-74; for the restrictions on substitution see chapters 26 and 28. 
Here, 1 am again particularly indebted to Ricketts; see his “Languages and Calculi,” p. 275-76.
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we show how to reduce the logical notations to a few primitive notations . .  . and then explain just these in 
ordinary language, availing ourselves o f  ample paraphrases and scholia as needed for precision/^
Our language, as it stands and is used, includes the possibility for its regimentation by way of
logical notation; logical notation is introduced piecemeal for the particular purposes of clarity,
simplicity, and algoritlunic power “as partial notations for discourse on all subjects,”'^ '^  And
similarly, logic contains language, for it is by means of this regimentation that we are able to
make perspicuous the logical relationship between any arbitrary sentences. Quine’s point, as he
concludes Word and Object, is that there is no privileged perspective from which our conceptual
scheme can be described externally:
The philosopher’s task differs hom  the others’ [other non-fiction researchers]. . .  in detail; but in no such 
drastic way as those suppose who imagine for the philosopher a vantage point outside the conceptual 
scheme that he takes in charge. There is no such cosmic exile. He cannot study and revise the fundamental 
conceptual scheme o f  science and common sense without having some conceptual scheme, whether the 
same or another no less in need o f  philosophical scrutiny, in which to work. He can scrutinize and improve 
the system from within, appealing to coherence and simplicity; but this is the theoretician’s method 
generally.'*^
Logic itself is part of this conceptual scheme of science, and like the other regions of science, it 
too is only understood from within this very conceptual scheme.
Il.i
Quine’s most cited criticisms of higher-order logic occur in his Philosophy o f Logic in the 
chapter entitled “The Scope of Logic”. Considering whether set theory belongs to logic, Quine 
remarks.
Pioneers in modern logic viewed set theory as logic; thus Frege, Peano, and various o f  their followers, 
notably Whitehead and Russell. Frege, Whitehead, and Russell made a point o f  reducing mathematics to 
logic; Frege claimed in 1884 to have proved in this way, contrary to Kant, that the truths o f  arithmetic are 
analytic. But the logic capable o f  encompassing this reduction was logic inclusive o f  set theory.'*'^
Quine, “Mr. Strawson,” p. 150 (Quine’s italics); see also Word and Object, p. 159.
Quine, Word and Object, p. 160.
Ibid., pp. 275-76; For the expression o f a related view with regard to logic specifically see W.V. Quine, “Truth by 
Convention,” in Ways o f  Paradox, pp. 105-06.
Quine, Philosophy o f  Logic [1986], pp. 65-6.
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Quine diagnoses this tendency to include set theory as part of logic as the result of a failure to 
see clearly the distinction between predication and membership, a confusion facilitated by an 
intermediate notion of attribution of attributes. His criticisms of higher-order logic can along 
these lines be viewed as continuous with the aims of his canonical notation sketched in the 
previous section. For Quine, the reason, at least in part, for paraphiasing a body of scientific 
theory into logical notation is the simplification and clarification of theory, and to obtain this 
objective, the logical notation itself must be a paradigm of clarity. Quine’s critical discussion of 
higher-order logic contributes towards this end.
The confusion that Quine points to as leading to the seemingly imiocent extension of 
ordinary, or classical, quantification theory by allowing quantification over predicate letters 
begins as a confusion of use and mention. As seen above, in the open sentence ‘Fx’ of 
quantification theory, ‘F ’ is a schematic letter standing in place of a predicate. ‘F ’ and ‘Fx’ are 
mere simulations of sentences and their parts, depictions of their logical structure. The 
schematic predicate letters do not name, or refer to, predicates, attributes, or sets but rather stand 
in place of unspecified predicates. It is the predicate expression itself, or a simulation thereof, 
that occurs in a sentence, not a name of it. This view of predicate letters is not held universally 
Quine adds: “Some logicians, however, have taken a contrary line, reading ‘F ’ as an attribute 
variable and ‘Fx’ as ‘x has F ’. Some, fond of attributes, have done this with their eyes open; 
others have been seduced into it by confusion. The confused logician sees the predicate letter ’ 
‘F ’ as sometimes standing in place of an unspecified predicate and other times as naming an 
unspecified predicate. This confusion leads him to attribute noun status to ‘F ’ and so to arrive at 
the reading of ‘Fx’ as ‘x has F ’. Though, of course, not all logicians are confused over this
Ibid., p. 66.
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matter. Some prodigal logicians, he explains, embrace attributes without the confusion. In either 
case though, quantification over predicate letters leads to one or another sort of murkiness in 
logic which Quine wishes to dispel.
Central to this entire issue, he thinks, is allowing for quantification over predicate letters. 
It is worth quoting this passage at length, as it is one at which Boolos will specifically direct his 
attack:
Consider first some ordinary quantifications: ‘3x (x walks)’, walks)’, '3x (x is prime)’. The open 
sentence after the quantifier shows ‘x ’ in a position where a name could stand; a name o f  a walker, for 
instance, or o f  a prime number. The quantifications do not mean that names walk or are prime; what are 
said to walk or to be prime are things that could be named by  names in those positions. To put the 
predicate letter ‘F” in a quantifier, then, is to treat predicate positions suddenly as name positions, and 
hence to treat predicates as name o f entities o f  some sort. The quantifier ‘3 F ’ or ‘V F ’ says not that some or 
all predicates are thus and so, but that some or all entities o f the sort named by predicates are thus and so.'*®
Quine’s argument is that to take quantification over predicate letters as a mere extension of
ordinaiy quantification theory is incoherent. Surely, these quantifications over predicate letters
are not saying something about all predicates any more than ordinary quantifications say
something about all names. But nor do these quantifications over predicate letters say something
about the predicate expressions themselves. What would it even mean to render the
quantifications ‘3F’ or ‘VF’ as ‘There exists some is F ’ or ‘For all is F ’? Of course this
rendering fails to capture precisely what a quantified schematic predicate letter would be like
given that the is of predication is actually part of what ‘F ’ simulates, but such imperfection is to
be expected from an idea that began incoherent. Instead, by allowing these so-called higher-
order quantifications, we are forced to take the predicate letter ‘F ’ as a variable that takes some
thing as its value. Quine’s point is that when we allow quantification over predicate letters, the
schematic predicate letters are no longer mere simulations of predicates. Instead, their status
‘*® Ibid., pp. 66-7 (Quine’s italics); A note to the reader: I have not standardized notation in quoting directly or in 
discussing particular passages. Rather, 1 kept with the notation used by the author in that context. I hope this will 
not confuse the reader.
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changes from substitution taking schematic letters to value taking variables. In quantifying over 
predicate letters, we are not innocently extending our ordinary quantification theory but making 
it into a theory about some particular subdomain of objects. To reiterate his earlier point, the 
prodigal logician recognizes this move and takes the predicates to name attributes while the 
confused logician moves back and forth between the two options lacking a clear conception of 
the difference between schematic predicate letters and value taking variables.
The question naturally arises now as to why the prodigal logician should be grouped 
together with the confused logician. What is wrong with his explicit assumption of attributes as 
the values of predicate letters that have taken on the role of variables? Quine’s response is that 
the notion of attribute is itself unclear for attributes lack a clear criterion of identity (and for 
Quine, there is no entity without identity). Unlike sets, which have their identity established by 
the law of extensionality—sets are the same when their members are the same—this does not 
hold for attributes. Compare the open sentence ‘x is a man’ with the open sentence ‘x is a 
featherless biped’. If there were such things as attributes, and by Quine’s lights there are not, 
these two open sentences may be said to have two different attributes as their intensions, or 
meanings. But to make sense of how to count attributes as the same and so also as different, we 
would first have to make sense of the relation of synonymy, a requirement that Quine does not 
thiiilc philosophy can meet."^  ^ In contrast, if we consider the two open sentences as determining 
sets, by the law of extensionality we can conclude that they do in fact determine the same set.
Quine next suggests rejecting attributes and taking the values of the predicate letters to be 
sets, but this too is confused in its own way. Indeed, this move would be little advance over the
Quine addresses the question o f  synonymy in Chapter I o f  Philosophy o f  Logic though his most famous attack is 
in “Two Dogmas o f Empiricism,” in From a Logical Point o f  View, pp. 20-46. Detailed consideration o f  Quine’s 
arguments against synonymy would take me too far a field for the purposes o f tliis thesis.
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confusion that Quine sees as leading to the very idea of treating predicate letters as quantifiable
variables in the first place:
But I deplore the use o f  predicate letters as quantified variables, even when the values are sets. Predicates 
have attributes as their “intensions” or meanings (or would if  there were attributes), and they have sets as 
their extensions; but they are names o f  neither. Variables eligible for quantification therefore do not belong 
in predicate positions. They belong in name positions.
And earlier he bemoaned attributes thus,
My complaint is that questions o f  existence and reference are slurred over through failure to mark 
distinctions. Predicates are wanted in all sentences regardless o f  whether there are attributes to refer to, and 
the dummy predicate ‘F ’ is wanted generally for expository purposes without thought o f  its being a 
quantifiable variable taking attributes as values. If we are also going to quantify over attributes and refer to 
them, then clarity is served by using recognizable variables and distinctive names for the purpose and not 
mixing these up with the predicates.^*
Taking predicate letters as value taking variables perpetuates the mistaken view that ordinary
quantification theory was always about attributes or sets rather than a technique for making clear
the logical relationships between statements concerning any subject matter whatsoever. The
proper way to render attributes or sets into logical notation on Quine’s view is with ordinary
object variables as this does not obscure the distinction between variables and schematic
predicate letters. Instead of reading ‘Fx’ as ‘x has F ’ clar ity in the science of logic is served by
writing ‘x has y \  or with a distinctive attribute variable ‘x has C- And the same holds when one
wants to admit sets as values of quantifiable variables writing instead ‘x e y \  or ‘x g a ’ using
distinctive set variables. Whereas ‘(3x)(Fx . Gx)’ is a logical schema, ‘(3x)(x e a . x e /?) is an
open sentence (what Quine calls its “set-theoretic analogue”) about sets whose logical form is
depicted by this logical schema. The set variables ‘a ’, ‘y’ etc. are eligible for quantification
the same as any other object variables are.^^
50 Quine, Philosophy o f  Logic [1986], p. 67. 
Ibid., p. 28.
Ibid., p. 51
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We might be inclined to ask now, given that attributes lack a clear criterion of identity, 
what would be the purpose of allowing quantification over attributes in the first place? Why not 
just start with sets? Here, Quine brings out more clearly how confusion over use and mention 
may lead a philosopher, namely Russell, to think that he is deriving set theory, and so 
mathematics, from narrowly logical beginnings. First, it will be helpful to briefly state the 
context in which Russell developed his theory.
Russell’s paradox emerged from Frege’s Basic Law Y in combination with the 
substitution rule of his 1893 work, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik'whioh allowed him to assert that 
for every function there is a logical object equivalent to it, what he called the function’s value- 
range, or extension. Formally, in modern notation Basic Law V is
{x : f(x)} = {x ; g(x)} = (x)(f(x) = g(x)), 
the extension of the concept T  is equal to the extension of the concept ‘g’ if and only if the 
function T  is extensionally equivalent to the function ‘g’.^  ^ The paradox may look more 
familiar to contemporary readers rendered in terms of the um estricted comprehension schema of 
naïve set theory:
(3y)(Vx)(x e y ^ F x )
where ‘y’ does not occur free in ‘F ’. Russell informed Frege of his discovery by letter on June 
22, 1902, shortly before the second volume of Grundgesetze was to go to press:
With regard to many particular questions, I find in your work discussions, distinctions, and definitions that 
one seeks in vain in the works o f  other logicians. Especially so far as function is concerned (§ 9 o f your 
Begriffsschrift), I have been led on my own to views that are the same even in the details. There is just one 
point where 1 have encountered a difficulty. You state (p. 17 [p. 23 in van Heijenoort]) that a function, too, 
can act as the indeterminate element. This I formerly believed, but now this view seems doubtful to me 
because o f  the following contradiction. Let w  be the predicate: to be a predicate that cannot be predicated 
o f itself. Can w  be predicated o f  itself? From each answer the opposite follows. Therefore we must
Michael Potter, R eason’s N earest Kin: Philosophies o f  Arithmetic from  Kant to Carnap (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), pp. 107, 112-13; Frege’s Basic Law V can be found in Gottlob Frege, The Basic Laws o f  
Arithmetic: Exposition o f  the System, Montgomery Furth, ed. and trans. (Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 
1964), p. 72.
24
conclude that w  is not a predicate. Likewise there is no class (as a totality) o f those classes which, each 
taken as a totality, do not belong to themselves. From this I conclude that under certain circumstances a 
definable collection [Menge] does not form a totality. '^*
Russell’s point is that from the unrestricted comprehension principle, we can derive that there is
a class of all classes which are not self-membered, and then ask of this class whether it is
contained in itself. The answer is that if it is then it is not, and if it is not then it is and so,
contradiction. Formally,
[1] (1) (3f)(Vx)(x e y ^ x  ^ x) P
[1, 2] (2) (Vx)(x G y = X 0 x) (I)y Eli
[1.2] (3) y e y = y ^ y  (2) UI
[1.2] (4) p . ~ p  (3) TF; [2]
In his 1903 Principles o f Mathematics, Russell gave lengthy treatment to the explication 
of the contradiction along with some inconclusive suggestions as to how it might be resolved, but 
it was not until his 1908 “Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types” that he 
discovered a solution.^^ What Russell saw as common to both of what we now identify as the 
set-theoretic and semantic paradoxes is the assumption of an illegitimate totality, a totality that 
would be enlarged by new members defined in terms of that very totality. For example, the 
collection of propositions will be supposed to contain a statement “all propositions are either true 
or false.” But this is a meaningless statement for it would have to be about some already definite 
collection “all propositions” which is impossible if new propositions are created by statements 
about all propositions.^^ Russell’s apparent insight here led him to formulate the Vicious Circle
Bertrand Russell, “Letter to Frege,” in Jean van Heijenoort, ed.. From Frege to Godel: A Source Book in 
Mathematical Logic, i57P-JP57 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 124-25; Gottlob Frege, 
Begriffsschrift, a form ula language, m odeled upon that o f  arithmetic, fo r  pure thought, 1879, in van Heijenoort, pp. 
1-82.
Warren Goldfarb presents this derivation o f  the contradiction in his “Deductive Logic,” unpublished ms. (1994), 
p. 186; Quine presents a sketch o f  the derivation in “On Universals,” The Journal o f  Symbolic Logic 12:3 (Sept. 
1947), p. 78.
Bertrand Russell, “Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory o f  Types,” 1908, in Logic and Knowledge, R.C. 
Marsh, ed. (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1956), pp. 59-102.
Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica, 1910-1913, 2"^ ' ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 37.
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Principle: “Whatever involves all of a collection must not be one of the collection.” His theory 
of orders, or types, implements this principle.^^ Under his theory of orders (the intensional 
counterpart upon which we will see the extensional theory of types constructed), Russell 
stratifies the universe into levels with individuals at level 1, attributes of individuals at level 2, 
attributes of attributes of individuals at level 3 and so on. The paradox is then blocked by 
allowing the objects at each level of the hierarchy to hold only of the objects one level below.
The intensional analogue to comprehension is then restricted as follows:
(3v)(\fu)(vu 5 Fu)
where ‘v’ is of level n + I f u i s  of level n, and ‘F ’ is a predicate that holds significantly over 
objects of the same level a s 'u \  Thus Russell’s theory of orders rules out self-predication as 
meaningless. This restriction then carries over to the extensional theory of types to block the set- 
theoretic paradoxes.
On Quine’s reading, Russell’s willingness to assume attributes results from his failure to 
appreciate the difference between schematically simulating predicates and quantifying over a 
particular kind of object, a ttrib u te s .W ith  this confusion in place, the construction of set theory 
from attributes then proceeds by contextual definition as Quine presents in his Set Theory and Its 
L o g i c , Russell’s first move is to treat the notation for membership, ‘ g ’, as an alternative 
notation for the attribution of a predicative attribute, a predicative attribute being an 
attribute of level «4-1 that holds of an object of level n\
‘x G for ^(p\x\
Ibid., Principia, p. 37; Russell “Theory o f  Types,” p. 63. (Russell’s italics) 
Ibid., p. 68.
^  W.V. Quine, Set Theory and Its Logic, 1963, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 251-52; 
For Russell’s original construction See Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia M athematica, vol. I, 
2"^  ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1925) pp. 24-5, 71-8; he presents the contextual definition itself 
on p. 76; for an exposition o f Russell’s original account see Potter, R eason’s Nearest Kin, pp. 147-50.
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Then he provides his contextual definition for class abstraction:
‘G{x: Fx}’ for ‘(3^)((Vx)(^!x = Fx) . G^)’ 
which defines ‘G{x: Fx}’ to express that ‘G’ is true of some arbitrary predicative attribute (p such 
that ‘(3^)(Vx)(ç9Îx = Fx)’, in short that some predicative attribute ‘r/>’ is extensionally equivalent 
to a predicate substitutable for the predicate ‘F ’. Quantification over classes is then defined 
‘(Vct)Ga’ for ‘(V^)G{x: ^!x}’, ‘(3a)Ga’ for ‘(3^)G{x: ^!x}’.
Finally, there is the law of extensionality,
(((Vx)(x G a = X e ^ ) . a G 3 ^  G k), 
for classes, but because they are only contextually defined, tire law does not have to be assumed 
for attributes as well, for as shown above, extensionality is all that distinguishes classes from 
attributes. By this contextual definition then, Russell thought he had derived set theory from 
what might appear as an innocent extension of predicate logic. Quine, however, concludes his 
discussion of Russell’s contextual definition remarking,
Russell had ... a philosophical preference for attributes, and felt that in contextually defining classes on the 
basis o f  a theory o f  attributes he was explaining the obscurer in terms o f  the clearer. But this feeling was 
due to his failure to distinguish between prepositional functions as predicates, or expressions, and 
prepositional functions as attributes. Failing this, he could easily think that the notion o f an attribute is 
clearer than that o f  a class; for that o f  a predicate is. But that o f  an attribute is less clear.*’*
It was the result of a failure to recognize distinctions between predicates and attributes that
Russell thought that he had reduced mathematics to logic.
In their Principles o f  Mathematical Logic, Hilbert and Ackermann drop Russell’s
hierarchy of propositional functions and assume outright that the values of their predicate
*’* Quine, Set Theory, pp. 256-57; For perhaps Quine’s earliest extended account o f  this criticism o f  Russell see his 
“Whitehead and the Rise o f Modern Logic [1941],” in Selected Logic Papers, enl. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), pp. 3-36, especially pp. 19-24.
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variables are extensional entities of a sort, classes or sets.^^ Here the problem as Quine sees it is 
no longer one of constructing the clearer upon the obscurer but that a misleading notational
device remains in place;
Followers o f  Hilbert have continued to quantify predicate letters, obtaining what they call a higher-order 
predicate calculus. The values o f  these variables are in effect sets; and this way o f  presenting set theory 
gives it a deceptive resemblance to logic. One is apt to feel that no abrupt addition to the ordinary logic o f  
quantification has been made; just some more quantifiers, governing predicate letters already present.^
Echoing Russell’s quantification over propositional functions, i.e., ‘V^’ and they quantify
predicate letters ‘VF’ and ‘3F ’ continuing to encourage the idea that so-called higher-order
predicate calculus is an innocent extension of ordinary predicate logic.
To illustrate his criticism Quine considers the axiom scheme of comprehension
‘(3y)(Vx)(x e y  = Fx) which assumes a set {x: Fx} determined by substituting an open sentence
for ‘Fx’. Here, it is worth noting some textual differences between the 1970 and 1986 editions of
Philosophy o f Logic as this will help clarify Quine’s argument. In the earlier edition he explains
the comprehension schema as
the central hypothesis o f  set theoiy, and the one that has to be restrained in one way or another to avoid the 
paradoxes. This hypothesis falls dangerously out o f  sight in the so-called higher-order predicate calculus.
It becomes ‘(3G) (x) {Gx = F x )\ and thus evidently follows from the genuinely logical triviality ‘(x) (Fx = 
Fx)’ by an elementary logical inference. Set theory’s staggering existential assumptions are cunningly 
hidden now in the tacit shift from schematic predicate letter to quantifiable set variable.^'*
Now, the importance of Quine’s earlier argument for the incoherence of quantifying over
schematic predicate letters reemerges. We saw there that having allowed quantification over
predicate letters, the predicate letters could no longer be treated as merely standing in place of
our ordinary predicates, e.g., ‘(D walks’, ‘(D is prime’, etc., but had to be rendered instead as
standing in place of objects of some sort. Russell’s theory of orders offered intensional objects.
David Hilbert and Wilhelm Ackermann, Principles o f  M athematical Logic, Lewis M. Hammond et al., trans. 
(New York; Chelsea Publishing Company, 1950) translated from Gnm dziige der Theoretischen Logik, 2"^  ed. 
(Berlin: Julius Springer, 1938); they cover “the extended predicate calculus” in chapt. IV.
Quine, Philosophy o f  Logic [1986], p. 68 .
^  W.V. Quine, Philosophy o f  Logic  (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970) p. 68 .
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attributes, and now Hilbert and Ackermann offer extensional objects, classes or sets. Quine’s 
complaint is that in doing so, they have not made this commitment to sets explicit but have rather 
presented their higher-order predicate calculus as misleadingly continuous with ordinary 
predicate logic. What Hilbert and Ackermann’s higher-order predicate calculus actually states in 
its ‘(3G)(x) (Gx = Fx)’ is ‘There is a set G such that for all objects x, x is a member of G if and 
only if X fulfills any condition F  on x’, rendered more explicitly in notation as ‘(3y)(x)(x e y s  
Fx)’, the unrestricted, and so contradictory, axiom schema of comprehension.^^ Of course 
Hilbert and Ackermaim’s higher-order predicate calculus, through its hierarchy of types, avoids 
the set-theoretic paradoxes in a way analogous to Russell’s hierarchy of orders.
What may leave Quine’s criticism in this passage uncleai' is the phi*ase ‘set theory’s 
staggering ontology’. Given that the context of this passage is a discussion of Hilbert and 
Ackermann’s higher-order predicate calculus, it is safe to say that the set-theoretic ontology is 
indeed staggering for the typically ambiguous comprehension schema will yield sets of 
individuals, sets of sets of individuals, sets of sets of sets of individuals and so on on up the 
hierarchy. Quine, whose primary interest in set theory has been in comparative set theory 
(comparative set theory being, roughly put, the study of what can be proved in a set theory 
according to the assumption of stronger and weaker axioms; much of contemporary set theory is 
more concerned with set theory’s model theory), certainly knows that not all formulations of set 
theory include the same staggering on to logy .Indeed , a primary concern of his has been to
For this way o f  reading Quine’s criticism see his earlier, “Logic and the Reification o f Universals,” in From a 
Logical Point o f  View, p. 121 and the reference there back to the unrestricted comprehension schema R3 o f “New  
Foundations for Mathematical Logic,” also in From a Logical Point o f  View. It is in “N ew  Foundations” that Quine 
presents his method o f  stratification for avoiding the set-theoretic paradoxes replacing R3 with R3'; see pp. 89-92 in 
particular.
Quine’s work in comparative set theory culminates with Set Theory and its Logic-, for an account o f  Quine’s work 
in the area o f  set theory see Joseph Ullian, “Quine and the Field o f Mathematical Logic,” in The Philosophy ofW . V. 
Quine, expanded ed., Lewis Edwin Hahn and Paul Arthur Schilpp, eds. (Chicago and LaSalle: Open Court 
Publishing Company, 1998), pp. 569-89; Set Theory and its Logic is discussed on pp. 582-86.
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investigate how little set theory must be assumed to still be sufficient for the needs of science.
That he does recognize these differences in ontological commitments appears explicitly in his
analogous discussion of the higher-order predicate calculus in Set Theory and its Logic. There
he remarks that Hilbert and Ackermann also present subsystems of full type theory where the
types terminate at a finite level. These theories they call the predicate calculus of «th order, and
so a theory that allows quantification over classes of individuals and relations of individuals they
call the second-order predicate calculus. They thus dub ordinary predicate logic “first-order
predicate calculus.” Quine views this practice of classifying logic and set theory by order as
once again encouraging the view that quantification over predicate letters is a mere extension of
ordinary predicate logic, a move that obscures the fact that quantification over predicate letters
introduces to logic a specific kind of object, sets.
Turning back now to the 1986 edition of Philosophy o f Logic, we find the following
revision to the above quoted passage concerning comprehension:
This hypothesis itself falls out o f sight in the so-called higher-order predicate calculus. We get ‘3G Vx (Gx 
<-> Fx)’, which evidently follows from the genuinely logical ti'iviality ‘ Vx (Fx <-> F x)’ by an elementary 
logical inference. There is no actual risk o f  paradox as long as the ranges o f  values o f ‘x ’ and ‘G’ are kept 
apart, but still a fair bit o f  set theory has slipped in unheralded.
Note first that Quine removes ‘dangerously’ fi'om the first sentence, and second, he revises the
last sentence explaining the restriction on comprehension needed to avoid the paradox and
tempers his claim about “set theory’s staggering existential assumptions”. Both changes, we can
surmise, are made in response to criticisms found in Boolos’s 1975 paper “On Second-Order
Logic” as we will see in the next chap te r.T h ere , Boolos criticized that Quine’s wording in the
original passage may lead some readers to think that Russell’s paradox had not been sufficiently
George Boolos, “On Second-Order Logic,” in Logic, Logic, and Logic, Richard Jeffrey, ed. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1991), pp. 40.
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eliminated from second-order logic. Quine’s removal of “dangerously” from the text and his 
inclusion of an explanation of how the paradox can be avoided dispenses with this worry.
There is though also a way in which we could see Boolos’s comments on Quine, not as 
criticism but as exposition. In a sense, Quine does think that higher-order logic is inconsistent, 
not as Russell, Hilbert and Ackermann, or Boolos present it of course, but as it stands prior to 
their introducing some ad hoc restriction in order to cope with the paradox. Without such a 
restriction “the genuinely logical triviality ‘ Vx(Fx Fx)’ by an elementary logical inference,” 
namely existential generalization over predicate letters, does generate Russell’s pai'adox thus 
demonstrating the inconsistency of what we may want to call “naïve higher-order logic.” Indeed, 
in his earlier work on the extension of quantification theory to quantification over predicate 
letters, this is precisely his order of explanation. In both the 1937 “New Foundations for 
Mathematical Logic” and the 1947 “On Universals”, he initially extends quantification to 
predicate letters so that they have all the privileges of ordinary variables. The result is Russell’s 
paradox. Only then does he add some restriction for blocking the paradox, some way of keeping 
the range of the predicate variables separate from that of the individual variables.^^ Flis purpose 
in presenting matters this way is to show that the extension of logic so as to include 
quantification over predicate letters deprives logic of any characterization as unconditioned, self- 
evident, or obvious, all descriptions that traditionally singled logic out from other sciences. It 
was precisely this trait that made the reduction of mathematics to logic so important to Quine’s 
predecessors in the analytic tradition, a point of which I will say more below.
Quine, “N ew  Foundations for Mathematical Logic,” pp. 89-92; “On Universals,” pp. 78-9; see also “Logic and the 
Reification o f  Universals,” pp. 121-25 and footnote 65 above.
The classic exposition o f  the sort o f  type-theoretic machinery required to block the set-theoretic paradoxes is 
Alonzo Church, “A Fonnulation o f the Simple Theory o f  Types,” Journal o f  Symbolic Logic 5:2 (1940), pp. 56-68; 
see also Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, “Syntactic Connexion,” in Polish Logic: 1920-1939, Storrs McCall, ed. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 207-31.
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On now to Quine’s more moderate claim about the ontological commitments of higher- 
order logic. This revision indicates not an error in the earlier edition but only that Quine is no 
longer considering the entire type-theoretic hierarchy as he was in 1970 but only a second-order 
subsystem consisting of individuals and sets of individuals. One consequence of Boolos’s paper 
was that it forced the debate over the status of higher-order predicate calculus to center on its 
second-order fragment. Though, from here, one may go on to argue this second-order fragment 
has nothing like the existential assumptions of the whole of set theory and so it is much closer to 
ordinary predicate logic than Quine would lead his readers to believe. Still, when he talks of 
keeping the ranges of the variables ‘x’ and ‘G’ apart, he is talking of two object variables, one 
over individuals and the other over sets. The existential assumptions of ‘3G Vx (Gx = Fx)’ 
become clear when rendered into the less misleading notation ‘3a Vx (x e a = Fx)’. The usual 
object variables ‘x’, ‘y ’, ‘z’, etc. range over a domain of individuals, and the set variables, ‘a ’,
‘y’, etc. range over subsets of this domain. The comprehension principle then states only the 
existence of sets of individuals.
“Set theory” seems the appropriate label in a second way as well for the sets of this 
theory represent an application of the power set operation, and while only a single application, it 
is one of the central ingredients for generating the whole of Zermelo’s iterative hierarchy of sets, 
and so is also a way of recognizing a particular subdomain of o b j e c t s . A l l  of these 
considerations lead Quine to view the second-order fragment of higher-order predicate calculus 
as another chapter of comparative set theory.
Ignacio Jane raises another difficulty with the single application o f power set here in that to understand the 
contents o f  the power set o f  a set o f  low rank we may need to appeal to sets o f much higher rank, i.e. appeal to a 
much more powerful set theory; see his “A Critical Appraisal o f Second-Order Logic,” H istory and Philosophy o f  
Logic 14 (1993), pp. 67-86, and especially pp. 75-6.
Here 1 am indebted to conversations with Thomas Ricketts.
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II.Ü
In his attempt to carve out a “reasonable boundary” for what he calls ‘logic’, Quine does 
not limit his attention to classical quantification theory and what amounts to its supplementation 
by some fragment of set theory. He recognizes that this boundary may still seem arbitrary to 
some readers and so expands his considerations to a particular feature of classical quantification 
theory itself, namely its completeness: that all valid schemas of classical quantification theory 
are deducible within it.
He places this objection—that ordinary quantification theory is arbitrarily restrictive— 
into the context of Henkin’s work on branching quantifiers.^^ To motivate this apparent 
extension of quantification theory, Quine considers the following example due essentially to 
Henkin:
(1) Each thing bears P to something y and each thing bears g  to something w such that RywP
Quine then offers two possible ways for parapluasing this sentence into ordinary quantification 
theory:
(2) (x)(3y)(Fxy . (z)(3w)(gzw . F^w))
(3) {z){3w){Qzw . (x)(3y)(Pxy . Pyw)).
But here he observes a difficulty: these two proposals are not equivalent. In (2) the choice of ‘y ’ 
is independent of the choice of ‘z’ whereas in (3) the choice of ‘y ’ is shown dependent on ‘z’;
and in (3) the choice of ‘w’ is independent of the choice of ‘x’ whereas in (2) the choice o f ‘w’ is
^  Quine, Philosophy o f  Logic, pp. 89-91; and “Existence and Quantification,” in Ontological Relativity and Other 
Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 108-13. I will focus on Quine’s more detailed 
discussion in “Existence and Quantification” though the conclusions he draws are the same in both texts. On 
Henkin’s branching quantifiers see Leon Henkin, “Some Remarks on Infinitely Long Formulas,” Infuiitistic 
Methods: Proceedings o f  the Symposium o f  Foundations o f  Mathematics, Warsaw /P5P (New York: Pergamon, 
1961), pp. 167-83.
Henkin, “Some Remarks on Infinitely Long Formulas,” p. 181.
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shown dependent on ‘x \  In addition, he also provides a possible interpretation for T ’, ‘g ’, and 
‘P ’ in (1) that renders these dependencies altogether unnecessary by taking T ’ as ‘is part o f , ‘g ’ 
as ‘contains’, and ‘P ’ as ‘is bigger than’ which yields
(4) Each thing is part of something y and each thing contains something w such that y is 
bigger than w.
Thus, it appears that the forced choice between (2) and (3) may be the fault of an arbitrarily 
restrictive quantificational notation. And in fact, this seems plausible as Henlcin’s initial solution 
to the dilemma, adding function letters as values of quantified variables, does avoid the 
prejudices of both (2) and (3):
(5) (3/)(3^)W(z) (Px/,. Q zsz.
But admitting function letters as values of bound variables yields a new prejudice not found in
(2) or (3). We have now committed ourselves to higher-order mathematical objects, functions, 
whereas (2) and (3) made no such commitments to any particular brand of objects, mathematical 
or otherwise. (5) then does not share the elementary character of (2) and (3). Henkin attempts to 
avoid this higher-order commitment by introducing his branching quantifiers:
W(3y)(6) (JPxy . Qzw . Ryw)
(z)(3w)
which eliminates the prejudices of both (2) and (3) and also of (5); the choice of ‘y ’ depends only 
on ‘x’ and the choice of ‘w’ only on ‘z’ while apparently avoiding any commitments to functions
Ibid., p. 181. This may seem a particularly natural way to expand ordinary quantification theory i f  the theory 
already contains function letters. However, as noted above, Quine does not include function letters in the austere 
notation o f ordinary quantification theory. Function letters may be used o f  course as a notational convenience, but 
so long as we do not quantify over them, we have made no commitment to their existence. The function letters can 
always be paraphrased away by Russell’s method o f descriptions. Following Quine’s view o f  unquantified class 
variables, we may think also o f this use o f  function letters as only “a degenerate specimen” o f  the theory o f  
functions given such a statement’s equivalence to some statement o f ordinary quantification theory without function 
letters. On the degenerate use o f  class variables see “Logic and the Reification o f Universals,” p. 114.
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thus lending even further support to the view that our original quantification theory was overly 
restrictive in its notational resources.
Against this view though, Quine urges the completeness of quantification theory, that 
quantification theory yields complete proof procediues for proving both validity and 
inconsistency. Either procedure will serve both purposes in that a formula is valid if and only if 
its negation is inconsistent.^^ In the functionally existential annex however, including sentences 
such as (5) which is equivalent to (6), there are only complete proof procedures for 
inconsistency. Likewise, its functionally universal counterpart has only complete proof 
procedures for validity. The same procedure for proving validity or inconsistency will not apply 
generally in the extended theory of quantification because the negation of a functionally 
existential formula is equivalent to a functionally universal formula, not a fimctionally existential 
formula. Just the opposite holds in the case of functionally universal formulas. In fact, Quine 
notes that Craig has shown that the negation of a functionally existential formula is never 
equivalent to a functionally existential formula except where the functions were unnecessary to 
begin with, i.e., where the functionally existential formula was already equivalent to some first- 
order formula. This fact holds equally for functionally universal formulas.
Yet we may remain unconvinced. Why limit logic to ordinary, or first-order, 
quantification theory? The answer lies in a point stressed in the first section of this paper— 
logic’s concern with implication. In a passage From Stimulus to Science, Quine asks.
Quine, “Existence and Quantification,” p. 111. The most relevant proof procedure in this context is based on 
Skolem’s device o f showing a formula inconsistent by taking its functional normal form and instantiating it so as to 
derive a truth functional contradiction fr om it. Quine presents the technique in “On a Proof Procedure for 
Quantification Theory [1954],” in Selected Logic Papers, pp. 196-204.
William Craig, “Thiee Uses o f  the Herbrand-Gentzen Theorem,” Journal o f  Symbolic Logic 22 (1957), pp. 269- 
85, specifically, p. 281. In his paper, Henkin reports a result o f  Eluenfeucht’s also demonstrating the 
incompleteness o f quantification theory supplemented with branching quantifiers; see “Some Remarks on Infinitely 
Long Formulas,” pp. 181-82. Quine no doubt presents the incompleteness o f  quantification theory supplemented 
with branching quantifiers in terms o f  quantified function letters to make more perspicuous the assumption o f  
substantial mathematical power contained in Henkin’s branching quantifiers.
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What defines implication? Elementary predicate logic is enough: the truth functions and quantification.. .
. In our mathematical maturity we can encapsulate this logic in a complete formalization describable from 
scratch in a couple o f  pages. More briefly still, for those abreast o f  the jargon, it is as follows. To prove 
that a given set o f  premises implies a contemplated conclusion, prove that the premises are inconsistent 
with the negation o f  that conclusion. Do so by putting the premises and the negated conclusion into prenex 
form and then accumulating a truth functional inconsistency by persistent instantiation o f  the universal and 
existential quantifiers, taking care to use a new variable for each existential instantiation.
Implication thus defined is all we need to mean by implication. The laws o f  set theory and the rest o f  
mathematics can be ranged rather among the premises that are doing the implying, on a par with the laws 
and hypotheses o f natural science.’’
The method Quine describes here for making implications explicit is one of the complete proof
procedures for ordinary quantification theory, “Thus,” for Quine, “classical, unsupplemented
quantification theory is on this score maximal: it is as far out as you can go and still have
complete coverage of validity and inconsistency by the Skolem proof procedure.
Completeness, assures us that a precise account of implication is ready to hand, by mere
description of one the complete proof procedures for classical quantification theory. Quine’s
account of implication does not rest on the truth of substantial mathematical suppositions such as
the axiom of choice, expressible in quantification theory supplemented with quantifiable function
letters, or the continuum hypothesis, expressible in quantification theory supplemented with
quantifiable predicate let ters .Limit ing logic to a complete theory, like his substitutional
definition of logical truth, is another way in which we manage to keep our feet on the ground.
The functionally existential annex, what appeared to be a harmless supplementation of the theory
of classical quantification, falls outside this boundary and gives us reason to fairly represent
Henkin’s branching quantifiers as committed to functions. “Fairly” in that Quine sees the lack of
completeness to indicate extra-logical mathematical content in the branching quantifiers;
”  Quine, Stimulus to Science, pp. 51-2.
’® Quine, “Existence and Quantification,” p. 111-12.
I will have more to say on this point in the following chapter,
Quine, Methods [1982], p. 212; Philosophy o f  Logic  [1986], pp. 56-8. Juliet Floyd, in conversation, has suggested 
to me another reason that Quine stresses the importance o f  completeness. Completeness allows him to maintain an 
extensional conception o f logical implication; there is no need to bring in the modal notion o f  necessity. Again, a 
description o f one o f the complete proof procedures for ordinary quantification theory is all we need mean by 
‘implication’.
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quantification over function letters makes this significant mathematical assumption explicit, he 
thinlcs, in a way that the branching quantifiers do not. The same can also be said for Quine’s 
considerations of quantification over predicate letters construed as set variables as discussed 
above. By Godel’s incompleteness theorem, he remarks, “it follows that set theory, even the 
mere theory of sets of individuals, admits of no complete proof procedure. In this regard it is 
like most branches of mathematics.”^^
There is one final issue to take up bearing relevance to Quine’s limiting quantification 
theory at the boundary of completeness. This is his characterization of logical truths as obvious 
or potentially obvious by a series of individually obvious steps. His choice of the word 
‘obvious’ here is significant as a replacement for more traditional characterizations of logic as 
self-evident or analytic in that ‘obvious’ is meant to undercut the overtones of epistemological 
privilege in a foundational sense associated with the more traditional philosophical terminology 
as he makes clear in his 1954 “Carnap and Logical Truth”:
I have been using the vaguely psychological word ‘obvious’ non-technically, assigning it no explanatory 
value. My suggestion is merely that the linguistic doctrine o f  elementary logical truth likewise leaves 
explanation unbegun. I do not suggest that the linguistic doctrine is false and some doctrine o f  ultimate and 
inexplicable insight into the obvious traits o f  reality is true, but only that there is no real difference between 
these two pseudo-doctrines.®^
For Quine, truth is truth, and nothing is gained for traditional epistemological aims by trying to
distinguish the logical truths from other “ordinary” truths, if this distinction can even be made
sense of at all.
Quine returns to this issue in Philosophy o f Logic by connecting the obviousness of 
logical truths with translation.^^ He begins by describing a situation in which we are trying to 
translate some unknown language on the basis of observable behavior. Suppose that a native
Quine, Stimulus to Science, pp. 52.
W.V. Quine, “Carnap and Logical Truth,” in Paul Arthur Schilpp, ed.. The Philosophy o f  R udolf Carnap (LaSalle:
Open Court Publishing Company, 1963), p. 390. 
Quine, Philosophy o f  Logic [1986], pp. 82-3.
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were willing to assent to some compound sentence but not to one of its components, this would 
be reason not to construe the compound as conjunction. The same reasoning would lead us not 
to translate a sentence as an alternation if a native were willing to assent to a component but not 
the compound. In such a way, we impose our logic on the native so building it into our 
translation manual. He is quick to remark though that logic is not all that we build into our 
translation manual. If the native were unwilling to assent to a certain sentence in the rain, this 
would be evidence for not translating the sentence as ‘It is raining’. In translating, we should 
aim to construe obvious sentences of the native language into obvious sentences of English. 
Quine’s maxim for translation is “Save the obvious.
Still he recognizes a difference between logic and other branches of science, for logic is 
more thoroughly obvious than these other branches, but again making his point, that ‘obvious’ is 
not meant to caiTy epistemological significance: “Preparatory to developing this point I must 
stress that I am using the word ‘obvious’ in an ordinary behavioral sense, with no 
epistemological overtones. When I call ‘1 + 1 = 2 ’ obvious to a community I mean only that 
everyone, nearly enough, will unhesitatingly assent to it, for whatever reason. . . Herein lies 
the difference between logic and the other sciences: all logical truths are obvious or potentially 
obvious by a series of individually obvious steps, and “[t]o say this is in effect just to repeat 
some remarks of Chapter 4: that the logic of quantification and identity admits of complete 
proof procedures, and some of these are procedures that generate sentences purely from visibly 
true sentences by steps that visibly preserve truth.
Here Quine presents yet another reason to limit logic to unsupplemented quantification 
theory. As remarked in our previous considerations of completeness, the mere extension of
®‘* Ibid., p. 83.
Ibid., p. 82.
Ibid., p. 83.
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quantification theory to branching quantifiers led to a loss of complete proof procedures and the 
same holds for set theory, even set theory limited to sets of individuals. There are truths in both 
of these extensions of quantification theory that are not obvious or obtainable by individually 
obvious steps. In the previous section, we saw a similar occurrence of a failure of obviousness 
with regard to the unrestricted comprehension principle. There, Quine focused not on the failure 
of completeness for higher-order logic, or set theory, but rather how the application of a 
supposedly elementary logical inference in a theory of classes or attributes led to Russell’s 
paradox making his point that in set theory, “ [cjommon sense is bankmpt.”^^  Now we see again, 
in considering completeness, how the logic of quantification is maximal and a solid and 
significant body of truths.
What Quine tries to show throughout his considerations of higher-order logic is that such 
extensions of ordinary quantification theory go beyond what intuitively, or traditionally, we 
would be willing to label Togic’. In presenting classical quantification theory, he has brought 
out its continuity with traditional, or intuitive, views of logic. Hence, he sketches a conception 
of logic that has as its chief importance implication as such, rather than implication that shows 
prejudice towards some particular subdomain of objects whether they be attributes, sets, or 
functions. His focus, like that of the pre-Frege-Russell tradition in logic, is on form; logic itself 
has no objects which to call its own. Additionally, the importance Quine attaches to implication 
for logic, leads him to emphasize that “logic” lacking in complete proof procedures goes beyond 
the boundary of what he recognizes as logic for it fails to yield a notion of implication that is 
both precise and independent of substantial mathematical claims. Finally, we have seen how 
Quine appeals to the traditional description of logic as a self-evident body of truths. He 
maintains this view by redescribing logic as ‘obvious’, stripping away the traditional
Quine, “Whitehead,” p. 27; see also footnote 19.
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epistemological overtones o f ‘self-evident’, and indicating how ordinaiy quantification theory 
has this feature of obviousness, while other higher branches of mathematics do not.
Someone may still object to all of these considerations. What has Quine really proved? 
Why should Quine, a philosopher who has broken with so much of traditional philosophy, hold 
fast to any of these ideas in carving out a body of truths on which to bestow the honorific 
“logic”? In his essay “Existence and Quantification,” Quine himself responded that he proved 
nothing.^^ To prove something, to show us what logic really is was not Quine’s aim, nor had it 
ever been.^^ His purpose rather was to show how the logical tradition stemming from Frege and 
Russell failed to recognize important cleavages between ordinary predicate logic and so-called 
higher-order logic. This failure to draw a distinction between logic naiTowly construed and logic 
broadly construed led to the view that mathematics had in essentials been reduced to logic, with 
all the epistemological privilege the tradition would associate with such a reduction. Quine’s 
aim was to bring out how the move to quantification over predicate letters was a move far less 
innocent than it appeared for it allowed logic to presuppose the power of higher mathematics, 
namely set theory. As he explains.
The reduction o f  classical mathematics to one or another so meager a conceptual basis was amazing and 
illuminating, but calling it a reduction o f  mathematics to logic— logicism, in a word— gave the wrong 
message. Logic was proverbially slight and trivial. Mathematics proverbially ranged from the profound to 
the impenetrable, and reduction o f mathematics to logic challenged belief, as indeed it well might. The 
reduction was to the unbridled tlieory o f  classes, or set theory, which, far from being slight and trivial, is so 
strong as to tangle itself in paradox until bridled in one way or another.. . .  But what it shows is that the 
startling reduction o f mathematics is to something far richer than traditional logic. I prefer to limit the term
W.V. Quine, “Existence and Quantification,” p. 112.
O f Quine’s dissertation Dreben writes.
Between 1916, when Sheffer began to teach at Harvard, and 1932 eleven dissertations were written on the 
nature o f logical implication, the nature o f  logical systematization, or the nature o f logical justification. 
Quine’s however was not one o f  these. In a foreshadowing o f  his great debate with Carnap, he showed no 
sign o f having shared his teachers’ conviction that logic is sui generis and requires a general philosophical 
account.
In “Quine,” p. 83.
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“logic” to the logic o f  truth functions, quantification, and identity, drawing the line at the reification o f  
classes,^**
We see here Quine not disparaging the reduction but only explaining tliat it was not a reduction 
to the obvious or self-evident foundation that Frege and Russell sought. Bestowing upon higher- 
order logic the label ‘set theory’ is not, then, in any way to show the reduction disrespect; it is 
rather to make clear what precisely the reduction was. Once, these assumptions have been made 
explicit, what we choose to call logic is merely a terminological issue.^^ What we see in Quine’s 
identification of logic with classical quantification theory is his adherence to the ordered pair as a 
philosophical paradigm—his special, if not unique, concern with clarity and explicitness. We do 
not claim synonymy or to make explicit hidden meanings that the speaker had in mind all along, 
but rather, “devise a substitute, clear and couched in terms to our liking, that fulfills those 
functions.” For Quine, logic’s importance is its ability to make sense of and to make explicit the 
logical relation of implication, and classical quantification theory fulfills this function to Quine’s 
satisfaction. The answer as to whether what he has presented is really logic is a non-starter for 
him. Indeed, in another context, we find just this sort of response to an objection of Kripke’s;
One o f  Kripke’s moral precepts deplores “the tendency to propose technical criteria with the aim o f  
excluding approaches one dislikes” (p. 410). He notes in illustration that I adopted a criterion of 
ontological reduction for no other reason than that it “includes well-known cases and excludes undesired 
cases.” I  pro test that mine was expressly a  quest fo r  an objective criterion agreeing with our intuitive 
sorting o f  cases. This is a p roper and characteristically philosophical sort o f  quest, so long as one knows 
and says what one is doing f
Much the same can be said for Quine’s conception of logic.
^  W.V. Quine, “Confessions o f  a Confirmed Extensionalist,” in Future Pasts: the Analytic Tradition in Twentieth- 
Century Philosophy, Juliet Floyd and Sanford Shieh, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) p. 219; 
similar considerations are found in Quine’s “Epistemology Naturalized,” in Ontological Relativity, pp. 69-70, 73.
See for example W.V. Quine, “Carnap and Logical Truth,” pp. 387-89; and his entry on “Predicate Logic,” in 
Quiddities: an Intermittently Philosophical D ictionary {C?iV[)bnége\ Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 158.
^  W.V. Quine, “Responding Further to Kiipke,” in Theories and Things (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1981), p. 175. Quine’s page reference is to Saul Kripke, “Is There a Problem About Substitutional Quantification?” 
in Truth and Meaning, Gareth Evans and John M cDowell, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 325- 
419. (My emphasis)
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Chapter II: Boolos on Second-Order Logic
In this chapter we will consider George Boolos’s response to Quine’s criticisms of 
second-order logic. In his 1975 “On Second-Order Logic”, Boolos sets out to call into question 
the view “commonly supposed that the arguments of Quine and others for not regarding second- 
(and higher-) order logic as logic are decisive. . . He describes his own interest in this dispute 
as one of a quasi-terminological nature, a deliberation over “the extent to which second-order 
logic is (or is to be counted as) logic, and the extent to which it is set theory.” Whether second- 
order logic may bear the (honorific) label “logic” or that of “set theory” is of little significance. 
What is of significance to him are the reasons that can be offered in support of the two 
positions.^
From our considerations of Quine’s conception of logic in the previous chapter, we see 
already that that the dialectic between Boolos and Quine will not be as straight-forward as we 
might have thought. For Quine himself is not among those who think that decisive arguments 
can be offered to decide the bounds of logic. The best we can do is to be explicit about how and 
what we are willing to apply the label “logic” to relying perhaps on certain intuitive 
chaiucteristics we may think logic should have. As we have seen, this part of the terminological 
issue is of the greatest importance for Quine. What he has emphasized is that merely applying 
the label “logic” does not guarantee that what we apply it to will have the sorts of features 
traditionally thought to characterize logic. This is of particular significance in context of 
logicism where the reduction to something called “logic” was supposed to secure a solid 
foundation for all of mathematics. In contrast, Boolos’s arguments proceed, mostly, by
‘ Boolos, “Second-Order Logic,” p. 37; 1 think Boolos presents his own position here as far more neutral than it 
sometimes comes across in the body o f his paper. To me, it seems, he is often presenting a defence o f  second-order 
logic as logic. Still, I have tried thi*oughout this chapter to inform my interpretation o f  his position with his initial 
declaration o f  neutrality in mind.
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comparing first-order logic, second-order logic, and set theory. However, he offers very little 
independent reason for us to consider why any of these theories should be considered logic 
further complicating a straightforward assessment as to the success of his arguments against 
Quine’s position. With this in mind, the possibility that Boolos and Quine are talking past one 
another should always be retained as the proper assessment of this debate, and perhaps also one 
reason that Quine never responded to much of Boolos’s attack.
Boolos begins his discussion by expressing his approval of Quine’s having deplored two 
confusions concerning quantification over predicate letters—that and ‘(VF)’ say that
some or all predicates or predicate expressions are thus and so and that quantification over 
attributes has ontological advantages over quantification over sets. He rejects Quine’s view 
though that quantification over predicate letters is to be deplored even when their values are 
taken to be sets because predicates are not names of their extensions. To make his point, Boolos 
returns to a passage from Quine, which we saw already in the previous chapter. Recall that 
Quine argued there,
Consider first some ordinary quantifications: ‘3x { x  walks)’, ‘ Vx (z walks)’, ( x  is prime)’. The open 
sentence after the quantifier shows ‘x ’ in a position where a name could stand; a name o f  a walker, for 
instance, or o f  a prime number. The quantifications do not mean that names walk or are prime; what are 
said to walk or to be prime are things that could be named by names in those positions. To put the 
predicate letter ‘F ’ in a quantifier, then, is to treat predicate positions suddenly as name positions, and 
hence to treat predicates as names o f  entities o f  some sort. The quantifier ‘3 F ’ or ‘ V/^’ says not that some 
or all predicates are thus and so, but that some or all entities o f  the sort named by predicates are thus and so/
Boolos is willing to grant that predicates are not names but not that quantifiable variables do not 
belong in predicate positions. To make his point, he then poses this inverted passage against the 
quotation from Quine:
“ Quine, Philosophy o f  Logic [1986], pp. 66-7. (Quine’s italics)
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Consider some extraordinary quantifications: ‘(3F)(Aristotle 7 3 ’, ‘(/^(Aristotle F ) \  ‘(373(17 73’. The 
open sentence after the quantifier shows ‘F ’ in a position where a predicate could stand; a predicate with an 
extension in which Aristotle, for instance, or 17 might be. The quantifications do not mean that Aristotle or 
17 are in predicates; whaf Aristotle or 17 are said to be in are things that could be had by  predicates in those 
positions. To put the variable ‘x ’ in a quantifier, then, is to treat name positions suddenly as predicate 
positions, and hence to ti eat names as predicates with extensions o f some sort. The quantifier ‘(3x)’ or 
‘(x)’ says not that some or all names are thus and so, but that some or all extensions o f  the sort had by 
names are thus and so.
And concludes, supposing Quine had argued this instead, “we should have wanted to say that the 
last two statements were false and did not follow from what preceded them. It seems to me that 
the same ought to be said about the argument Quine actually g iv e s .B o o lo s  explains that 
quantifying over ‘F ’ may be to treat ‘F ’ as having a range, but this does not mean that these 
predicates become names of any sort of entity. Quine’s mistake is in supposing that because 
ordinaiy variables, individual vaiiables, always occur where a name could stand, this must hold 
for all kinds of variables. The two concluding sentences of Boolos’s parallel passage for 
extraordinary quantifications do indeed fail, but not, I think, in the way he intends them to.
Let us consider the two passages more carefully and see where they do or do not go 
wrong. First, we have Quine’s ordinary quantification ‘(3x)(x walks)’. In this sentence, ‘x ’ can 
be instantiated by an object, any object of the domain, and we use a name to mention the object, 
so ‘x’ is in a position where a name could stand. For example we could use the name ‘Aristotle’ 
to mention the object, the person, Aristotle, and say ‘Aristotle walks’. It would be difficult, 
really nonsensical, to try to place the person Aristotle himself into the sentence, but using a name 
to mention him easily dispenses with this awkwardness. The case of the predicate is different; 
we just have the predicate ‘© walks’ itself occurring in the sentence, and this predicate has an 
extension, specifically the set of walkers, ‘ {y : y walks}’, though nothing is said of this extension 
here. The occurrence of a predicate in a sentence commits us to no further entity of which it is a 
name. We could however re-wiite the sentence so that it does say something of the extension,
Boolos, “Second-Order Logic,” p. 38. (Boolos’s italics)
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the thing or object, that the predicate has thus: ‘(3x)(x e {y: y  walks})’. Both renderings of this 
sentence have the logical form ‘(3x)Fx’. Except in this second version, the name '{y: y  walks}’ 
names the set of walkers, {y: y  walks}, which is the extension of the predicate ‘ ® walks’. 
Aristotle is a member of this set: ‘Aristotle g {y: y  walks}’ which invites additional ordinary 
objectual quantifications if we add a second sort of variable that ranges only over sets, such as 
‘(3a)(3x)(xe a )’ and ‘(Va)(3x)(xe a)’.
Comparing Boolos’s parallel passage for predicates, here we have extraordinary 
quantifications such as ‘(3jF)(Aristotle F )\  ‘(VF)(Aristotle F )\  and ‘(3F)(17 F )\  Boolos 
explains that the open sentence shows ‘F ’ in a predicate position, so here we could insert a 
predicate such as ‘© walks’ that has the extension ‘{y: y walks}’ in which, for example,
Aristotle might be. The extraordinary quantifications do not say Aristotle is in a predicate, but 
rather that Aristotle is in things that could be had by predicates in this position, and these things 
are extensions, or sets. But read with Boolos’s locutions “for all things had by a predicate F  such 
that” or “for some thing had by predicate F  such that”, the quantifications over predicate letters 
seem to actually be quantifications over extensions, or sets. By both Boolos and Quine’s 
accounts then, the things had by predicates are extensions, or sets.
Now to assess the concluding two sentences of which Boolos thinlcs we should have 
wanted to say are false and do not follow from what preceded them: “To put the variable ‘x’ in a 
quantifier, then, is to treat name positions suddenly as predicate positions, and hence to treat 
names as predicates with extensions of some sort. The quantifier ‘(3x)’ or ‘(x)’ says not that 
some or all names are thus and so, but that some or all extensions of the sort had by names are 
thus and so.” For example, existentially quantifying over ‘x’ we get something like ‘® is x’ or 
'd) x ’s \  where a predicate such as ‘© aristotlizes’ could go. When interpreted under Boolos’s
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suggested locution for quantification over predicate letters, the extraordinary quantification does 
not force an incoherent reading. Instead, the quantification is over the extension of ‘© is x’, over 
the predicate’s extension, a set ‘ {z: xz} ’. The quantification treating the name position as a 
predicate position no longer treats indiscriminately among the objects of the domain but 
specifically of sets. Instead of saying “There is some object x such that x walks” as in Quine’s 
name passage, the extraordinary quantification says ‘There is some thing that the predicate x has 
such there is some thing that the predicate F  has such that the thing that x has is included in the 
thing that F  has’ or alternatively, ‘There is some set {z: xz} such that there is some set {y: Fy} 
such that (z: xz} is included in {y: Fy}’ or even more simply \3 a ) (3 /] ) (a c fy .
What Boolos wants his readers to say is false and does not follow in his last two 
sentences is that names do not get turned into predicates with extensions of some sort when they 
are quantified over just because the extraordinary predicate letter quantifications quantify over 
the extensions had by predicates. This should lead us to the same conclusion about Quine’s 
name passage—that just because some variables stand in name positions does not mean that all 
variables do. This does not work as Boolos would have liked. As we just saw, his predicate 
letters remain schematic, marking places where actual predicates could be substituted. What 
looks to be quantification over predicate letters, he explains, is quantification over the things had 
by predicates in these positions, over their extensions. Put this way no use of ‘name’ or any of 
its cognates is made. But this locution seems to obscure the fact that we are indeed quantifying 
over the things predicates have which nicely leads to a point Quine has repeatedly emphasized— 
that extending quantification to predicate letters is not an imiocent extension of ordinary 
quantification theory but rather introduces sets to the quantification theory. These
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quantifications are fairly, and more honestly, shown by quantifying over sets, and these set 
variables occur in positions where names of sets could stand.
The apparently extraordinary quantifications over predicate letters then are not so 
extraordinary after all. They are just ordinary quantifications over a subdomain of objects, sets, 
and Quine certainly does not want to deny the legitimacy of these quantifications. In fact, this 
sort of quantification is already available in Quine’s ordinary quantifications. Quantification 
over extensions is objectual quantification—quantification over places where names could 
stand—names of objects, specifically sets in the case of extensions. The variables ‘x’, ‘y ’, ‘z’ 
will already admit sets as their values should we want to allow sets into our ontology. And if we 
want to distinguish set variables from individual variables we may admit the variables ‘a ’,
‘y’ to range separately over sets. This move leaves the schematic predicate letters available for 
the places where they are actually needed without any suggestion that they may also serve as 
quantifiable variables/ Quine and Boolos can agree so far as predicates not naming anything. 
What Quine will object to is Boolos’s allowing predicate letters to do double duty so as not to 
make explicit the predicate variables’ commitments to quantification over sets. Boolos wants to 
say that the predicate letter stands in a place where a predicate could go, so they are schematic in 
Quine’s sense. But then when he quantifies over the predicate letter, he quantifies over the 
things predicates could have as their extensions. He does not add a distinct variable for these 
quantifications, so it is hard to understand the predicate letters otherwise than as now ranging 
over extensions, as being in positions where names could go, specifically names of sets.
What we should have wanted to say is false and does not follow from what preceded it is 
that names do not have extensions, but what we have seen as correct is that when quantifying
For a discussion o f just these sorts o f  issues see W.V. Quine, “Logic and the Reification o f  Universals,” in From a 
Logical Point o f  View^ pp. 112-13.
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over extensions, the variable marks a place where a name could stand, a name of the things in the 
range of the variables. And we reach this correct conclusion whether we consider Quine’s 
original passage or Boolos’s inverted passage. A more promising strategy for Boolos perhaps 
would have been not to focus on Quine’s view that quantified predicate letters say that some or 
all entities named by predicates are thus and so, but that quantified predicate letters do not force 
existential commitments to the extensions that these predicate variables could have.^
Boolos next turns his criticisms towards Quine’s suggestion that rather than quantify over 
predicate letters, the logician who wants to admit these quantifications should instead replace the 
logical schema with its set-theoretic analogue and then quantify over the set variables. Boolos 
explains.
In the same section o f Philosophy o f  Logic  Quine has some advice for the logician who want to admit sets 
as values o f  quantifiable variables and also wanted distinctive variables for sets. The logician should not, 
Quine says write ‘Fx’ and there upon quantify on ‘F ’, but should instead write ‘x  e  a ’ and then, if  he 
wishes, quantify on ‘cc’. The advantage o f the new notation is thought to be its greater explicitness about 
the set-theoretic presuppositions o f  second-order logic. ^
Boolos’s explanation of Quine’s suggestion is not quite right. In the passage Boolos refers to,
Quine is instead further explicating the difference between schematic predicate letters and
variables, as we saw in the previous chapter. Reiterating his point that predicates are not names
of attributes or sets, he recommends instead replacing the predicate letters with ordinary
variables and reading them as ‘x hasy’, or ‘x has Ç using distinct attribute variables. The same
can be done for the logician who rejects attributes in favor of taking the values of predicate
letters to be sets writing instead ‘x e y ’, or ‘x e a ’ using distinct set variables. Quine’s
recommended notation will of course have certain consequences for how the set- (or attribute-)
 ^ Indeed this is the strategy we will see Boolos pursuing in the next chapter. 
 ^Boolos, “Second-Order Logic,” p. 39.
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theoretic presuppositions of second-order logic are displayed, but this is not Quine’s primary 
purpose here.
The way Boolos understands Quine’s recommendation brings out an important difference 
between the ways these two philosophers regard second-order logic. Boolos, for the pmposes of 
his present investigation into second- (or higher-) order logic, grants that second- (or higher-) 
order logic may be a distinct theory, perhaps independent of both logic and set theory, of which 
he can inquire into what extent it is like set theory and to what extent is it like first-order logic. 
Quine, in contrast, sees reasons to reject a distinct theory of higher-order logic identifying it 
instead as a way of formalizing set theory, and like all set theories, its set-theoretic commitments 
will vary depending on the strength of the set theory involved. As we have seen, it may include 
just individuals and sets of individuals or it may include the whole of the type-theoretic hierarchy 
(construed cumulatively or, as Quine does, non-cumulatively), individuals, sets of individuals, 
sets of sets of individuals and so on. This difference is worth noting as Boolos will place much 
emphasis on accounting for the set-theoretic presuppositions of second-order logic, whereas for 
Quine, they will vary according to how strong the higher-order logic, i.e., the set theory, is.
A related point can be made concerning the reason Boolos suggests as to why Quine may 
want to make explicit the set-theoretic presuppositions of second-order logic. He explains.
In order to give a theory o f  truth for a first-order language which is materially adequate (in Tarski’s sense) 
and in which such laws o f  truth as “The existential quantification o f a true sentence is true” can be proved, 
it is not necessary to assume that the predicates o f the language have extensions, although it does appear to 
be necessary to make this assumption on order to give such a theory for a second-order language.’
This does seem to be something like what Quine has in mind though he does not make the point
with explicit reference to Tarski’s theory of truth. Both Boolos and Quine understand predicates
as having extensions; the difference is that in a first-order setting these extensions are not
Ibid., p. 40; Boolos restates this point on p. 48.
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quantified over/ We should be careful here however on the issue of model theory. Boolos’s 
reference to Tarski may be misleading as to the source of Quine’s criticisms. Quine’s concerns 
over second-order logic are not concerns about its model-theoretic semantics though, as we have 
seen, he is concerned with how we are to interpret, or how we are to understand, what we are 
quantifying over when we allow quantification over predicate letters. He urges that ordinary 
individual variables or set variables replace the quantified predicate letters because these higher- 
order quantifications are not over predicates but over their extensions. His set-theoretic analogue 
makes explicit the departure from ordinaiy quantification theory in favor of a move towards a 
powerful mathematical theory.^
Boolos does offer some counter considerations for not accepting Quine’s set-theoretic 
analogue notation, though. For one, he thinks Quine’s notation does not capture certain aspects 
of logical form in the same striking way as the standard notation for second-order logic. In 
second-order logic, the definition of the strong ancestral is wiitten \\/F)[{\/x){aRx id F x ) . 
(Vx)(Vy)(Fx . xRy =) Fy) z) Fby  whereas in Quine’s set-theoretic notation it is re-written as 
‘(Va)[(Vx)(aFx 3  x e a ) . (Vx)(Vy)(x e a , xRyzD y  e  d )  id  b e  a]". Additionally, and more 
importantly from Boolos’s perspective, is that Quine’s notation results in a loss of validity or 
implication for some second order formulas: ‘(BF)(Vx)Fx’ is a valid second-order formula 
whereas ‘(3a)(Vx)x g a ’ is not, and ‘x is logically implied by ‘(VT)(7x 3  Y yf but not by
® O f course, as Quine points out, we are û ee to construe the schematic predicate letters by their set-theoretic 
analogues, but so long as we do not go on to quantify over the set variables, the set-theoretic analogues remain 
equivalent to logical schemas. ‘(3x)(x e  a . x e  F)’ L, as Quine describes it, “a degenerate specimen” o f  set theory 
as it is equivalent to the logical schema ‘(3 x )(F x . G x )\ See W.V. Quine, “Logic and the Reification o f Universals,” 
p. 114; and Chapt. I, fh. 74.
 ^Indeed, the origins o f  Quine’s claim that quantification over predicate letters amounts to quantification over sets 
can be found at least as early as his 1937 “N ew  Foundations for Mathematical Logic”. To the best o f my 
knowledge, the model theory for higher-order logic was not given in its full generality until 1964 in David Kaplan 
and Richard Montague, “Foundations o f Higher-Order Logic,” in Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy o f  Science: 
Proceedings o f  the 1964 International Congress, Yehoshua Bar-Uillel, ed. (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing 
Company, 1965), pp. 101-11.
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‘(Va)(x e a ZD y  e a y . There is reason to think that Quine will not feel the force of Boolos’s 
counter considerations.
First, for Quine, ‘(VF)[(Vx)(aFx 3  F x ). (Vx)(Vy)(F% . xRy 3  Fy) 3 F6]’ is not a logical 
form. Rather, this sentence recognizes a particular subdomain of objects in its quantified 
predicate letters, namely sets, and is properly construed as the sentence Quine suggests, a 
sentence of set theory where the set variables range over subsets of whatever the individual 
variables range over.^® Similarly for the loss of validity or implication—for Quine, Boolos’s 
second-order quantifications are just statements of set theory. This is made explicit when 
‘(3F)(Vx)Fx’ is rewritten as ‘(3a)(Vx)x g a ’, a true statement in a type theoretic set theory 
(though as it stands, this statement is typically ambiguous) and in Quine’s NF (New 
Foundations), and false in ZF (Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory). And again, ‘x = y ’ is not a logical 
implication as Quine understands it but is implied set-theoretically by ‘(Va)(x & a id y  g a)' 
where the sets range over subsets of individuals; in short in a type-theoretic set theory up to type 
1. A proof of this implication in ZF will also require an appeal to the non-logical extensionality 
axiom, ‘(a)(y5)((Vx)(x g a = x g y^ ) 3 a = /?)’ for the assurance that sets that have the same 
members are the sanie set. What we see emerging here more clearly is that there looks to be a 
lack of common ground for Quine and Boolos to stand on. Boolos recognizes a theory of higher- 
order logic which he can compare with both first-order logic and set theory in an attempt to 
establish what features higher-order logic shares with each of first-order logic and set theory.
For him it is an open possibility as to whether logical implication or validity applies in higher- 
order logic. Quine oh the other hand rejects that there is any such higher-order logic. What
Boolos similarly confuses actual sentences with schemas on p. 51 calling ‘(3x)(3v)->x =_y’ both a sentence and a 
schema. There is nothing schematic about this formula though if  ‘= ’ is counted as a logical symbol, as Boolos does. 
Quine, on the other hand, can count identity as schematic defining it by exhaustion o f  combinations o f variables 
with a finite number o f  schematic predicate letters as seen in the previous chapter; see W.V. Quine, Philosophy o f  
lo g m [1 9 8 6 ],p p .6 3 -^ '
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some philosophers have called “higher-order logic” is best construed as one of the ways that set 
theory can be formalized. Notions such as validity and logical implication do not apply as ways 
of characterizing truths of higher-order theories unless of course these higher-order validities or 
logical implications rely only on the resources of ordinaiy quantification theory for their validity 
or to do their implying.
Boolos now turns to Quine’s remarks, discussed already in the preceding chapter, on the 
comprehension principle for higher-order logic. As we saw in our earlier discussion of this 
passage, Boolos first notes that Quine’s objection here seems to be that the higher-order 
predicate calculus gestures at inconsistency, but as Boolos admits and as we have seen, Quine 
certainly does not think that higher-order logic is inconsistent, at least not as Boolos presents it. 
His point was instead that without imposing some ad hoc restriction on the comprehension 
axiom, the higher-order predicate calculus in its quantification over predicate letters does yield 
the inconsistent unrestricted comprehension principle. Quine takes this as one way to distinguish 
the thoroughgoing obviousness of ordinary quantification theory from the extra-logical 
mathematics of the higher-order predicate calculus.
Boolos goes on to consider how the existential assumptions of higher-order logic 
compare with those of set theory, how set theory’s staggering existential assumptions are hidden 
in the shift from schematic predicate letter to quantifiable variable. Again, as shown in the 
earlier chapter, what Quine means by “staggering existential assumptions” will depend on the 
strength of the set theory being considered. In the 1970 edition of Philosophy o f Logic and in Set 
Theory and its Logic he considered the entire type-theoretic hierarchy while in the 1986 edition 
he dropped the word “staggering” and considered only a theory of individuals and sets of 
individuals. Boolos adds a further observation. He points out that
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the validity o f '3XVx{Xx =  -,x  e  x ) \  which certainly looks contradictory, would at any rate seem to 
demonstrate that their [higher-order predicate calculi’s] existence assumptions must be regarded as “vast.”
A problem now arises: although ‘3X3xXx’ and ‘HAVxAx’ are also valid, ^3XBx3y(Xx a  X y a  x  ^ y ) ’ is not 
valid; it would seem that despite its affinities with set theory and its vast commitments, second-order logic 
is not committed to the existence o f  even a two-membered set/^
He proposes that consideration of the notion of validity in second-order logic will resolve this
tension and “show a certain surprising weakness in second-order logic.” ^^
A second-order sentence is valid when it is true under all its interpretations, and it follows
from others when it is true under all its interpretations under which the other sentences are also
true, he explains. And an interpretation for standard second-order logic, in which the second-
order quantifiers range over all subsets of the range of the first-order quantifiers, is an ordered
pair of a non-empty set, the domain, D and an assignment of an interpretation function /  to each
non-logical constant of the sentence that takes each of them to appropriate items constructed
from D. The domain of the function is the set of all «-tuples of members of D if the constant is
of degree «, and its range is a subset of D if the constant is a function constant and a subset of
{T, F} if it is a predicate constant. What Boolos points out as important in this notion of second-
order interpretation is that it requires no explicit reference to a separate range for the second-
order variables occurring in the sentence. An interpretation for a sentence of standard second-
order logic is just the same thing as an interpretation for a sentence of first-order logic, an
ordered pair (D, / ) .  An existentially quantified sentence 3aF(a) is true under an interpretation
then, when F{p) is true under some interpretation J  differing from I  at most only on what J
assigns to the constant /?, where p  does not occur in 3aF{a) and is of the same logical type as a.
Like the notion of interpretation for a second-order language, the definition of truth in an
interpretation requires no specific mention of what sort of variable—individual, sentential.
" Boolos, “On Second-Order Logic,” p. 40. 
Ibid., p. 41.
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function, or predicate— a is. Furthermore, when this definition is restricted to individual 
variables, Boolos observes, this is just a paraphiase of one standar d account of truth in an 
interpretation.^^ While Quine has stressed the discontinuities of first-order logic with its higher- 
order counterpart, Boolos believes the continuity of the notion of an interpretation between first- 
and second-order languages shows otherwise. This continuity provides him with a 
straightforward and obvious way to extend the definition of truth in an interpretation and so also 
the standard first-order accounts of validity and consequence to second-order sentences.
Flaving shown how these notions extend to higher-order logic, Boolos can now offer an 
explanation of the validity of ‘(3JQ(Vx)(Wx = -,x e x)’. It is valid simply because given any /, 
there will always be some appropriate J  in which ‘(Vx)(Fx = -ix g  x ) ’ is true by assigning to ‘F ’ 
the set of all objects in the domain D not bearing to themselves the relation that /  assigns to ‘ g  ’. 
As the domain of / is  a set, ZF’s axiom of separation, ‘(Vz)(3y)(Vx)(x g  ^  ^  e  z . Fx)’,
guarantees the existence of such a subset of the domain. On the other hand, ZF offers no 
guarantee that there is a set of all sets, therefore the validity of ‘(3W)(Vx)(Ax = -ix g  x)’ does not 
assert the existence of a set of all non-self-membered sets which would yield Russell’s paradox. 
Though Boolos observes trouble still arises if we suppose ‘x ’ to range over all sets and to 
range over sets of all objects that ‘x’ ranges over, and we interpret ‘ g  ’ as membership. Because 
he takes the validity of ‘(3A)(Vx)(Xx = -ix g  x)’ to depend on a set-theoretic semantics done in 
ZF, this sentence now turns out false but not invalid, for in ZF there is no set, ‘X , of all non-self- 
membered sets, ‘x’; there is, as Boolos remarks, no interpretation whose domain contains all sets.
This way of blocking Russell’s paradox leads to the surprising weakness Boolos finds in 
second-order logic. He explains, “Our difficulty is thus circumvented, but at some cost. We
Ibid., p. 41.
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must insist that we mean what we say when we say that a second-order sentence is valid if true 
under all its interpretations, and that an interpretation is an ordered pair of a set and an 
assignment of functions to constants.” "^^ As shown by the validity o f ‘(3W)(Vx)(Ax = -,x e x)’ 
and ‘(3A)(Vx)Xx’, second-order logic, unlike first-order logic, appears unavailable for 
formalizing discourse about certain sorts of objects, such as sets or ordinals, in case there is no 
set to which all the objects of that sort belong, i.e. when there is no domain D of objects of that 
sort that forms a set. However, ZF, for example, is often construed in first-order notation with 
the quantifiers supposedly ranging over all sets even though there is in ZF no set to which all sets 
belong. So to maintain the truth of ‘(3^(Vx)(Xx = -ix e x)’ and ‘(3A)(Vx)Ax’ as valid sentences 
according to the standard account of the conditions under which a sentence is true, ‘Vx’ cannot 
be taken to range over all sets in either sentence and cannot be taken to range over all ordinals in 
the second. For if ‘ Vx’ ranges over all sets, we can generate the Russell paradox and if over all 
ordinals, the Burali-Forti. Under these circumstances then, second-order logic is unavailable for 
formalizing discourse about all sets or all ordinals, very much in contrast with first-order logic.
Quine, in response, would find all of Boolos’s discussion of the natural extension of the 
notions of interpretation, truth in an interpretation, and validity to second-order logic completely 
beside the point. Quine thinlcs he has offered sufficient reasons not to recognize so-called higher 
order logic as logic, so these notions simply do not apply beyond first-order logic. In a footnote, 
Boolos observes, “In Part IV of [Methods (1972)], Quine extends the notion of validity to first- 
order sentences with identity and discusses higher-order logic at length, but does not describe the 
extension of the notion of validity to second-order logic.” Given what we have already seen of
Ibid., p. 42. (Boolos’s italics)
Ibid., p. 42, fii 9; W.V. Quine, Methods o f  Logic  [1972], 3“' ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 
1972), pp. 209-56.
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Quine’s views of higher-order logic, it should come as no smprise that he does not extend 
validity to higher-order logic. For Quine, there is no higher-order validity because he 
understands higher-order logic to be properly construed as a theory of sets. Validity is a logical 
notion associated with ordinary quantification theory. There is no equivalent notion of validity 
for set theory, only the notion of being true in a set theory formalized according to certain 
axioms that yield set theories of greater and lesser strengths. Though, again, the axioms 
themselves and the theorems obtained from them can be characterized as valid, if they can 
already be shown valid by the resources of ordinary quantification theory alone.
Indeed, examining Part IV of Methods, we find less than a page covering higher-order 
logic if higher-order logic is to be understood simply as the extension of quantification theory to 
quantification over predicate letters, and Quine’s remarks here focus on the sorts of confusions 
he sees involved in allowing such extensions of quantification theory. The chapter itself.
Chapter 43, is entitled “Classes,” and it initiates his discussion of the theory of classes, or sets, 
and then advances through the construction of the natural numbers and the ancestral culminating 
with Chapter 46 “Systems of Set Theory.” He proposes his usual resolution to the unclarities of 
higher-order logic—a type-theoretic set theory with the ordinary (individual) variables ‘x’, ‘y ’, 
‘z’, . . . ,  the class variables ‘a ’, ‘7’, .  . . ,  and the predicate ‘ e ’ for ‘is a member o f . The
variables ‘x’, etc. range over an unspecified universe U, while the class variables ‘a ’, etc. 
range over a distinct but related universe Ui of the subclasses of The simple sentences of 
this theory are sentences of the form ‘x e a ’ where an ordinary variable stands to the left of ‘ g ’
So long as the class variables range over all subsets o f  the entities that the variables o f  V  range over, Quine’s type 
theory with separate but related domains is equivalent to B oolos’s second-order logic with a single domain. See 
Shapiro, Foundations without Foundationalism, p. 74; Richard Montague shows how the model for higher-order 
logic with cumulative types is extended to higher-order logic with non-cumulative types, as Quine construes it. See 
Montague’s “Set Theory and Higher-Order Logic,” in Formal Systems and Recursive Functions: Proceedings o f  the 
Eighth Logic Colloquium Oxford, July 1963, J.N. Cross ley and Michael Dummett, eds (Amsterdam: North-Holland 
Publishing Company, 1965), pp. 144-45, .
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and a class variable stands to the right of ‘ g Hence, Quine blocks Russell’s paradox not by 
appeal to ZF but by ruling out the specification of a set by the condition ‘-i©  g  © ’. As Quine 
made the point in Philosophy o f Logic [1986], the paradox is blocked so long as the ranges of the 
first- and second-order variables are kept apart. Complex sentences aie then built up from these 
by quantification and the truth func t ions .Th is  is the theory that Quine discusses at length in 
Part IV of Methods, so ’we can only assume that this type-theoretic set theory is what Boolos 
refers to as “higher-order logic” in the footnote quoted above. And as we saw in the previous 
chapter, this is the theory, or some fragment of it, that Quine takes philosophers and logicians to 
mean by higher-order logic.
Granted that Quine and Boolos’s considerations are directed at the same theory, it is 
worth pausing to note the differences between their presentations of it. First, as we have already 
seen, Quine replaces the quantified predicate letters with class variables; second, he construes 
these class variables as ranging over a distinct but related universe Ui made up of the subclasses 
of V; and third, he introduces the notation ‘ g  ’ for the membership predicate. All of these 
devices serve to distinguish set theory, i.e. Boolos’s higher-order logic, from ordinary 
quantification theory. In contrast, Boolos presents higher-order logic, i.e. Quine’s set theory, 
emphasizing its continuities with first-order logic. We have already seen him explain how the 
notion of interpretation does not change fi'om first- to higher-order logic, noting in particular that 
there is no need to mention a separate domain for the second-order variables when the second- 
order variables are construed as ranging over all subsets of the domain. In addition, the 
definition of truth in an interpretation requires only a supplementary clause to handle the new
”  Quine, Methods [1972], pp. 235-36.
See for example W.V. Quine, Set Theory and its Logic, p. 258; “Response to Ullian,” in Philosophy o f  W. V. 
Quine, p. 591-92.
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second-order quantifiers, and again requires no specific mention of what sort of variable the 
quantifiers range over.
Boolos does not stress however that the second-order quantifiers range over subsets of 
the domain, and what assures this is that the function, a variable assignment function, assigned to 
each variable will talce each first-order variable to a member o f D and each second-order variable 
to a subset of D, The extension of the notion of truth in an interpretation to cover second-order 
quantification then yields the locutions ‘there is a subset U of the universe’ for "3 lf  and ‘x is an 
element of I f  for ‘t/x’ which essentially treats membership as logical.*^ Boolos’s account of 
interpretation and truth in an interpretation, while accurate, draws attention away from the very 
features of second-order logic that Quine sees as crucial to distinguishing it so much fi om 
ordinary quantification theory, to the extent that it belongs with set theory. I take it that Boolos 
does not mean to deceive his readers by presenting second-order logic in the way he does.
Rather, as we will see shortly, he just does not share the kinds of concerns that moved Quine to 
equate higher-order logic with set theory.
II
Boolos next turns to his most extended discussion of the ways in which second- (and 
higher-) order logic comprise existential commitments to sets. He initiates his discussion
On the notion o f “variable assignment” see Shapiro, Foundations, p. 72. While Shapiro also notes that the notion 
o f  interpretation does not change from first- to second-order logic, he makes much more explicit how first- and 
second-order logic differ in what values their variables take. He remarks on how second-order logic treats 
membership as logical on p. 6. Though he also thinks there is a distinction between what he calls ‘logical sets’ and 
the sets o f  the iterative hierarchy which use the non-logical ‘e ’ to indicate membership; for criticism o f  this view 
see Jane, “A Critical Appraisal o f  Second-Order Logic,” pp. 75-8. The locutions for reading second-order 
existential quantification and “predication” are given by John P. Burgess in his introduction to Boolos, Logic, Logic, 
and Logic, p. 7; Richard Montague’s notation for higher-order logic uses a notation for higher-order logic that 
includes the logical constant ‘^’ for membership distinguishing it from the non-logical ‘ e ’; see his “Set Theory and 
Higher-Order Logic,” pp. 131-48. The more general issue here is the status o f  the copula between objects; for more 
on this see Peter Geach, “History o f  the Corruptions o f Logic,” in Logic M atters (Berkeley; University o f  California 
Press, 1980), pp. 44-61,
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remarking that set theory, which he identifies here explicitly with ZF, does make staggering 
existence claims and that ‘Quine maintains that higher-order logic involves “outright 
assumptions of sets the way [set theory] does.”’ °^ Boolos also immediately locates a difference 
between set theory and higher-order logic—that ‘(3A)(3x)(3f)(A3c , X y , x ¥ ^ y y  is not valid. This 
sentence is false in all one-membered interpretations whereas all set theories (presumably ZF and 
its subsystems and extensions) agree that there is a two-membered set. The point may appear to 
be straightfomard and obvious, and perhaps for this reason Boolos does not develop it fiirther. 
Still, there are a couple of things in it to comment on that again illustrate how fundamentally 
different Boolos’s understanding of higher-order logic is from that of Quine. First, Boolos shifts 
the context of Quine’s remark in a slight but significant way. Quine states his comparison as 
between the theory of types and set theory, so what we see here again, as in Boolos’s footnote on 
Methods Part IV, is Boolos freely equating the theory of types with higher-order logic. Second, 
Quine would not admit that every set theory agrees that there is a two-membered set, specifically 
one like the type-theoretic set theory he presents but that contains at level 0 only one individual 
and at level 1 only subsets of level 0 objects. Again, Boolos aims to bring out the continuity 
between first- and higher-order logic by showing how notions applicable to logic, such as 
interpretation and validity, carry over to higher-order logic. But as we have seen, Quine has no 
reason to extend these notions to higher-order logic because higher-order logic is more 
accurately understood as set theory.
Boolos, “On Second-Order Logic,” p. 44-5; Quine, Set Theory and its Logic, p. 258.
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Now, let us continue with Boolos’s main considerations on the relationship between 
higher-order logic and set theory. He begins with the claim that “in second-order logic one
quantifies over sets,”^^  explaining,
There are certain (second-order) sentences o f  any given language that will be classified by second-order 
logic as logical truths (i.e., as valid), even though they assert, under any interpretation o f  the language 
whose domain forms a set, the existence o f  certain sorts o f  subjeA o f  the domain. (The sort depends upon 
the interpretation.) ‘3YVx(A3c = -ix g  x )’ and ‘3AVx(A3c = x = x )’ are two examples. Thus, unless there 
exist sets o f  the right sorts, these sentences will be false under certain interpretations [Boolos’s italics].’’
As we have already seen, since the domain of / is  a set, ZF’s axiom of separation guarantees that
there will be a set of all the non-self-membered sets of the domain, though also by appeal to ZF,
there is no set of all sets and so no set of all non-self-membered sets. Similarly, the axiom of
separation guarantees a set of all the self-identical sets of the domain, and again by appeal to ZF,
this set will not be the universal set but, like the domain itself, only some one set out of the vast
number of sets that make up the so-called iterative hierarchy. It is on this feature of certain
second-order sentences that Boolos thinks someone may object to their status as logical:
The view that logic is “topic-neutral” is often adduced in support o f this opinion: the idea is that the special 
sciences, such as astronomy, field theory, or set tlieory, have their own special subject matters, such as 
heavenly bodies, fields, or sets, but that logic is not about any sort o f thing in particular, and, therefore, that 
it is no more in the province o f  logic to make assertions to the effect that sets o f  such-and-such sorts exist 
than to make claims about the existence o f various types o f planets. The subject matter o f a particular 
science, what the science is about, is supposed to be determined by the range o f  the quantifiers in 
statements that formulate the assertions o f  the science; logic, however, is not supposed to have any special 
subject matter: there is neither any sort o f  thing that may not be quantified over, nor any sort that must be 
quantified over.”
To this view, Boolos admits he has no completely successful response though he does see 
some weaknesses with it. For one, he suggests that we should be suspicious of identifying the 
subject matter with the range of a theory’s bound variables asking, “Is elementary arithmetic
”  Boolos, “On Second-Order Logic,” p. 44. Boolos has the remark in quotations though provides no citation for it, 
so it is not clear if  the remark is supposed to be from Quine. A  previous quotation on the page does come from 
Quine, Set Theory and its Logic, p. 258, but this remark is not located there. In fact, it seems unlikely that this is 
meant to be a direct quote ft om Quine as he rarely ever refers just to second-order logic but instead uses the more all 
encompassing “higher-order logic.”
”  Ibid., p. 44.
”  Ibid., p. 44.
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really not about addition, but only about numbers [Boolos’s italics]?” If we agree that arithmetic 
is in some sense about addition, then would not logic be about the notions of negation, 
conjunction, identity, and the notions expressed by the universal and existential quantifiers even 
though these notions are rarely ever quantified over? There is some truth to Boolos’s suggestion, 
but it would seem to have little effect on a logician who thought logic is topic neutral. He may 
indeed grant the point that arithmetic is about addition, but what is addition other than a 
relationship holding between numbers? Now contrast this with the logical notions Boolos 
presents. They apply indiscriminately to any subject matter whatsoever, so while there may be a 
sense in which we can say that logic is about, or at least yields an understanding of how the 
logical vocabulary works, these notions still do not single out any particular subject matter in the 
way that arithmetical notions single out numbers.
A second consideration Boolos puts forward is that unlike the notions of planet or field, 
the notions of set, class, property, concept, and relation, etc. have often been treated as logical 
notions for reason of their general applicability—that these notions do not discriminate amongst 
the objects to which they apply. They treat of all objects on an equal footing; anything may 
belong to a set, have a property, or bear a relation. On these grounds, that second- or higher- 
order systems make some set or relation existence assertions does not seem sufficient to 
disqualify them as logical systems in the way that they would be disqualified if they classified as 
logical truths the existence of a planet with some number of satellites. Boolos concludes tlien 
that “[p]art 3 of the Begriffsschrift. . . where the definition of the ancestral was first given, is as 
much a part of a treatise on logic as are the first two parts; the first occurrence of a second-order
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quantifier in the Begriffsschrift no more disqualifies it from that point on as a work on logic than 
does the earlier use of the identity sign or the negation sign.” "^^
Here, we see at least partially what motivates Boolos in his desire to construe higher- 
order logic as logic: logic for Boolos is that tradition in logic that might be deemed “Fregean”. 
Let us review a little. So far in this chapter, we have seen many points of apparent dispute 
between Quine and Boolos as to whether higher-order logic ought to be considered continuous 
with its first-order coimterpart and so also considered logic. Boolos, inclined towards the 
position that higher-order logic is logic, has shown various ways in which notions applied to 
first-order logic apply also to higher-order logic, either unchanged or in what he views as slightly 
modified or naturally extended ways. But against any of these extensions of first-order notions 
to higher-order logic, Quine always appears to have a response that denies Boolos’s move, 
namely that notions such as interpretation or validity simply to not go over to higher-order logic 
because higher-order logic is more accurately described as set theory. Boolos and Quine, then, 
appear to be at an irreducible standoff.
Quine does have some further room to maneuver though, as we saw in the previous 
chapter he settles the boundary of logic at ordinary quantification theory because it possesses 
certain features that we might intuitively associate with logic. One such feature is logic’s 
' particular concern with implication as such; the expounding of implications does not rely on the 
specific subject matter of the sentences concerned. In this sense logic is topic-neutral. Another 
is the traditional view that logic is epistemically privileged, that it provides an irreproachable 
foundation for knowledge, and in particular for mathematical knowledge. Recall that Quine 
rejects this notion of epistemological privilege, attributing its origins to the fact that all logical 
truths are merely obvious or reachable by a number of obvious steps. Logic’s obviousness is a 
”  Ibid., p. 45.
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characteristic he does hold on to. He wishes to make explicit that the supposed reduction of 
mathematics to logic was a reduction to something far more powerful than traditional logic; 
specifically it was a reduction to logic inclusive of set theory. So again, we see the relevance of 
topic neutrality to logic. Topic neutrality assures that the assumption of sets and their 
accompanying mathematical power will not be built into logic. Limiting logic to ordinary 
quantification theory preserves, for Quine, a fairly intuitive or traditional conception of what 
counts as logic, a way of distinguishing it from other branches of mathematics or science. 
Ordinary quantification theory does not presuppose implication to depend upon particular sorts 
of objects nor misleadingly attribute epistemological privilege, or obviousness, to set theory.
Boolos, though, in his reference to Frege’s construction of the ancestral in his 
Begriffsschrift, may now appear to acquire this same sort of room to maneuver that Quine has in 
motivating an intuitive or traditional conception of what logic is. Boolos appeals to Frege’s 
authority on logic, authority gained as the figuie most responsible for the development of 
modern mathematical logic as we know it, to motivate his view that higher-order logic is indeed 
part of logic. It is within Frege’s logical work and the logicist tradition that notions such as set, 
class, property, concept, and relation play significant roles conceived as logical notions. Indeed, 
Boolos locates the purpose of his article precisely within this tradition in footnote on the opening 
page,
My motive in taking up this issue [the logical status o f  higher-order logic] is that there is a way o f  
associating a truth o f  second-order logic with each truth o f  arithmetic; this association can plausibly be 
regarded as a “reduction” o f  arithmetic to set theory.. . .  I am inclined to think that the existence o f  this 
association is the heart o f  the best case that can made for Logicism and that unless second-order logic has 
some claim to be regarded as logic, Logicism must be considered to have failed totally. I see the reasons 
offered in this paper on behalf o f  this claim as part o f  a partial vindication o f  the logicist thesis. I don’t 
believe we yet have an assessment that is as just as it could be o f  the extent to which Frege, Dedekind, and 
Russell succeeded in showing logic to be the ground o f  mathematical truth.’^
”  Ibid., p. 37, &. 1. (Boolos’s italics)
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Once this move has been made, Boolos is in a position to investigate the extent to which 
important notions in first-order logic such as interpretation and validity carry over to higher- 
order logic either directly or with minor or natural modifications/^ He is not restricted by a 
conception of logic, such as Quine’s, that does not admit sets, i.e. subsets of a given domain, as 
logical.
Yet, there is a further question to be raised about this move. As Boolos notes in the 
above quotation, the logicists aimed at a reduction of mathematics to logic so as to provide a 
foundation for mathematical truth. We have seen in the previous chapter that the thought that 
this reduction counted as a reduction to logic was one of the primary motivations in Quine’s 
attempt to distinguish clearly between ordinaiy quantification theory and higher-order logic, or 
set theory. Certainly arithmetic, and most of the rest of mathematics, stands on firmer ground 
than does set theory itself, as evidenced for example by the discovery of Russell’s paradox. The 
logicists’ reduction does not achieve the epistemological aims they thought it did.
To this objection, Boolos simply concedes the point. He explains, by Gôdelization and 
the completeness theorem, elementary arithmetic “Z” provides a suitable background for a 
theory of first-order validity coextensive with the usual model-theoretic notion of validity. First- 
order validity is definable in Z by Gôdelization, and then, the validity each of the valid formulas, 
and only of the valid formulas, can be proved in this theory along with many general laws of 
validity. For second-order logic this does not hold. There is no way to prove each valid second- 
order sentence in elementary arithmetic, and second-order validity is not even definable in
”  Though it should be stressed at this point that though Boolos appeals to the authority o f  Frege or the logicist 
tradition to encourage the idea that higher-order logic is to be counted as logic in the same sense that first-order 
logic is to be counted as logic so that notions such as interpretation or validity extend in their applicability to higher- 
order logic as well, this appeal does not mean that Frege and Russell had these semantic notions in their conception 
o f  logic, I do not mean to suggest here that Boolos thinks that they do (o f course he may think this, but this is not 
the point here). Whether Frege and Russell did have a metatheoretic conception o f logic is a highly contentious 
issue. Again, for an overview o f the debate see Floyd, “Frege, Semantics, and the Double-Definition Stroke,” pp. 
141-66.
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second-order arithmetic. While for each first-order sentence à fairly simple statement of 
arithmetic can be effectively associated with it that is true if and only if the sentence is valid, this 
association is not in the least possible for second-order sentences. Second-order validity is 
definable only in set theory (for Quine second-order validity would only be definable in a 
stronger set theory, if the notion of validity were applicable to second- and higher-order theories 
at all; that is beyond the validity already accounted for by ordinary quantification theory). This 
guarantees that set-theoretic truth does not reduce to second-order validity and that second-order 
validity does reduce to set-theoretic truth. There is no effective function that assigns second- 
order validities to all and only set-theoretic truths; nor is there such a fimction definable in set 
theory. For otherwise set-theoretic truth would be set-theoretically definable. Though, the 
function that assigns each second-order formula to the sentence of set theory asserting the 
formula’s validity reduces second-order validity to set-theoretic truth. The notions of the series 
(first-order validity, first-order arithmetical truth, second-order arithmetical truth, second-order 
validity, set-theoretic truth) can always be reduced by effective functions to notions occurring 
later but never to notions occurring earlier in the series because they are in order of increasing 
strength.^^
Boolos also notes here that there exist second-order sentences that are valid if and only if 
certain “highly problematical statements of set theory,” such as the continuum hypothesis, are 
true. He concludes, “Thus the metatheory of second-order logic is hopelessly set-theoretic, and 
the notion of second-order validity possesses many if not all of the epistemic debilities of the 
notion of set-theoretic truth. Here we see an illustration of the sort of maximality that Quine 
understands the completeness theorem to provide for first-order logic. Validity can be
”  Boolos, “On Second-Order Logic,” pp. 45-6. 
”  Ibid., p. 45.
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characterized without appeal to the substantial mathematical theory of classes by merely 
describing one of the complete proof procedures for first-order validity.
Having conceded that higher-order logic lacks the epistemological privilege, self­
evidence, or obviousness, of first-order logic, Boolos is now in a somewhat awkward position.
He has shown how some second-order validities that assert the existence of particular subsets of 
the domain will depend upon the existence of sets of the appropriate sorts for their truth. And 
now he has also shown how second-order logic is tied up in many, if not all, of the 
epistemological debilities of set theory. Whereas Quine has singled out ordinary quantification 
theory, i.e. first-order logic, as corresponding to an intuitive and fairly uncontroversial 
conception of what logic may be like and what it aims to do, Boolos no longer has this option.
He merely appeals to Frege and the logicist tradition that embraced as purely logical such 
notions as set, class, property, concept, and relation. In making this move, it is unclear as to how 
second- and higher-order logic are to be distinguished from set theory for it could just as easily 
be said of Frege’s logic that it would have been more appropriately characterized as set theory, 
which is precisely what is at issue here between Quine and Boolos. Boolos could perhaps look 
to their differing strengths; second-order logic does not have the full power of set theory (ZF), 
but such comparisons of strength are common to the study of set theories in general.
Boolos thinks there is another way out though. Remarking on Quine’s view that “the 
logic capable of encompassing [the reduction of mathematics to logic] was logic inclusive of set 
theory,” he explains that this logic would have to count as valid some nontrivial theorems of set 
theory, and in particular some theorems of set theory asserting the existence of certain kinds of 
sets, where by “set theory” he means ZF or some subsystem or extension of it.^  ^ It looks as
”  Ibid., p. 46; W.V. Quine, Philosophy o f  Logic [1986], p. 66. Boolos is not entirely clear throughout his article 
what he means by set theory. As noted earlier, in one place (p.43), he explicitly identifies set theory with ZF. It
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though second-order logic does indeed do this for it counts both and
%HA!)(V%)(^ = Ç xy  as valid and these sentences look to assert the existence of the null and
power sets. Against this view though, he cautions,
It seems, however, that there is a serious difficulty in supposing that any second-order sentence asserts, for 
example, that there is a set with no members; it seems that no second-order sentence asserts the same thing 
as any theorem o f  set theory, and hence that not even the smallest fragment o f  set theory is, in this sense, 
included in second-order logic.^ *^
The problem is that the range of the quantifiers must be fixed before a second- (or first-) order
sentence can be said to have a determinate sense. For example, the sentence ‘(Vx)x = x’ only
asserts that everything is self-identical once the range of ‘everything’ has been fixed. Prior to
deteimining the range of everything, the sentence can only be said to assert “Everything in the
domain, whatever the domain may be, is self-identical.” Boolos then extends this observation to
‘(3A)(Vx)-tAx’. What this sentence asserts "depends upon what the domain is supposed to be
(and also upon how that domain is ‘given’ or described). But, whatever the domain may be,
‘(3A)(Vx)-nAx’ will assert that there is a subset of the domain to which none of its members
belong.”  ^^
From this, he concludes that no valid second-order sentence asserts the same thing as any 
theorem of set theory. A second-order sentence, regardless of its validity, asserts something only 
with respect to an interpretation whose domain must be restricted so as not to include all sets on 
pain of paradox. To assert the same thing as a theorem of set theory, the domain would have to 
include all sets. The valid sentence ‘(3A)(Vx)Ax’ does not assert the existence of a universal set, 
which is false according to ZF, but only that there is a subset of the domain, whichever set this
appears that many o f  his objections to Quine’s view that higher-order logic includes set theory rely on equating “set 
theory” with ZF. Boolos criticisms in this section seem to make sense only when we understand him meaning ZF by 
“set theory”.
Boolos, “On Second-Order Logic,” p. 46. (Boolos’s italics)
Ibid., pp. 46-7.
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may be, of which everything in the domain is a member. The first-order quantifiers expressing 
the assertions of ZF on the other hand range over all sets and do not together form a single set.
In summary, he expresses his point, “We have argued that the ranges of the variables in second- 
order sentences must be sets. If so, it is hard to see how any second-order sentence could express 
or assert what any theorem of ZF does, or that second-order logic counts as valid some 
significant theorems of set theory.
Boolos does acknowledge one way in which second-order logic is clearly committed to 
asserting the existence of the empty set. Since the empty set is a subset of every set, and the 
domain itself is a set, and the empty set is the only set to which no members of the domain 
belong, ‘(3A)(Vx)-tAx’ asserts the existence of the empty set independently of any interpretation. 
By the same reasoning, higher- and higher-order logics will be committed to more and more sets 
in the following way. Second-order variables range over all subsets of the domain so at least 
over the empty set 0 .  Third-order variables will then range over all subsets of what the second- 
order variables range over so over {0}. And fourth-order variables will then range over all 
subsets of what the third-order variables range over so over{0, {0}}. And fifth-order variables 
will then range over all subsets of what the fourth-order variables range over so over {0 , {0}, 
{{0 }}, {0 , {0}}} and so on as each additional level of higher-order variables is introduced. 
Second-order logic itself, though, includes only this, what Boolos calls “modest”, commitment to 
the empty set.^^
I do not wish to belabor the point, but I will at least mention again briefly that Quine is 
unlikely to accept that second-order logic should have to count as valid some theorems of set 
theory, and in particular theorems asserting the existence of certain kinds of sets, in order for
Ibid., p. 47.
Ibid., p. 48.
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second-order logic to be inclusive of set theory. Higher-order logic, as Quine sees it, is set 
theory so the notion of set-theoretic truth will be applicable to it rather than the logical notion of 
validity.
This point aside, the central issue for Boolos is that no sentence of second-order logic 
asserts the same thing as a theorem of set theory, ZF. For Quine the theory of types, or some 
variation of it such as Boolos’s, is just another way of formalizing set theory, and so, it would 
hardly be surprising that no sentence of second-order logic would assert the same thing as a 
theorem of ZF. Where ZF has what is intuitively characterized as a cumulative hierarchy of sets, 
type theory, while also hierarchical, restricts its sets to discrete levels so that the sets of a level n 
+ 1 are constmcted only of subsets of the preceding level n. Accordingly, the comprehension 
axiom is restricted differently in each of the two theories. ZF blocks the set-theoretic paradoxes 
in its axiom of separation, ‘(Vz)(3>')(Vx)(x e >». = . x e z . Fx)’. The members of the set y are 
not everything of wliich ‘F ’ is true but everything in tlie set z of which ‘F ’ is true. The method is 
one of relativization; we assume that every monadic predicate has an extension only within the 
given class z. And as shown in the previous section, the theory of types divides the universe into 
discreet levels where the variables ‘x’, ‘_y’, ‘z’, etc. range over an unspecified universe U, the 
variables ‘a ’, ‘y’, etc. range over the universe U} composed of subsets of U, the variables he’,
U’, etc. range over the universe U2 composed of subsets of Ui and so on. The formulas are 
then restricted so that a formula of the form u e v  only makes sense when the variable v is of one 
type higher than the variable u. Hence in the comprehension schema, ‘(3x)(V_y)(y g x = Fx)’, it 
is impossible to specify a set by the monadic predicate of non-self-membership, ‘ ® 0 ® ’. The 
notion of monadic predicate is itself restricted so as not to yield Russell’s paradox.^"^
For this account I am indebted to Goldfarb, “Deductive Logic,” pp. 187-92.
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There are some additional points to mention that further minimize the significance of the 
differences between the two theories. For one, Quine has presented a method for translating the 
many-sorted theory of types into a version of the single sorted ZF. It begins by adopting general 
variables and adding the predicate ‘T„x’ for ‘x is of type n \  followed by some simplifications, 
such as equating the empty sets at each level of the type-theoretic hierarchy with a single empty 
set, and then adding the Zermelo axioms, among them, power set, pairing, separation, sum, and 
extensionality and so obtaining a set theory of cumulative types. The logic is simplified and the 
many-sorted formulation is shown inessential to the tlieory of types considered merely as a 
theory of what sets there are.^  ^ Quine’s own set theory, NF, combines the general variables of 
Zermelo’s theory with Russell’s type restrictions by demanding that each instance of the 
comprehension schema, ‘(3x)(Vy)(y e x = Fx)’, be “stratified” meaning that there must always 
be a way to index variables flanking ‘ g ’ in the formula ‘Fx’ so that they will be of consecutive 
type, of the form n & n -^ \ .  Thus stratification rules out the contradictory ‘(3x)(V_y)(y G x 0 
y ) \  but allows ‘(3x)(Vy)(y e x = = jp)’ for when ‘y = y  is fully expanded into the primitive 
notation of NF it becomes \z){y  g  z )  z )  ( y  g  z)’. Hence in NF the universe itself is a set, V g
V,36
One final feature I wish to point out of set theory and higher-order logic that also shows a 
striking similarity between these theories comes from Boolos’s comment on how higher- and 
higher-order logics will be committed to more and more sets by way of second-order logic’s 
commitment to the empty set. These increasing commitments to sets are in essentials the result 
of repeatedly applying the power set operation to the domain so as to obtain the requisite items
^^See W.V. Quine, Set Theory and its Logic, pp. 266-86; “Unification o f Universes in Set Theory,” Journal o f  
Symbolic Logic 2 \:3  (1956), pp. 267-79.
W.V. Quine, “N ew  Foundations for Mathematical Logic,” pp. 80-101; see also Set Theory and its Logic, pp. 287- 
299.
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for the additional n + 7^^-order quantifiers to range over.^^ And very much this same method 
generates the pure sets of ZF. In his 1971 article “The Iterative Conception of Set,” Boolos 
describes the formation of the cumulative hierarchy by forming all subsets of each level of the 
hierarchy so as to obtain more and more sets.^^ Beginning with individuals, at stage one, form 
all possible collections of individuals, then at stage one form all possible collections of 
individuals and all possible collections of sets formed at stage zero, then at stage two form all 
possible collections of individuals, all possible collections of sets formed at stage zero, and all 
possible collections of sets formed at stage one and so on on up the ordinals. To obtain the pure 
sets of which ZF usually treats, the process is carried out in the same way only we assume that 
there are no individuals so at stage zero the only set formed is the empty set 0 , then at stage one 
we form {0 }, at stage two we form {0 , {0 }}, at stage three we form {0, {0 }, {{0}}, {0,
{0} } } and so on. It is hard to see what fundamental difference distinguishes this process from 
the way in which higher- and higher-order logics will be committed to more and more sets.
Regardless of in what sense second-order logic can be said to count as valid some 
theorems of set theory asserting the existence of sets of a certain sort, Boolos concludes his 
discussion of second-order logic’s commitment to the existence of sets referring back to his 
comment on how a materially adequate truth theory for a first-order language will differ from
that of a second-order language:
One sense, already noted, in which the use o f second- but not first-order logic commits one to the existence 
o f sets is this: If f , is the first-order fi*agment o f an interpreted second-order language L2 whose domain D  
contains no sets, then there are many logical truths o f  Li that claim the existence o f  objects in D  with 
certain properties, but there are none that claim the existence o f  subsets o f  D\ however, among the logical 
ti'uths o f  L2 there are many such: for each predicate o f  L2 with one free individual variable, there is a 
logical truth o f  L2 that asserts the existence o f  a subset o f  D  that is the extension o f  the predicate,^^
Shapiro, Foim datiom  without Foundationalism, p. 138.
George Boolos, “The Iterative Conception o f  Set,” in Logic, Logic, and Logic, pp. 20-2. 
Boolos, “On Second-Order Logic,” p. 48.
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This is in a way an accurate rendering of how Quine views higher-order logic as inclusive of set 
theory to the extent that it brings to the fore that the quantified predicate letters of higher-order 
logic are no longer mere simulations of predicates. Though, again, it should be made clear that 
he does not conceive of this as resulting from the model theory for higher-order logic. Quine 
sees higher-order logic itself as set theory. Despite the differences between them, both ZF and 
something like higher-order logic with types are theories about sets.
I ll
Boolos next turns his discussion to second-order logic’s greater expressive capacity with 
respect to first-order logic. He remarks that when we conjoin the first two “Peano postulates” for 
arithmetic, ‘(Vx)(.sx 0)’ for ‘zero is not a successor’ and ‘(Vx)(Vy)(i'x = z»x = y)’ for
‘uniqueness of immediate predecessor’, replacing constants with variables and existentially 
closing, we get ‘(3z)(35)((Vx) z # S(x) . (Vx)(Vy)(<S(x) = S(y) zdx~ y))’, a sentence true only in 
interpretations with domains that are Dedekind infinite. We can apply the same method to the 
induction postulate, ‘(FO . (Vx)(Fx => Fsx)) => Fx’, which yields ‘(3z)(35)(VA)(Wz . (Vx)(Ax z> 
XS(x)) z) (Vx)Ax)’, a sentence true only in interpretations with domains that are countable.
Flence, the notions of infinity and countability are characterizable in second-order logic, unlike 
in first-order logic as shown by the compactness and Skolem-Lowenheim theorems. He 
observes that there are many other interesting notions such as well-ordering, progression, 
ancestral, and identity that also cannot be characterized in first-order logic.
Though second-order logic’s greater expressive capacity alone is not reason enough to 
favor it as logic, for these notions can also be characterized in set theory. That second-order 
logic can characterize these notions may be all the more reason for equating it with set theory.
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Boolos, however, does not appeal merely to second-order logic’s greater expressive capacity as 
somehow determining its logical status. He continues on to point out that because of its greater 
expressive capacity, second-order logic can offer an explanation of the apparent inconsistency of 
certain infinite sets of statements, each of whose finite subsets is consistent. This again contrasts 
with compact first-order logic. Four examples of such sets of statements are {‘Smith is an 
ancestor of Jones,’ ‘Smith is not a parent of Jones,’ ‘Smith is not a grandparent of Jones,’ . . .},  
{‘It is not the case that there are infinitely many stars,’ There are at least two stars,’ ‘There are at 
least three stars,’ . . .} ,  {'R  is a well-ordering,’ 'aiRao,' 'ü2R aif . . .} ,  and {x is a natural
number,’ ‘x is not zero,’ ‘x is not the successor of zero,’ . . .}.  When compared with the sets of 
statements {‘Not: there are at least tliree stars,’ ‘Not: there are no stars,’ ‘Not: there is exactly 
one star,’ ‘Not: there are exactly two stars’} and {‘F is a linear ordering,’ 'agRai,' 'ajRa2,' ‘Not: 
aoRa2 ') , which can be shown inconsistent by first-order logic."^  ^ In light of such differences in 
expressive capacity, Boolos thinlcs we should find first-order quantification theory too 
impoverished to be all there is to logic.
Consider the first of these two sets of sentences. The first sentence will be satisfied only 
in a model that has less than three elements, so in a model of zero, one, or two elements. The 
second sentence rules out that there are no stars; that is the domain is non-empty. But the next 
sentence rules out the second option and the last sentence rules out the third. Flence, this set of 
sentences is unsatisfiable and so also formally inconsistent by the completeness of first-order 
logic. By similar reasoning it might seem that logic should also be able to explain the 
inconsistency of the infinite set of sentences about stars that Boolos initially presents. Some 
model with a finite number of elements will certainly satisfy the first sentence. Some finite 
model will also satisfy each finite subset of this infinite set of sentences which by compactness
Boolos, “On Second-Order Logic,” pp. 48-9.
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would yield the conclusion that this infinite set of sentences is satisfiable. Clearly this is not the 
case. In fact, the first of these sentences cannot be characterized by a first-order sentence, but it 
can be characterized by the second-order sentence ' ( Y / ) - % ( ( V x ) ( = y )  . (3x)(Vy)(/5^
Compactness thus fails for second-order logic as this set of infinite sentences shows. 
Drawing the boundary of logic at first-order logic may then again (as we saw first-order 
quantifier dependencies suggest in the previous chapter) appear to be arbitrarily restrictive. To 
show the inconsistency we could use second-order logic to express the infinite number of first- 
order sentences indicated by ‘. . . ’ thus ‘(3/)((Vx)(Vy)(^ =fy Z) x = y) . (3x)(Vy)(^ ^  x ))\  a 
sentence clearly inconsistent with the first sentence of this infinite set.
Of course that we should think that logic alone should show the inconsistencies in the 
first four sets of sentences depends on the inconsistencies of the first four sets being of a strictly 
logical character. Quine rejects that they are on the grounds that what provides the second-order 
sentences with their greater expressive capacity, and so their capacity to explain the 
inconsistency in each of the first four sentences, is their assumption of sets (or in the specific 
case of the stars discussed above, functions, which can of course be defined in set theory). As 
we have seen, aside from his appeal to the fact that these inconsistencies can be explained in a 
system not unlike the one Frege used, Boolos has provided very little to counter Quine’s view 
that these sets of sentences require more than just logic to show their respective inconsistencies.
It is no detriment to Quine’s conception of logic that notions such as well-ordering, progression, 
ancestral, (Dedekind) infinite, and denumerable fall outside the bounds of ordinary quantification 
theory. That ordinary quantification theory cannot characterize these notions tells us that they 
are “not that elementary, and that [they] can be expressed only with help of one or another
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term—epsilon, for instance. . . They are notions of mathematics in a sense exclusive of
logic.
This brings us in a natural way to consider the significance of the failure of the 
completeness theorem for higher-order logic, what Boolos notes as “hardly ... one of second- 
order logic’s happier featui'es.”"^  ^ Boolos wishes to take issue here with the importance Quine 
attaches to the completeness of first-order logic as a characteristic that demarcates “an integrated 
domain of logical theory with bold and significant boundaries,” a characteristic which the 
extension to higher-order logic lacks. Against this view, Boolos observes that though “[t]he 
existence of a sound and complete axiomatic proof procedure and the effectiveness of the notion 
of proof guarantee that the set of valid sentences of first-order logic is effectively generable; 
Church’s theorem shows that it is not effectively decidable.”"^  ^ However, he continues that the 
monadic fragment of first-order logic with identity is decidable, and this feature caiiies over to 
monadic second-order logic. Why should we follow Quine then and favor completeness over 
decidability as determining the boundary between logic and mathematics, i.e. set theory?
Earlier Boolos remarked that
although it is not hard to have some sympathy for the view that no notion o f  validity should be so 
extravagantly distant fi*om the notion o f  proof, we should not forget that validity o f  a first-order sentence is 
just truth in all its interpretations. (The equation o f  first-order validity with provability effected by the 
completeness theorem would be miraculous if  it weren’t so familiar.)'*'^
However miraculous this coincidence may be, that the two notions do coincide is significant for
Quine in his move to limit logic to ordinary quantification theory. It is in this sense, as we saw
in the previous chapter, that he views ordinary quantification theory as maximal in that “it is as
W.V. Quine, The Roots o f  Reference: The Paul C am s Lectures (LaSalle: Open Court Publishers, 1974), p. 115; 
this partial quotation is in the context o f  Quine’s discussion o f the Skolem-Lowenheim theorem and logic’s inability 
to distinguish between the notions o f  denumerable and indenumerable.
Boolos, “On Second-Order Logic,” p. 50,
Quine, Philosophy o f  Logic [1.986], p. 90; Boolos, “On Second-Order Logic,” p. 50.
Ibid., p. 46.
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far out as you can go and still have complete coverage of validity and inconsistency by the 
Skolem proof procedure.”^^  Decidability in contrast is not maximal in this way. Characterizing 
logic according to whether the theory is decidable or not would leave infinitely many validities 
and inconsistencies outside the scope of logic. So far as Quine sees logic’s primary aim as the 
tracing of implications through the systematic study of logical truth, decidability would be an 
undesirable and arbitrary place to draw the boundaiy of logic.
But now it seems Boolos could make this same point against Quine. Confining logic to 
first-order logic leaves infinitely many higher-order validities and inconsistencies outside the 
scope of logic. After all, as Boolos characterizes validity as truth in all interpretations, the notion 
extends in a natural way to higher-order truths. Here we see another of the reasons that Quine 
attributes such significance to the coincidence of validity with provability in ordinary 
quantification theory. Though the notion of validity can be extended to higher-order logic, by 
the incompleteness theorem, higher-order logic will include “logical” truths that are not provable 
and so logical truths that are not obvious in the way that all truths of ordinary quantification 
theory are. As we have seen Quine emphasize, the completeness theorem assures us that the 
first-order validities can be specified mechanically in terms of proof. There is no need to appeal 
to the limitless realm of classes or even to notions of truth and satisfaction used in the 
substitutional and model-theoretic definitions of logical truth to specify the truths of ordinary 
quantification theory. On the other hand, Boolos has indicated that there will be a sentence of 
second-order logic whose validity will depend upon determining the truth of the continuum 
hypothesis. Truths of higher-order logic will not all be obvious, but in many cases will depend 
upon no small amount of mathematics to determine their truth. We see again how when the 
boundary of logic is drawn at ordinary quantification theory, logic is obvious through and
Quine, “Existence and Quantification,” pp. 111-12.
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tlirough unlike its higher-order counterpart. Of course we are free to give up this 
characterization of logic as obvious or self-evident, but then we also seem to have little reason 
for distinguishing higher-order logic from set theory in the first place.
In conclusion, Boolos remarks that the completeness theorem is not the sole feature that 
leads Quine to draw the boundary between logic and extra-logical mathematics where he does. 
Quine also cites, along with the completeness theorem, the “remarkable concurrence of diverse 
definitions of logical truth” as terminating the extent of logic at ordinary quantification theory. 
Boolos focuses specifically on Quine’s substitutional definition of logical truth: a schema is 
provable if and only if it is valid, if and only if every substitution instance of it in any reasonably 
rich object language is true. Boolos remarks on two points about the definition, also, as we have 
seen, noted by Quine; that identity cannot be counted as logical, otherwise ‘(3x)(3t )- iX 
would count as a logical truth, and that for a language to be reasonably rich it must be rich 
enough for elementary number theory."^^
Boolos thinks, “The theorem may be remarkable, but it is not,” he thinks, “remarkably 
remarkable.”"^  ^ The reason for this, he explains, is that a distinction can be made between a weak 
completeness theorem and a sti'ong completeness theorem. A weak completeness theorem shows 
that all valid sentences are provable and a strong completeness theorem shows that a sentence is 
provable from a set of sentences whenever it is a logical consequence of the set. Alternately, he 
states the strong completeness theorem as “a set of sentences is satisfiable if it lacks a refutation. 
(A refutation of a set of sentences is a proof of the negation of a conjunction of members of the
Boolos, “On Second-Order Logic,” p. 51. 
Ibid., p. 52.
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set.)” Most proofs of weak completeness can be easily expanded to proofs of strong
completeness.'^^ However he remarks,
It seems to me that the concurrence o f the two accounts o f  the concept o f logical truth cannot be called 
remarkably remarkable if  their extensions to the relation o f  logical consequence do not occur. If there is a 
reasonably rich language and a set o f sentences in that language which is satisfiable according to the usual 
account but which cannot be turned into a set o f  truths by (simultaneous, uniform) substitution o f open 
sentences o f  the language, then the interest o f the alternative definition o f logical truth is somewhat 
diminished, for it is a definition that cannot be extended to kindled logical relations in the correct manner. 
And, as it happens, there is a satisfiable set o f sentences o f  a reasonably rich language with this property.'*^
Boolos considers two first-order languages without identity L and M with predicate letters
‘Z’, ‘S”, ‘P ’, ‘F , and ‘G’ and variables ranging over the natural numbers. For both languages the
predicate ‘P ’ is true of all natural numbers, ‘Z’ is true of zero alone, 'S \  ‘P ’, and ‘F  are
respectively ‘successor’, ‘sum’, and ‘product’. L specifies that ‘G’ is true of all natural numbers,
and L is a reasonably rich language. Let A be the set of all Godel numbers of truths of L. By
Tarski’s indefinability theorem, A is not definable in L. M specifies that ‘G’ is true of all and
only the members of A. Now, let B be the set of truths of M. B is satisfiable, but B cannot be
turned into a set of truths of L by substitutions of open sentences of L for the predicate letters
‘F ’, ‘Z’, ‘5 ’, ‘P ’, ‘F ,  and ‘G’. For if this were possible, A would be recursive in L for the
extensions of the open sentences substituted for ‘Z’, ‘*S’ and ‘G’; and ‘definable in L’ is closed
under ‘recursive in’. Therefore, the set A would be definable in L which would violate Tarski’s
indefinability theorem. And Boolos shows that there is indeed a way to reinterpret the predicates
‘Z’, ‘5” and ‘G’ of M into predicates of L so that A would be recursive in
Boolos suggests a fix to this difficulty by way of the compactness theorem. We could
define satisfiability as a set o f  sentences is satisfiable only when every conjunction o f its
members has a true substitution instance since a set is satisfiable if and only if all of its finite
Ibid., p. 52. 
Ibid., p. 52. 
Ibid., p. 53.
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subsets are satisfiable. He concludes then that we have three accounts of satisfiability of sets of 
sentences, this one, truth in some model, and irrefutability. This concurrence Boolos does not 
thinlc in the least remarkable though. What he does thinlc remarkable about the concurrence of 
the two definitions of logical truth is that truth in all interpretations and truth of all instances is 
that ^'both definitions have some antecedent plausibility as correct explications o f a pre- 
theoretical notion o f  logical validity (‘truth regardless of what the non-logical words mean’). 
Conversely, he comments, “The definition of satisfiability of a set as ‘truth of some instance of 
each conjunction of schemata in the set’ has no such plausibility as an account of satisfiability. It 
even sounds wi'ong.”
There are a few points that we can raise in Quine’s favor against Boolos’s remarks. For 
one, Quine does not state that proof of the equivalence between provability, validity, and 
substitution is “remarkably remarkable”, only remarkable, and Boolos agrees that it is indeed 
remaikable. What would make it remarkably remarkable would be if it easily extended to cover 
the case of strong completeness in addition to weak completeness. One way in which it seems 
that this feature may not matter a great deal to Quine is that he has continually focused on the 
notion of logical truth, or validity, as the route to implication, rather than looking directly to 
logical consequence. So far as his interest is logical tmth, the weak completeness theorem is 
enough. And even in early editions of Methods o f  Logic, where Quine placed more emphasis on 
showing implications directly by a method of natural deduction, where it might have made more 
sense to prove the strong completeness theorem, the form of completeness he proved aimed at 
validity rather than logical consequence.^^ Quine, unlike Boolos, is content with his remarkable 
theorem.
Ibid., p. 52-3. (B oolos’s italics)
W.V. Quine, Methods o f  Logic  [1958], 2"** rev. ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1970), p. 253.
79
A second and perhaps more important point is that Boolos does provide a way to extend 
the definition to logical consequence. Against it, he maintains that it lacks any plausibility as an 
account of the satisfiability of sets of sentences in a way that the substitutional and model- 
theoretic definitions of logical truth do not. Again though it should be emphasized that the 
account does work is more important than that it may sound wrong. And in fact it is not clear 
how wrong it actually does sound in the context of taking the substitutional definition of logical 
truth as the primary definition of logical truth. One could also think that the definition of 
something as trivial as logical truth sounds wiong in its appeal to the power of set theory. Quine 
himself admits both definitions of logical truth as legitimate but settles for substitution as it is 
ontologically more economical.
Boolos concludes his paper,
One ought then to be wary o f  the claims that the concurrence o f diverse definitions o f  logical truth is 
remarkable and that this concurrence suggests that classical quantificational logic is a “solid and significant 
unity.” One o f  the definitions is a definition o f  logical truth only in virtue o f  a remarkable theorem about 
first-order logic; another caimot be generalized properly. Does classical quantificational logic then fail to 
be a significant and solid unity? Certainly not.^^
Throughout this chapter I have tried to show the ways available to Quine for responding to
Boolos’s criticisms. I have also tried to bring out the ways in which they often seem to be
arguing at cross purposes, that there may really be no common ground on which they can
arbitrate their dispute over the logical status of higher-order logic or set theory. Boolos’s
concluding remark here does emphasize one of the ways in which Quine is at an advantage in
this debate. He presents a conception of logic that is well-motivated in its appeal to intuitive and
traditional views of what logic is and what its primary aims are. By way of this appeal, he settles
the boundary of logic at ordinary quantification theory. Boolos comes closest to this sort of
move in appealing to the logicist tradition stemming from Frege. However, it is the very logical
Boolos, “On Second-Order Logic,” p. 53.
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status of Frege’s logic that is in question, so the move seems illegitimate within this context. 
Quine, unlike Boolos then, is in a position to offer definite answer to the question of why we 
may want to take classical quantificational logic to be a significant and solid unity.
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Chapter 3; Higher-Order Logic as the Logic of Plurals?
With his two papers “To Be is to Be a Value of a Variable (or to Be Some Values of 
Some variables)” (1984) and “Nominalist Platonism” (1985), Boolos returns to consider the 
logical status of second-order logic. ^  Instead of arguing that second-order logic has some claim 
to the honorific “logic” because its set-theoretic commitments are only to some limited amount 
of set theory, in these papers, he argues that at least monadic second-order logic need not be 
committed to any set-like entities at all when it is translated into a theory of plural logic. In this 
chapter, we will examine Boolos’s plural interpretation of monadic second-order logic (MSOL) 
along with some criticisms of it found in the work of Resnik, Parsons, and Linnebo.^ In light of 
these criticisms, I will then conclude by returning to Quine speculating what significance he 
would have attributed to Boolos’s final attempts at placing second-order logic firmly within the 
bounds of logic.^
To motivate his position, Boolos begins his “To Be is to Be a Value of a Variable” by 
asking whether the quantifier-variable notation along with the usual logical connectives and 
identity of first-order logic are sufficient to represent quantification and cross-reference in 
English. He suspects that most philosophers and logicians think it is. These philosophers and 
logicians would certainly include in their logic truth-functional logic, but they would also readily
’ George Boolos, “To Be is to Be a Value o f  a Variable (or to Be Some Values o f Some Variables),” in Logic, Logic, 
and Logic, pp. 54-72; “Nominalist Platonism,” in ibid., pp. 73-87.
 ^Michael D. Resnik, “Second-Order Logic Still Wild,” The Journal o f  Philosophy 85 (1988), pp. 75-87; Charles 
Parsons, “The Structuralist View o f Mathematical Objects,” Synthèse 84 (1990), pp. 303-46; Oystein Linnebo, 
“Plural Quantification Exposed,” Noûs 37:1 (2003), pp. 71-92.
 ^As I mentioned in the introduction, Quine wrote veiy little o f B oolos’s plural interpretation o f MSOL. The one 
brief remark I have been able to find occurs in his late essay “Structure and Nature,” Journal o f  Philosophy 89:1 
(1992), p. 6. The remark is made in the context o f  a discussion o f David Lewis’s Parts o f  Classes (New York: 
Blackwell, 1991).
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agree that this is not all there is to logic because a vast number of inferences of natural language, 
dependent upon the quantificational words ‘all’ and ‘some’ and cross-referential works like ‘it’, 
‘who’, and ‘that’, are not captured by truth-functional logic alone. To do this work, logic 
requires that quantification theory be added to express these other sorts of inferences. Also, 
essential to cross-reference is identity; and as identity lacks distinctive content and pervades all 
of natuial language, it too may be uncontroversially included as a logical notion. These logicians 
and philosophers conclude, according to Boolos, that once logic has all of these resources at 
hand, there are very few inferences of natural language having to do with cross-reference, 
quantification, and generalization that first-order quantification theory with identity cannot 
express. And furthermore, that the variety of inferences not captured by first-order 
quantification theory with identity is nowhere near as great or as interesting as those inferences 
that are. Boolos, himself, has doubts about this conclusion. In particular, he questions whether 
we actually do know how much or how little within the province of logic first-order 
quantification theory with identity cannot treat. What he will go on to show is that it may be 
suiprisingly more than the logicians and philosophers who hold to the view described above 
suppose.'^
Boolos spends much of the rest of his paper presenting examples aimed at leading his 
readers to the view that logic must include resources beyond first-order quantification theory 
with identity. In what follows, I will not discuss all of his examples, but I will present some of 
them and in particular, those that seem most relevant to the debate over the logical status of 
second-order logic. Boolos begins with some examples of well-known constructions, sentences, 
and inferences that are non-first-orderizable, those that comprise numerical quantifiers such as 
“more,” “most,” and “as many.” The inference
Boolos, “To Be is to Be a Value o f  a Variable,” pp. 54-5.
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Most democrats are lefl-of-center.
Most democrats dislike Reagan.
Therefore, some who are left-of-center dislike Reagan.
is one such. Another, tliat he has given a fair amount of attention to, is “For every A there is a
which cannot be expressed in first-order logic as it can be understood as the synonymous
“There are at least as many Bs as A s f  One may think that this sentence could be represented by
f\fx)(Ax ZD (3y)By)\ but this is equivalent to ‘(3x)Zx Z) (3y)By\  ^ We can however express such
numerical statements as “There is at least one A f  “There are at least two A s'\ “There are at least
tliree As,” etc. in first-order notation, respectively, as ‘(3x)Fx’, ‘(3 x ) (3 t ) (F x  , F y . x ^ y ) \
‘(3x)(3y)(3z)(Fx . Fy , Fz , x ^ y  . x ^ z  . y j ^ z ) \  etc. The same can also be done in first-order
notation for “at most” and “exactly”. Likewise, one may have thought that the examples Boolos
provides here would also go over into first-order notation.
Another non-first-orderizable sentence of a different sort, and perhaps the most familiar
of them, is the Geach-Kaplan sentence
(1) Some critics admire only one another,
cited also by Quine, attributing it to Peter Geach and David Kaplan.^ Boolos explains that this 
sentence is supposed to mean that there is a collection of critics, each of whose members admires 
no one not in that collection, and none of whose members admires himself. In second-order 
logic, this sentence can be rendered as
(2) (3A)((3x)Ax . (V x )(V t )[X x  . Axy z D x ^ y . Xy]),
where M’ is the dyadic predicate admires Q)\ The Geach-Kaplan sentence may sound 
simple enough that one would think it should be representable in first-order logic. A proof given 
by Kaplan shows however that this is not the case for the second-order version of the Geach-
 ^ Ibid., p. 55; also Boolos, “For every A there is a Linguistic Inquiiy 12 (1981), pp. 465-66. 
 ^Quine, Methods (1982), p. 293; Roots o f  Reference, p. 111.
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Kaplan sentence is not equivalent to any first-order sentence. His technique for showing non- 
first-orderizability is to substitute ‘(x = 0 v x = ; p =  1)’ for 'Axy' which yields
(3) (3A)((3x)Ax . (Vx)(Vt)[Xx . (x = 0 v x = y  = X y]\
a sentence true in all nonstandard models of arithmetic and false in the standar d model.^
It is sentences like the Geach-Kaplan sentence whose non-first-orderizability Boolos 
finds truly surprising because unlike sentences involving numerical quantifier words, these 
sentences "look as if they ‘ought to be’ symbolizable in first-order l o g i c . W h a t  appears to 
account for the non-first-orderizability of sentences like Geach-Kaplan is their use of plural 
forms. To illustrate this he gives the example:
(4) There is a horse that is faster than Zev and also faster than the sire of any horse that 
is slower than it.
Taking the universe of discourse to be the set of horses, and using ‘O’, and ‘<’ for ‘Zev’,
‘® the sire of ® ’, ‘® is faster than ® ’, and ‘® is slower than ® ’ respectively, (4) can be 
rendered into first-order notation as
(5) (3x)(x > 0 . (V_y)[y < x id x > f(y)])
But now making some adjustments so that the sentence expresses a plural form, we get
(6) There are some horses that are faster than Zev and also faster than the sire of any 
horse that is slower than them,
the content of which Boolos thinlcs is made more explicit by
(7) There are some horses that are all faster than Zev and also faster than the sire of any 
horse that is slower than all of them.
Finally, Boolos takes as an acceptable paraphrase of both (6) and (7)
’ Boolos, “To Be is to Be a Value o f  a Variable,” pp. 56-7. 
® Ibid., p. 57.
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(8) There is a nonempty collection (class, totality) X  of horses, such that all members of 
X  are faster than Zev and such that, whenever any horse is slower than all members of 
X, then all members of X  are faster than the sire of that horse.
And this paraphrase is easily represented in second-order logic (with the same domain and
interpretation of predicates as in (5)) as
(9) (3X)((3x)Xx . (Vx)(Xx z>x > 0) . (Vt)[(Vx)(Xx =))/ < x ) =) (Vx)(Xx z>x > ^(y))]).
This second-order sentence, like the Geach-Kaplan sentence, is non-first-orderizable as it is false 
in the standard model of arithmetic when the domain is the set of natural numbers and we 
reinterpret ‘0’ as ‘zero’, ‘>’ as ‘0 is greater than ® ’, ‘<’ as ‘0 is less than 0 ’ and 's' as the 
successor function. It is true in any non-standard model of arithmetic as the set of non-standard 
elements of the model will always be a suitable value for 'X ?
Boolos’s interest in providing these examples of non-first-orderizable sentences 
containing plural forms is not so much an interest in the application of formal methods to the 
analysis of natural language as it is a return to the question of the relationship between second- 
order logic and set theory. His first move in this direction is to consider the sentence:
(10) There are some sets that are such that no one of them is a member of itself and 
also such that every set that is not a member of itself is one of them. (Otherwise put, 
there are some sets, no one of which is a member of itself, and of which every set that 
is not a member of itself is one.)
Taking the universe of discourse to be sets and ‘e ’ to be ‘is a member o f , this sentence can be
rendered into the second-order sentence:
(11) (3X)((3x)Ax. (Vx)[Xx ZD ~ix g x ] . (Vx)[-ix g x  z d X x ] )  
which is equivalent to
(12) (3X)((3x)Ax. (Vx)[Xr = -ix e  x]).
Ibid., pp. 57-8.
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He next observes that ‘(3x)-ix e x’ follows directly from (12), and conversely, when ‘(3x)-,x e 
x’ holds, then there is some set in tlie totality X  of sets that is not self-membered. X  witnesses the 
truth of (12), and so (12) comes out equivalent to ‘(3x)-ix e x’, what Boolos describes as “an 
obvious truth concerning sets.” ^^
He does not find it surprising in light of (lO)’s near self-evidence and the validity of the 
second-order comprehension schema, ‘(3X)(Vx)(X s^(x))% which includes as an instance of it
(13) (3A)(Vx)(Xx = -ix € x), 
that (12) should be equivalent to the first-order ‘(3x)-ix e x’. However, he takes the second- 
order (12) to more accurately reflect the semantic structure and meaning of (10) than its first- 
order counterpart. Still there is an important question for Boolos to raise here dating back to at 
least his “On Second-Order Logic;” can we use second-order logic to malce assertions about all 
sets? Towards answering this question, he suggests we consider (13) as it is somewhat simpler 
than both (11) and (12). What (13) appears to express is the existence of a totality or collection 
containing all and only those sets x which are not members of themselves. Acceptance of the 
validity of (13) then, with its quantifiers taken as ranging over all sets and ‘ e ’ interpreted as 
membership, commits us to the Russell set, the set of all sets that are not self-membered, and this 
we laiow results in paradox.
Avoidance of this conclusion can be blocked in a number of ways as we have seen. The 
method Boolos suggests here is the one he described in his 1975 paper, that it is illegitimate to 
use second-order formulas when the objects over which the individual variables in the formula 
range do not themselves constitute a set. This strategy leaves all instances of the second-order 
comprehension schema as logical truths and allows one to read all formulas of the form ‘Ax’ as
10 Ibid., p. 64.
" Ibid., pp. 64-5.
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‘x is a member of the se tX . He now rejects this way of avoiding the paradox in that it has the
following undesirable feature:
The principal drawback o f  this way out is that there are certain assertions about sets that we wish to make, 
which certainly cannot be made by means o f  a first-order formula— perhaps to claim that there is a 
“totality” or “collection” containing all and only sets that do not contain themselves is to attempt to make 
one o f  these assertions— but which, it appears, could be expressed by means o f  a second-order formula if  
only it were permissible so to express them. To declare it illegitimate to use second-order formulas in 
discourse about all sets deprives second-order logic o f  its utility in an area in which it might have been 
expected to be o f  considerable value.
In his 1971 article “The Iterative Conception of Set,” Boolos observed that some axioms of set
theory cannot be fully expressed by way of first-order logic because they camiot fully express the
principles from which the whole of ZF can be generated/^ For some axioms of set theory, e.g.,
separation and replacement, first-order logic provides an axiom schema that stands in for some
infinite number of instances of that schematic form. Consider the first-order version of the
separation axiom
(14) (Vz)(3y)(Vx)(x e t  = ^ ^  ^• Xc),
where ' ÿ  is not free in F. This axiom schema, on Boolos’s view, fails to express a single 
principle that says any monadic predicate put in place of ‘F ’ will specify a set; the separation 
schema asserts instead an infinite number of instances of this particular schematic form. In this 
way, he thinks that the separation principle cries out for the second-order formulation
(15) (VA)(Vz)(3t)(Vx)(x e y  =  x  e  z  . Xx).
His complaint is that
[w]hatever our reasons for adopting Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory in its usual [first-order] formulation may 
be, we accept this theory because we accept a stronger theory consisting o f  a fin ite  number o f  principles, 
among them some for whose complete expression second-order formulas are required. We ought to be able 
to formulate a tlieory that reflects oin beliefs.
Ibid., p. 65.
George Boolos, “The Iterative Conception o f Set,” in Logic, Logic, and Logic, pp. 22, 25. 
Boolos, “To Be is to Be the Value o f  a Variable,” p.65. (Boolos’s italics)
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Herein lies the heart of Boolos’s project, how can second-order logic be so understood as to 
legitimize it for use in asserting claims about all sets?
What further complicates a solution is that he also wants to maintain the truth of second- 
order comprehension principles such as ‘(3A)(Vx)(Xx s  e x)’ if he is to use second-order 
logic in discourse about all sets. One standard way of doing this is to allow other set-like 
objects, called ‘ultimate (or ‘proper’) classes’ as values of the second-order variables. Ultimate 
classes have members but are not themselves members of sets on account of their being “too big” 
to be sets. Boolos rejects this way out though on the grounds that “[s]et theory is supposed to be 
a theory about all set-like objects” and ultimate classes themselves are in essentials “set-like non- 
sets.”^^
Boolos’s proposed solution to these difficulties is to give up the idea that the use of plural 
forms are to be understood as committing us to the existence of sets (or any other set-like entities 
such as classes, collections, or totalities) of the entities over which the individual variables range. 
Instead, we are to render second-order formulas into ordinary English plural forms thus 
eliminating the obstacles the standard interpretation of second-order logic presents for 
representing discourse about all sets. For example,
(16) ~i(3A)((3x)Xx . (Vx)[Xx z) (x g x v  (3y)[y e x  ,X y  x])]),
which is equivalent to the second-order statement of the set-theoretic induction axiom:
(17) (VA)((3x)Xx z) (3x)[Xx . (Vy)(y G xz) -Xy)]),
can be understood to mean
(18) It is not the case that there are some sets each of which either contains itself or 
contains at least one of the others.
Ibid., p. 66. (Boolos’s italics)
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Similarly, this can be done for the second-order version of the axiom of separation, (15) above, 
reading it as
(19) It is not the case that there ar e some sets that are such that it is not the case that for 
any set z there is a set y such that for any set x, x is a member of y  if and only if x is a 
member of z and also one of them.
In the interest of perspicuity, Boolos then re-writes (19) as
(20) -1 there are some sets such that -i(Vz)(3>')(Vx)[x g y = (x e z . x is one of them)]. 
Though he notes that more properly (19) and (20) have the meaning:
(21) -i(3A)((3x)Ax . -i(Vz)(3>’)(Vx)[x g  y  = (x g  z . Ax)])
which includes the non-emptiness clause ‘(3x)Ax’ unlike the full separation axiom. Separation 
can be fully expressed by adding ‘and there is a set with no members’ to (19) and ‘(3>-)(Vx)-iX g  
y ’ to (20)."^
In relation to these last couple remarks, Boolos notes two features of his use of plur als as 
a method for interpreting second-order logic. First, he considers the case where there is exactly 
one Cheerio in the bowl in front of him. In ordinary English, he agrees with the intuitive view 
that would count the statement “There are some Cheerios in the bowl” as false, but for his 
present purposes, this does not really matter. He instead makes “the customary logician’s 
assumption, which eliminates needless verbiage, that the use of plural forms does not commit 
one to the existence of two or more things of the kind in question.”  ^^  In contrast, and in favor to 
a more literal understanding of plurals in ordinary English, he does assume that phrases such 
‘some critics’ are committed to the existence of at least one critic, or in other words, to the non­
emptiness of the class of critics. It is this feature that explains the additional clause ‘(3x)Ax’ in
Ibid., pp. 66-7. 
Ibid., p. 67.
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the above formulas .Having said this, Boolos is now in a position to set out his translation of 
second-order logic into English plural talk.
First of all, he observes that translation from any logical notation into English will be 
complicated by a general lack of resources in natural languages for expressing cross-reference, 
so it will be necessary to augment English somehow with such resources. Boolos proposes 
subscripted pronouns, for example ‘it;^ ’, ‘that/, ‘ity’, etc., and ‘them /, ‘th a t/, ‘them /, etc. Such 
indexing, he observes, is very much continuous with the ordinary usage of ‘former’ and ‘latter’ 
in unaugmented English. The translation then proceeds as follows: translate Vv as ‘ity is one of 
them /, ‘v e v" as ‘itv is a member of ity»’, v = v' as ‘itv is identical with ity'’, . as ‘and’, -i as ‘not’, 
and, where F* is the translation of F, translate (Bv)F as ‘there is a set thatv is such that F*’. The 
translation for the second-order existential is not quite what may be expected because of the non­
emptiness condition we saw above. To accommodate this feature of discourse about plurals, 
Boolos translates (3 V)F as follows: let F* be the translation of F, and let F** be the translation 
of the result of substituting an occurrence of —iv = v for each occurrence of Vv in F. (3 V)F then 
translates as ‘either there are some sets that^ are such that F*, or F**’.^ ^
Much of the recent literatui'e on Boolos’s plural interpretation of second-order logic 
clarifies the translation by construing it into a language called plural first-order (PFO).^° This 
language has in addition to the usual first-order individual variables (for every natural 
number i), plural first-order variables 'xx,’ (for every natural number i), and a two-place logical 
predicate ‘oc’, which takes in its first argument place, individual variables and in its second 
ai'gument place, pluial variables. The plural existential quantifier '3xx,’ is interpreted as ‘there
Ibid., p. 67.
Ibid., pp. 67-8.
See for example the appendix to Agustin Rayo, “Word and Objects,” Nous 36:3 (2002), pp. 436-463; and also 
Linnebo, “Plural Quantification Exposed,” pp. 73-4.
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are some objects,- such that’, and ‘Xj oc xx/ as ‘it, is one of themy’. The interpretation of ‘3xx,-’ 
allows for the case where the objects,- is just a single object. Indeed all pluralities are counted as 
non-empty, so (Vvv)(3v)v oc vv is taken as an axiom. Boolos’s plural interpretation then 
translates into PFO as follows:
Tr{Vv) = V oc vv
Tr((3v)F= (3v)Tr(F)
Tr({3V)F = (3vv)7>(F) v  7F(F*), where F* is the result of substituting -iv = v everywhere 
for Vv.
There is also a translation of the second-order comprehension schema into:
(3vv)(Vv)(v o c  vv = ÿ?) V  (Vv)(v ^ v ^ ( p )  
which can be rendered equivalently but more perspicuously as 
(3v)^ 3  (3vv)(Vv)(v o c  v v  s  
where is a formula of PFO and does not contain vv free. Finally, to complete the theory of 
PFO, we add to the usual natural deduction rules for first-order logic, rules for the plural 
quantifiers and also for identity.
As an illustration of his translation of second-order logic into talk of plurals, Boolos 
presents as an example \ X x  = ~ix g x)’ which he renders into augmented English as Tt;^  is one of 
them% if and only if it^ : is not a member of itself, or in PFO, ‘(x o c  xx = -ix e x ) ’. Now, with the 
quantifiers ranging over sets, he renders ‘(Vx)(Xx = -ix g x)’ as ‘Every set is such that it is one 
of them% if and only if it is not a member of itself, or again in PFO, ‘(Vx)(x oc xx =  -,x G x)’; and 
finally, he renders ‘(3A)(Vx)(Xx s  -,x g  x)’ as ‘Either there are some sets that are such that 
every set is one of them if and only if it is not a member of itself or every set is a member of 
itself, or once more in PFO, ‘(3xx)(Vx)(x o c  xx =  -ix g  x ) ’ . It should be noted here that Boolos’s
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translation is only for monadic second-order logic (MSOL), but given a pairing function, which 
he says will be available in many of the most important applications of second-order logic, the 
monadic second-order variables will be sufficient for doing the work of all second-order 
variables. For example, the axiom of replacement can be symbolized in MSOL as:
(22) (VA)((Vx)(Vj;)(Vz)[A'<x, y) . X{x, z) 33/ = z] id (Vw)(3v)(V_y)[y e v = (3x)(x g u .
Shapiro, however, has observed that handling the second-order variables in this way results in 
the arbitrary posit of a pairing function. Furthermore, this pairing function will amount to an 
axiom of infinity when the domain has at least two elements because no such function exists on 
finite domains.^ ^
Putting concerns about the assumption of a pairing function aside, Boolos’s translation of 
MSOL into augmented English plural talk, a language we already understand,appears to 
provide him with a perfectly acceptable way of applying second-order logic to discourse about 
all sets while at the same time, precluding Russell’s Paradox. In addition, he claims to avoid 
ontological commitments over and above the ontological commits of the first-order variables, in 
this case, all sets; the application of second-order logic to set theory does not force any 
commitments to set-like non-sets, i.e. (ultimate) classes.
Still, he recognizes that someone may object that we only understand our use of plural 
forms in natural language because we have some prior understanding of statements about 
collections, totalities, or sets, and this prior imderstanding should be made explicit by analyzing 
these statements as claims about the existence of certain collections, totalities, or sets. This 
objection, Boolos thinks, may arise from the idea that any precise and adequate semantics for 
natural language must be interpretable in terms of set theory. However, he see’s this as confusing
Shapiro, Foundations without Foundationalism, p. 63. 
^  Boolos, “To Be is to Be a Value o f  a Variable,” p. 69,
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two questions—-whether talk of plurals in our language is intelligible with whether a semantic
theory can be specified for those sentences that contain plural forms. Given Tarski’s work on
truth theories for formal languages, Boolos explains, we should not accept as self-evident that an
adequate semantics for a natural language, such as English, can be formulated within that
language. We may indeed have to look to set theory, but this has no bearing on our prior
understanding of English plural forms.^^
In his “Nominalist Platonism,” Boolos goes a step further in dispelling this objection by
developing a truth theory for second-order set theory that in fact does not analyze plural forms in
terms of set-like non-sets. The second-order variables of this theory take as their values the same
sorts of entities as the first-order variables, namely all sets. Boolos formulates this truth theory
in the second-order language of set theory with a new satisfaction predicate that contains two
first-order variables ‘5’ and ‘F ’ and one second-order variable ‘F ’ such that R and the sequence s
satisfy the formula F. A sequence is a function from the set of first-order variables where the
first-order variables have as values all sets. The theory is then as follows:
If F  is w e  V, then R and s satisfy F  iff s(u) e  s(v);
if F  is w = V, then R and j  satisfy F  iff s{u) = j"(v);
if F  is Vv, then R and s satisfy F  iff R{V, s(v));
if F  is -lO, then R and j  satisfy F  iff -i(F and s satisfy G);
if F  is (G . H), then R and s satisfy F  iff (R and s satisfy G . R and s satisfy H);
if F  is (3v)G, then R and s satisfy F  iff (3x)(30(^ is a sequence . t{v) = x . (Vw)(w is a first-
order variable . w v 3 t(u) = s(u)) . R and t satisfy G);
if F  is (3 V)G, then R and s satisfy F  iff (3A)(37)((Vx)(Xx s  T{V, x) ) . is a second-
order variable . U ^ V zd (\/x)(T(U, x) = R(U, %))) . T and s satisfy G);
where , )’ is the ordered-pair function sign.^ "^  So here we have a truth theory for the second-
order language of set theory that has second-order variables ranging over the same entities as the
first-order variables, namely sets; there is no need to posit additional values for the second-order
Ibid., p. 70.
Boolos, “Nominalist Platonism,” pp. 80-1.
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variables, such as classes, ultimate or otherwise. The second-order variable ‘F ’ in the new 
satisfaction predicate takes on the role of ‘one of them’ in our augmented English plural forms.
Boolos offers one final consideration against the idea that our ordinary talk of plurals 
commits us to sets, or collections, presenting the example,
(23) There are some sets of which every set that is not a member of itself is one, 
claimed to be false on the basis that this sentence entails the existence of a set that is “too big”, 
specifically the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. He finds such a claim 
unlikely, comparing with it the claim that there is a set of all trucks and observing that this 
sentence does not appear to follow from the true sentence, “There are some trucks of which 
every truck is one.” But an even stronger consideration against the falsity of (23), he thinks, is 
his strong intuition that English sentences of the form “There are some As of which every B is 
one,” are synonymous with sentences of the form “There are some As and every B is an If 
we grant Boolos his intuition, then (23) means the same as the trivial truth
(24) There are some sets and every set that is not a member of itself is a set, 
and so does not entail the existence of a “too big” set?^
From these considerations, Boolos rests with his conclusion that second-order formulas 
that include individual variables ranging over all sets can be interpreted in terms of English 
plural forms, in terms of a language that we already understand. Second-order quantification 
does not force us to recognize further entities that have members and would be sets if it were not 
for their unwieldy size.^^
Boolos concludes by remarking on an additional benefit obtained by the interpretation of 
second-order logic in terms of English plural forms. It is not just when we apply second-order
Boolos, “To Be is to Be a Value o f  a Variable,” pp. 70-1. 
Ibid., p. 71.
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logic to set theory that the plural interpretation avoids multiplying entities beyond necessity.
This advantage carries over to our ordinary plural talk in that we need not take ourselves to be 
committed to the existence of sets when we use plural forms, as he has already alluded to in his 
truck example mentioned two paragraphs prior. Now, he considers a second bowl of Cheerios.
In this bowl there are well over two hundred Cheerios, but it seems highly counterintuitive to 
think that in addition to the Cheerios, there is also a set of Cheerios in the bowl, and then perhaps 
also all subsets of the Cheerios in the bowl. We would no doubt feel a similar awkwardness in 
talking about a set of critics in addition to the critics mentioned in the sentence, “Some critics 
admire only one another. As he explains,
The lesson to be drawn from the foregoing reflections on plurals and second-order logic is that neither the 
use o f plurals nor the employment o f  second-order logic commits us to the existence o f  extra items beyond 
those to which we are afready committed. We need not construe second-order quantifiers as ranging over 
anything other than the objects over which our first-order quantifiers range, and, in the absence o f other 
reasons for thinking so, we need not think that there are collections o f  (say) Cheerios, in addition to the 
Cheerios. Ontological commitment is carried by oury?^*j -^order quantifiers; a second-order quantifier 
needn’t be taken to be a kind o f  first-order quantifier in disguise, having items o f a special kind, collections, 
in its range. It is not as though there were two sorts o f things in the world, individuals, and collections o f  
them, which our first- and second-order variables, respectively, range over and which our singular and 
plural forms, respectively, denote.^^
Let us turn now to some critical response to Boolos’s plural interpretation of second-order logic.
II
\ Probably the first fully developed criticism of Boolos’s position comes from Michael
Resnik in his “Second-Order Logic Still Wild” (1988). Resnik’s overriding criticism is that his 
logical/linguistic intuitions concerning sentences that use plural forms differ significantly from 
those of Boolos. In fact, his intuitions are precisely those that Boolos thinlcs get second-order
Ibid., p. 72; Boolos, “To Be is to Be a Value o f  a Variable,” p. 74, 77-8. 
Boolos, “To Be is to Be a Value o f  a Variable,” p. 72. (Boolos’s italics)
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logic wrong in supposing that second-order variables take classes as their values. Resnik urges, 
in light of Boolos’s work on second-order logic, a reconsideration of the Geach-Kaplan sentence:
(1) Some critics admire only one another.
He admits that while this sentence appears to say nothing of classes, he understands it as saying,
(2) There is a non-empty collection of critics each member of which admires no one but 
another member.
And this, he says holds for many sentences that include plural quantification; he cannot process 
them without understanding them as referring to collections. For consider again Boolos’s 
translation of tlie second-order formula:
(3) (3A)((3x)Ax . (Vx)(V_y)|Ax . Axy iDXT^y, XyJ),
as
(4) There are some critics such that any one o f  them admires another critic only if tlie 
latter is one o f  them distinct from the former.
Resnik sees this translation as explicitly referring to collections in its ‘one of them’ with the
referent of ‘one’ being a member of it. Though he will grant that (3) and (4) can be read as (1)
thus doing away with the problematic ‘one of them’, this move just brings us back to trying to
work out the ontological commitments of (1) and discerning what these commitments are was
supposed to be the reason for moving to (3) and then to (4). Returning to (1) is unhelpful at best
in settling this ontological dispute.^^
There is something appealing in both Resnik and Boolos’s understanding of plural forms.
It is not difficult to agree with Boolos that when we eat some Cheerios we are not also eating a
set of Cheerios, and certainly not all the subsets of Cheerios. However, when we eat one of the
Cheerios, it seems equally difficult not to agree with Resnik that we are eating one o f  them, one
Resnik, “Second-Order Logic Still Wild,” pp. 77-8. (Resnik’s italics)
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member of a collection. Parsons, in his “The Structuralist View of Mathematical Objects,”
(1990) has suggested a way to make sense of these two opposing intuitions. That is to think of 
pluralities in terms of Russell’s notion of ‘a class as many’, which allows for discourse about 
collections without forcing a commitment to a class as a whole, as a single object, i.e. the notion 
of class or set found ordinarily in set theory.
Further support for this way of understanding plural terms appears in Linnebo’s “Plural 
Quantification Exposed” (2003) which discusses a slight extension of the language PFO to PFO+ 
containing predicates and relations, in addition to the logical relation ‘oc’, that take plural 
expressions as arguments where the predication is non-distributive. The plural predication 
‘F(xx)’ is distributive just in the case that it is equivalent to ‘(Vx)(x oc xx = F x)\ As examples of 
distributive and non-distributive predication, he provides the respective examples, ‘The boys ran 
across the field’ and ‘The boys lifted the piano’. Once we allow plural expressions to occur as 
subjects of predications, Linnebo observes, it is hard not to see them as standing for some sort of 
entities (and in fact the satisfaction relation Boolos defines for MSOL uses a non-distributive 
plural predication with the relation ‘F ’ in its first argument place). Furthermore, he remarks, that 
given the language of PFO+, we can define an identity predicate holding between pluralities as 
‘xx - y y ^  (y/u){u oc xx =  w oc y y ) \  and this ability to state identity conditions has often been 
taken as a indication of objecthood.^ ^
Perhaps we do not want to say that these plural “entities” are sets, but it is hard to avoid 
the conclusion that they are some form of collection, perhaps Russell’s sets as many or some 
other set-like non-sets, This conclusion, of course, will not be acceptable to Boolos as he takes
Parsons, “Structuralist View o f Mathematical Objects,” p. 326; Russell, Principles o f  Mathematics, §§ 70, 74, 
104.
31 Linnebo, “Plural Quantification Exposed,” pp. 79, 90 fii. 20.
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set theory “to be a theory about all set-like objects.”^^  The very point of his plural interpretation 
for MSOL is that it does not result in additional ontological commitments beyond what the first- 
order variables were already committed to. Allowing, as further objects, plural entities, in 
addition to sets and perhaps also ultimate classes, is just the opposite result of what he intended. 
And if sets and ultimate classes are enough to do the work of plural entities why not just stick 
with them so as to avoid ontological excesses? Perhaps if our interest is in capturing our 
intuitions about English plural forms, plural entities are better then ultimate classes, but either 
way, Boolos would be forced to acknowledge additional set-like objects. This looks to be a 
difficult position for him. Linnebo, though, points out one central assumption required for this to 
be decisive against Boolos’s plural interpretation; that is it requires a full account of what it is to 
be an object in the first place and neither Boolos, nor Resnik, nor Parsons, nor Linnebo provides 
this. At best, this dispute remains a standoff between intuitions about the ontological status of 
English plinal talk.^^
Both Resnik and Parsons raise a related objection to the alternate semantics Boolos 
proposes for MSOL. Boolos’s new semantic theory was supposed to show that the second-order 
valuables need not assume classes as their values. So does his theory actually do this? As all of 
the other clauses of his definition of the satisfaction predicate ai*e the usual ones. Parsons focuses 
on the alternate clause for second-order existential quantification:
(5) if F  is (3 F)G, then F and f  satisfy F  iff (320(37)((Vx)(Ax 5 %)) . (VU)(G is a
second-order variable . U i^ V zd (Vx)(T(U, x) = R{U, x))) . T  and s satisfy G)
suggesting that we look at this clause “platonistically.” Then F codes an assignment of second- 
order entities to the variables of the language in that the variable V is assigned the abstract 
XxR{V, x). This clause then reads “There is a (second-order entity) X and an assignment T such
Boolos, “To Be is to Be a Value o f  a Variable,” p. 66. (Boolos’s italics) 
Limiebo, “Plural Quantification Exposed,” pp. 79-80.
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that T assigns XXo V  and agrees with R in what it assigns to other variables, such that T  and j  
satisfy G.” Once this move is made. Parsons finds it hard to see why we should think that the 
second-order variables are not assigned values in a way analogous to the assignment of values to 
the first-order variables. He explains,
The values o f  the individual variables, Boolos says, are just the terms o f  the sequences. Why should we not 
say similai'ly, that 2T is a value o f a second-order variable if  it is ÀxR(V, x) for some R and V, that is if 
(3R){3 V)(\fx)(Xx = R{V, JC»? The difference between the treatment o f first- and second-order variables 
seems to lie just in the facts that in the second-order case functions are coded by predicates and that a 
function from individuals to «-argument second-order entities can be coded by an « + 1-argument second- 
order entity
So much like the competing intuitions over the ontological status of English plural forms, 
Boolos’s alternate semantics for MSOL fails to be decisive in determining the ontological 
commitments of his plural interpretation MSOL.
Linnebo, however, develops a fuither criticism of Boolos’s interpretation that does not 
rely on intuitions about the ontological commitments of English plural forms and that does look 
to illustrate a serious point of instability in Boolos’s position. He begins by reviewing the 
reasons Boolos claims that set theory needs second-order logic. First, tliere are claims about sets, 
such as
(6) There are some sets that are all and only the non-self membered sets, 
that look to be meaningful, and even true, but cannot be paraphrased in the usual set-theoretic 
way in first-order logic without introducing a Russell set and the accompanying paradox.
Second, there are results in set theory that are provable regardless of what set-theoretic predicate 
is substituted for some schematic predicate letter. Linnebo observes, for example, that whenever 
‘F ’ is a set-theoretic predicate, the union of the ordinal numbers satisfying ‘F ’ is well-ordered by 
the membership relation. To express this kind of result, Boolos sees a need for allowing
Parsons, “The Structuralist V iew  o f Mathematical Objects,” pp. 327.
Ibid., p. 328; Resnik, “Second-Order Logic Still Wild,” pp. 80-3 expresses similar worries, though less succinctly.
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quantification over predicate letters, and this can be accomplished by adding a theory of second- 
order logic to set theory. Finally, and Linnebo remarks, most importantly, Boolos thinks that 
second-order logic is required to fully express the intended meanings of the axioms of 
replacement and separation. Here, a problem arises for Boolos. On the standard imderstanding 
of second-order logic, the second-order variables require there to be entities for them to range 
over, usually in the form of either sets or classes. In order to bring out the difficulties these 
options pose for Boolos, Limiebo appeals to an argument advanced by Parsons to the effect that 
adding to set theory this apparently necessary theory of second-order logic always leads in a 
natural way to a universe of sets larger than the one with which we began.
The process begins by adding a weak theory of classes to ZFC. By a weak theory of 
classes is meant a theory of classes with a predicative class comprehension schema:
(7) (3F)(V x)(xG F=^)
where does not contain ‘F ’ free and its quantifiers are restricted to sets. The result is a 
conservative extension of ZFC known as Neumann-Bernays-Godel set theory (NBG). Parsons 
thinlcs that the addition of this weak theory of classes can be justified merely by considerations of 
our use of predication in language. However, this predicative theory does not allow for the 
expression of instances of replacement or separation that contain bound class variables. To gain 
the resources needed to express all instances of replacement and comprehension, including those 
that do contain bound class variables, we must add the full impredicative class comprehension 
schema,
(7^ ) (3F)(Vx)(xEF=(p)
where does not contain ‘F ’ free but its quantifiers are not restricted to sets; they may also 
range over classes. This yields Morse-Kelley set theory (MK), a set theory significantly stronger
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than NBG both in its logical strength and ontological commitments. MK’s increase in power 
though no longer leaves open the linguistic justification for quantification over class variables 
used in the expansion of ZFC to NBG. Instead, the impredicative class comprehension schema 
relies on the notion of an arbitrary subset of the domain which depends on the sorts of 
combinatorial intuitions contained in set theory itself, namely the notion of an arbitrary subset of 
the domain. Once we appeal to these kinds of combinatorial intuitions though—the kind of 
combinatorial intuitions that give rise to our understanding of the notion of set in the first 
place—Parsons explains, we have all the resources needed to treat the classes of MK themselves 
as sets so allowing us to increase the size of our original set-theoretic universe. Furthermore, this 
natural expansion of our original set theory can be repeated again and again resulting in larger 
and larger universes of sets. There is no natural stopping place.^ *^
What Limiebo finds surprising here, assuming Parsons is correct, is that “[i]t is 
impossible ever to quantify over absolutely all sets. For whenever a domain is specified for the 
first-order quantifiers of our set theory, we can carry out this thi'ee-step extension procedure, 
which will lead us to accept an even larger domain of sets.”^^  He summarizes the results of 
Parsons’s considerations in two claims—that of ontological proliferation and of inexhaustibility. 
Ontological proliferation claims there is more than one ontological category of set-like entities; 
there are also classes. And inexhaustibility claims the impossibility of every quantifying over 
absolutely all sets. Ontological proliferation occurs already in the first step as soon as we allow 
for the addition of the weak theory of classes, and inexhaustibility occurs only in the final step.^^
Charles Parsons, “Sets and Classes,” Noiis 8:1 (1974); pp. 1-12, especially pp. 5-11; see also Linnebo, “Plural 
Quantification Exposed,” pp. 81-3.
Linnebo, “Plural Quantification Exposed,” p. 83.
Ibid., p. 83.
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Linnebo began his account of Pai'son’s argument by stating three reasons that lead Boolos 
to recognize a need for the applicability of second-order logic to set theory. Boolos also thinks 
that set theory is a theory of all set-like entities and that it should be possible to quantify over 
absolutely all sets. He does not want to recognize set-like non-sets in the form of classes nor 
does he want to be forced by the threat of inconsistency to restrict second-order quantification to 
domains that themselves constitute sets. His plural interpretation of MSOL is supposed to allow 
him to satisfy both these aims simultaneously.
In light of this discussion, Linnebo is now in a place to consider the logicality of Boolos’s 
translation of MSOL into English plural forms. In the interest of perspicuity, he considers 
instead the translation of MSOL into the language PFO described above, but nothing of any 
particular philosophical significance hangs on this move. To this end, he first provides three 
criteria to serve as a partial analysis of what it is for a theory to count as pure logic. The first is 
ontological innocence, that PFO is not committed to any entities beyond those of the first-order 
domain; the second is universal applicability, that PFO can be applied to any universe of 
discourse regardless of subject matter (he notes that this would distinguish PFO from both set 
theory and second-order logic with the standard set-theoretic semantics. Both set theory and 
second-order logic with standard semantics are applicable to any universe of discourse so long as 
it is set-sized); and the third is cognitive primacy, that PFO presupposes no extra-logical 
knowledge in order to be understood. Lying behind all thi ee of these criteria is the idea that 
logic be unconditioned and presuppositionless.^^ I think that Boolos would not object to any of 
the criteria Linnebo proposes as something like these are just the sorts of features he praises in 
his plural interpretation and a lack of which he finds problematic for standard second-order logic.
Ibid., pp. 75-6.
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Linnebo is willing to grant that much of PFO can uncontroversially be counted as lying 
within the domain of logic, e.g. the tautologies, the non-emptiness axiom, and the natural 
deduction rules; where he sees a worry about logicality arising, if anywhere, is in the plural 
comprehension axioms. What he intends to show now is that the considerations that allow for 
the addition of a theory of plural quantification to set theory will be strong enough to yield 
iterated extensions for plural quantification of the sort Fai sons described in the case where we 
add the usual theory of second-order quantification to set theory."^  ^ Linnebo reminds us that 
because we want to add a theory of plural quantification in order to fully express the axioms of 
replacement and sepaiation, adopting the predicative plural comprehension axioms will not be 
enough. We will need to add the full impredicative plural comprehension axioms. This means 
that we caimot take the plural comprehension axioms 
(3v)^ 3  (3vv)(Vv)(v o c  vv = 
to determine pluralities only where (p contains no bound plural variables; we must also allow (p 
to contain bound plural variables. And this requires that we understand what these bound plural 
variables range over. Such understanding entails our understanding of the notion of a 
determinate range of arbitrary sub-pluralities of the original domain.^ ^
This notion of a determinate range of arbitrary sub-pluralities, Limiebo thinks is far from 
primitive and unanalyzable, so we will require an account of the kinds of considerations that give 
it content. As he explains,
The need for an account o f  this notion becomes particularly acute when we want to apply the plural 
comprehension axioms to the domain o f  higher set theory. For applied to this domain, the notion o f a 
determinate range o f  arbitrary sub-pluralities becomes extremely complicated and abstract. In fact, the 
notion o f an arbitrary sub^e/, which is closely related to but weaker than that o f  an arbitrary svb-plurality, is 
one o f  the most difficult and problematic concepts o f  all set theory.. . . For instance, i f  we understand the
Ibid., p. 75, 84. 
Ibid., p. 85.
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notion o f  an arbitrary subset, we understand all the concepts that are needed to express the Continuum 
Hypothesis. So it would be highly um easonable to regard this notion as unanalyzable.'*^
The considerations that Linnebo thinks do give content to this notion of a determinate range of
arbitrary sub-pluralities belong to combinatorics and set theory. Such considerations provide a
good understanding of the range of arbitrary sub-pluralities of small finite collections, the sorts
of collections our ordinary English talk of plurals is most often concerned with. He explains that
this understanding most likely comes from the operations that we can perform on such
collections, such as going through the items of the collection one at a time and applying a
process of acceptance or rejection to these items. Our understanding of an arbitrary sub-plurality
in the case of infinite collections is then gained by extrapolating from our understanding of these
small, finite cases."^ ^
Here, Linnebo finds a serious difficulty in Boolos’s claim the theory of plural
quantification is pure logic for our understanding of the notion of a determinate range of
arbitrary sub-pluralities appears to depend upon a prior understanding of combinatorics, and so
possibly also of set theory. Once these combinatorial ideas are in play, he argues, there is no
reason that we cannot collect pluralities into pluralities of a higher level, so pluralities of
pluralities, and then of course, we can continue to repeat this process obtaining higher and higher
levels of pluralities. The result of quantifying over pluralities parallels that of quantifying over
classes; the combinatory considerations used to justify impredicative plural comprehension lead
42 Ibid., p. 85. (Linnebo’s italics)
Ibid., pp. 85-6; this idea comes from Paul Beraays, “Platonism in Mathematics,” (1935) in Philosophy o f  
Mathematics: Selected Readings, 2"^  ed., Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam, eds. (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983) pp. 258-71. Parsons, in “Sets and Classes,” appeals to just this argument o f  Bernays in 
arguing, above, that our understanding o f  the notion o f  set itself depends upon combinatorial rather than linguistic 
considerations, pp. 9-10.
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us to theories of far greater strength than Hence, Linnebo concludes, adding PFO to set
theory yields even stronger extensions of set theory:
There is no conception o f  plural quantification that allows us to add impredicative PFO to ZFC set theoiy 
without naturally leading to further extensions as well. This means that if  Boolos wants to apply the theoiy 
of plural quantification to set theory, he will have to accept higher plm al quantification as well. This leads 
to a stratified theory o f  higher pluralities. When we develop this theory up to the level o f  some ordinal 
number a, the resulting theory will be isomorphic with impredicative simple type theory o f  order a, in the 
sense o f  being equi-interpretable with it.'*^
Boolos’s plural quantification suffers from the same phenomenon of inexhaustibility Parsons
describes in the case of quantification over classes. In neither case will it ever be possible to
quantify over all sets. Just as with classes we could “singularize” each new level of pliualities,
i.e., treat them as sets, but each time we carried out this process would yield a larger domain of
sets than the one we began with. Even if we did not singularize each new level of pluralities, he
explains, we would still end up with the phenomenon of inexhaustibility in that there will be no
way to quantify over all pluralities for there will always be higher levels. The reason for this in
both cases, that of classes and of pluralities, are the kinds of combinatory considerations that
give content to the notions of arbitrary sub-collection or sub-plurality used to justify the
respective impredicative comprehension schemata."^^
Linnebo’s primary aim here is not to show that Boolos’s pluial interpretation of MSOL
fails to deny the inexhaustibility phenomenon Parsons described for set theory where the second-
order variables ranged over classes. Rather his point is to show that the impredicative plural
comprehension axioms rely too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic ideas for us to
consider PFO a purely logical theory; PFO does not share the cognitive primacy of our ordinary
first-order quantification theory. That Boolos’s translation of MSOL into PFO is also subject to
inexhaustibility is just a manifestation of combinatorial ideas built into the theory of PFO. There
'*'* Linnebo, “Plural Quantification Exposed,” pp. 86. 
Ibid., p. 88.
Ibid., p. 88.
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is also a further conclusion concerning ontological innocence that Linnebo suggests can be 
drawn from these considerations—that the truth of the plural comprehension axioms “consists in 
much the same as does the truth of the corresponding set theoretic comprehension axioms. The 
present suggestion therefore implies that both sorts of comprehension axioms cany ontological 
commitments.” The proponents of PFO could attempt to deny this conjecture, but then they 
would be forced to recognize that two logically equivalent theories, the inexhaustible set theory 
with classes and the set theory with an inexhaustible hierarchy of plural quantification, could 
have, as Linnebo describes it, “radically different ontological commitments.” And this view, he 
thinks, could not help but raise the question of why the “notion of ontological commitment 
should be so important to the philosophy of mathematics in the first place.
III
In conclusion, I turn now to consider what Quine’s view of this dispute over the logical 
status of plural quantification might have been. Perhaps the best case Boolos makes for 
accepting a theory of plural logic as pure logic goes by way of his appeal to our ordinary 
understanding of English plural forms. After all, these claims do seem to be relatively 
straightforward and so well within the realm of what we may be willing to think of as self- 
evident, trivial, or obvious. Furthermore, to claim that simple sentences, such as “Some critics 
admire only one another” or “There are some Cheerios in the bowl” are committed to the 
powerful mathematical theory of sets looks highly counterintuitive, particularly when we start 
asking questions about whether we might be eating in addition to the Cheerios, a set of Cheerios.
Ibid., p. 89. (Linnebo’s italics) 
Ibid., p. 89.
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But Quine, I think, would not feel the force of such arguments in favor of plural 
quantification for remember why he urged the regimentation of ordinary language into the 
notation of first-order logic to begin with: it was to provide a reasonable standard forjudging the 
ontological commitments of a theory where ordinary language provided only unclarity and 
confusion. As he explains.
The common man’s ontology is vague and untidy in two ways. It talces in many purported objects that are 
vaguely or inadequately defined. But also, what is more significant, it is vague in its scope; we cannot even 
tell in general which o f  these vague things to ascribe to a man’s ontology at all, which things to count him 
as assummg. Should we regard grammar as decisive? Surely not; the nominalizing o f  verbs is often a mere 
stylistic variation. But where can we draw the line?
It is a wrong question; there is no line to draw. Bodies are assumed, yes; they are the things, first and 
foremost. Beyond them there is a succession o f  dwindling analogies....
My point is not that ordinary language is slipshod, slipshod though it be. We must recognize this grading 
off for what it is, and recognize that a fenced ontology is just not implicit in ordinary language. The idea o f  
a boundary between being and nonbeing is a philosophical idea, an idea o f technical science in a broad 
sense. Scientists and philosophers seek a comprehensive system o f the world, and one that is oriented to 
reference even more squarely and utterly than ordinary language. Ontological concern is not a correction 
o f  a lay thought and practice; it is foreign to the lay culture, though an outgrowth o f  it.'*^
Like much of science, ontology does not rely on our intuitions about natural language. Indeed,
this was much the reason for his talk of paraphrase in regimenting ordinary language into
canonical notation; the aim was not synonymy but rather the resolution of ambiguity. And such
is the aim of science generally. For Quine, science is an artificial construct for the organizing of
our experience. As Peter Hylton explains, commenting on the above quoted passage,
To those who complain that Quine’s ideas about ontology distort common sense, his answer is that any 
attempt at ontology is bound to do so, for common sense does not contain an answer to the ontological 
question, not even implicitly. To those who complain o f  artificiality, the answer is that the very question is 
a product o f  artifice, as are all advances in our knowledge.^®
Here there is considerable divergence between Quine and Boolos over the importance of 
the relationship between synonymy and logical analysis. Quine, as we have seen, sees a desire
W.V. Quine, “Things in Their Place in Theories,” in Theories and Things (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1981), p. 9.
Peter Hylton, “Quine o f  Reference and Ontology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Quine, Roger Gibson, ed. 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 128. Full consideration o f  Quine’s views on ontology, though 
very apt, would take me very far from the present concern o f  higher-order logic. Hylton’s article is an excellent 
overview o f this topic in Quine’s philosophy.
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for synonymy as wholly misplaced as a criterion of correct analysis; the ordered pair is his 
paradigm. In fact, he does not think we can make any rigorous sense out of the notion of 
synonymy at all. Boolos, in contrast, frequently appeals to synonymy as a standard for 
measuring the success of a correct logical analysis. “There are some Cheerios in the bowl” 
should not be analyzed in terms of set theory because Boolos thinlcs it absurd to suggest that in 
eating some Cheerios, we are also eating a set of Cheerios. For this reason, he thinks his plural 
interpretation of MSOL captures the meaning of the English sentence more accurately than does 
an analysis in set theory. He does not however provide an account of what counts as a 
synonymous analysis or why this should be our criterion for a correct analysis. Given his 
sympathy with Quine’s view that an extensional account of second-order logic is far more 
desirable that an intensional one, it is unlikely that Boolos would want to analyze synonymy in 
terms of intensional entities, i.e., meanings.
What Boolos is more likely to have in mind as a criterion of synonymy is something like 
sameness of truth conditions or logical equivalence, but it seems that we are under no obligation 
to say that either of these criteria captures what we ordinarily mean in saying that one sentence is 
synonymous with some other sentence. Both are artificial standards that may or may not help us 
to arrive at a definitive view of when a sentence is synonymous with another. Much of the 
appeal and force in Boolos’s suggestion that MSOL should be understood in terms of plural 
quantification is that the plural interpretation is more natural, more intuitive, for expressing 
ordinary English plural forms. However, once we admit that the criterion of synonymy 
employed in judging the accuracy of our analysis into MSOL is artificial, we have less reason to 
thinlc that synonymy in its more intuitive sense is of primary importance to such an analysis. We 
would then appear to be at liberty to employ other equally artificial devices in our analyses of
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ordinary English plural talk, for example, we may analyze it in terms of set theory. We may not 
be eating a set of Cheerios in addition to the Cheerios themselves, but so long as we only aim to 
paraphrase when we give a logical analysis, as Quine does, such oddities are of little concern.
By similar reasoning though, Quine himself cannot appeal to his own logical or linguistic 
intuitions as justifying his view that English plural forms are more properly pai'aphiased in terms 
of classes or sets. This haay seem to present a problem for him by making his claim that a 
sentence such as “Some critics admire only one another” commits one to the existence of classes 
now look arbitrary. Why should we understand talk of plurals as committing us to sets rather 
than to just a plurality of the objects that we refer to singularly? The beginning of a response 
would be the same as above. Quine’s aim is not synonymy but resolution of ambiguity. Of 
course, the problem remains in that his proposed paraphrase in terms of classes appears 
prejudiced in favor of his taking English plural forms to commit us to classes and so outstripping 
the bounds of what we may reasonably consider to be pure logic.
However, 1 do not think Quine’s parapln*ase in terms of classes is as arbitrary as all this in 
light of Linnebo’s considerations against taking the language of PFO to be pure logic. We saw 
there that the language of PFO relies on significant combinatorial, and perhaps even set- 
theoretic, ideas violating what Linnebo calls logic’s cognitive primacy. In addition, he argued 
that set theory with quantification over classes and set theory with plural quantification are 
logically equivalent theories. Quine’s move to paiaphi'ase English plural talk in terms of classes 
now seems far from arbitrary. Indeed, Limiebo’s view on this matter is, I think, very much in
A similar point could be made on the basis o f  B oolos’s acceptance o f tlie view that use o f  a plural form does not 
commit one to the existence o f  two or more objects; the domain need only be non-empty. ‘There are some 
Cheerios’ will be true then if  there is only one Cheerio. He admits that this is artificial but o f  no matter for the 
development o f  his logical theory. However, much o f the appeal in his theory o f  plural quantification is the natural 
way that it regiments English plural forms. Once we start introducing such artificialities (a technique that Quine 
fully endorses), there seems little reason to complain about the use o f  set theory to regiment our ordinary plural talk. 
See above p. 90.
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line with what would have been Quine’s own response had he ever given substantial 
consideration to Boolos’s plural interpretation of MSOL.
For consider again Quine’s discussion of Henkin’s branching quantifiers presented at the 
end of chapter I. There, Quine focused on the lack of a complete proof procedure for Henkin’s 
theory indicating that the addition of branching quantifiers went beyond ordinary quantification 
theory in assuming the power of extra-logical mathematics. A theory of branching quantifiers 
could not be viewed as obvious throughout, a criterion of logicality that parallels Linnebo’s 
condition of cognitive primacy. Quine concluded then that the theory of branching quantifiers 
was fairly represented by the extra-logical mathematical theory of functions instead. Indeed, by 
appeal to this earlier line of thought, Quine does not even need to count on the correctness of 
Parsons’s argument as Linnebo does.^^ For regardless of the success of Linnebo’s line of 
thought, Quine can again make his argument based on the completeness of ordinary 
quantification theory. No matter how intuitive Boolos’s translation of MSOL into ordinary 
plural talk may seem, this theory will still lack in completeness; there will still be some truths of 
MSOL that are not obvious or capable of being made so by a finite number of individually 
obvious steps.
It is not entirely clear how much importance Quine stakes in the objects of a theory in 
any case as he explains, “Structure is what matters to a theory, and not the choice of its 
objects.... I extend the doctrine to objects generally, for I see all objects as theoretical.”^^  We 
have aheady seen some hint of this view in our earliest discussions of Quine’s criticisms of 
second-order logic. Recall that he described both Frege and Russell in their extension of the 
theory of quantification to predicate letters as quantifying over attributes, yet he ultimately
Boolos indeed does reject much o f the Parsons’s argument with regard to sets; see his “Reply to Charles Parsons’ 
‘Sets and Classes’,” 'm Logic, Logic, and Logic, pp. 30-6.
W.V. Quine, “Things and Their Place in Theories,” p. 20.
I l l
describes their attempted reduction of mathematics to logic as a reduction to a theory of classes 
or sets, not to a theory of attributes. All that distinguishes classes from attributes is that classes, 
given their extensionality, have a readily available criterion of identity. In the interest of clarity 
then, Quine finds the mathematical content of Frege and Russell’s logic more accurately 
represented in terms of classes. Similarly, it seems that he would view a choice between class 
theory and plural logic for the most part as both logically and ontologically insignificant in light 
of Linnebo’s conclusion that PFO and simple type theory are logically equivalent theories. 
Quine’s preference for paraplirasing sentences such as Geach-Kaplan in terms of classes then is 
not so arbitrary for class theory makes explicit that our ordinary talk of plurals leads to a 
mathematical theory of far greater strength than ordinary predicate logic. Such was also what 
motivated him in his preference for representing Henkin’s branching quantifiers in terms of 
quantification over functions.
Remember though that he also concluded that his considerations over branching 
quantifiers proved nothing, and the same can be said for these considerations of Boolos’s theory 
of plural quantification. The response I have suggested here as Quine’s also proves nothing. 
Quine has merely offered some considerations for carving out a subclass of truths to which we 
might reasonably apply the label, honorific or not, of “logic”.
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